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ABSTRCT  
Pelle Darota Danabo 
Department of Philosophy, May, 2008  
University of Kansas 
 Since Western Liberal Democracy’s philosophical, cultural, and value 
foundations are radically different from that of Africa and based on post-disciplinary 
approach and review of the vast literature on theories and philosophies of democracy, 
the dissertation proposes and argues for Constitutional communitarianism and 
Africana democracy as alternative and complementary path towards democratization 
in Africa. When almost all its conditions are lacking in Africa, liberal democracy 
cannot easily be transferred and rooted nor should it be enforced as a weapon of 
political conditionality unless the call for democratization is a disguised cry for 
recolonization. Also, since liberal democracy is Newtonian politics at work with 
adversarial and inquisitorial opposition running rampant at its core, the future of 
humanity rests no less in transforming and reforming liberal democracy itself as in 
democratizing illiberal societies and tyrannical polities 
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Introduction 
 Africa of today is constitutive of what V.Y. Mudimbe calls an African, 
Muslim, and European or what A. Mazrui identifies as the indigenous, the Arabic, 
and the Western heritages. From the Eastern to the Western; from the Northern to the 
Southern corners, one can observe these confluences and imprints alive and thriving: 
the Indigenous, the Christian, the Islamic, and the Judaic; or, the African, the Arabic, 
the Semitic, and the European. From the Western African Ocean (the now Atlantic) to 
the Eastern African Ocean (the now Indian), Africans have a shared history and 
values that unites them more than those that divide them as some try to convince us. 
Africa is our common ancestral home, it is our common country. Whether one refers 
to the system of communal councils or earned leadership or the Palaver tradition or 
the Chieftainancy system or the traditional Shura System, one is dealing with a 
culture and tradition where the need and necessity for public deliberations and 
consented-consensus has always been its indigenous and constitutive hallmark.  
 Even more, there are historical facts and brutal truths that unite us as Africans 
than anything else: our shared and collective suffering and afflictions in the history of 
the modern world. We are the burden bearers of the organized crimes, the injustices, 
and the inhumanities of the modern world: We were/are deeply afflicted, wounded, 
abused and raped; we were subjugated and dehumanized together no matter what our 
localities, our regions, our ethnicities, religions, our resistances, and our gallantry; we 
were browbeaten as Africans; sold and shipped away as Africans; colonized and 
degraded as Africans; indebted and went through the hellish and unjust shock 
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therapies as Africans; infested and infected with all sorts of man made and natural 
diseases and disasters as Africans. In short, we were/are the targeted. Thus, our 
shared suffering and affliction is no less important than our shared culture and 
geography in uniting us as Africans from one corner to the other.   
 Philosophically, Africans are responsibility/duty-based than rights-based 
societies; politically, they work around consented-consensus than majoritarian 
decision making procedures. Whatever and how ever expressed, there are aspects of 
Africana-ubuntu in allover places in Africa, no matter where our emphasis focuses 
on. Africans value life, community, generosity, sharing, spiritual union, mercy, 
forgiving, personal as well as communal healing and moral restoration. In Africa, the 
restoration and mending of the health of communal ties is no less important than 
retribution and balancing of the scales. It is in the light these back grounds that the 
project of liberal democracy should be seen ad evaluated against.           
 Given these backgrounds, there are a number of reasons why one should take 
a second thought on the possibility and feasibility of liberal democracy in Africa. 
There are questionable assertions/claims about WLD, both in theory and in political 
practice: for instance, the entrenched and unresolved tension between the liberal and 
the democracy conjuncts in the liberal democracy pair; equating liberal democracy 
with democracy in general; infusing understanding of democracy with liberal ideas 
and assumptions; conceiving democratization as liberalization; and framing an 
argument for democracy in terms of an argument for liberal values such as 
unconstrained individual freedoms, rights, liberties, and the free market. Whether this 
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relation of identity is correct and universalizable is questionable, to begin with. There 
are different conceptions of democracy all of which have useful things to say about 
what a democratic polity should be and liberal democracy should be understood as 
one among possible models, the viability of each depending on the socioeconomic 
and cultural contexts to which it is to be applied. Since cultural/philosophical 
considerations should be constitutive part of the democracy project, the cultural 
particularity of liberal democracy should not be ignored also. Thus, thoughtless and 
arrogant attempts to universalize liberal democracy as the end goal of world history is 
both self defeating and imperialistic at its core. That is why the reflection on whether 
it is possible to transplant and integrate liberal democracy in Africa becomes an 
attractive philosophical investigation in of itself.  
 In the light of this, here are some reasons/reservations why an uncritical 
attempt to universalize liberal democracy may fail to bear fruit with detrimental 
consequences for both the imposer and the importer under illiberal socioeconomic, 
philosophical, and cultural circumstances.  
 To state some: WLD is founded on the conception of human nature that is 
either (only) expressive of the essence of Western humanity or else extremely 
exaggerated, even out rightly wrong. It is founded on a pessimistic, one-dimensional 
conception of humans as brutish and selfish beings; it is a rights-based democracy 
that gives precedence to individual rights with little or no appreciation of groups’ 
rights, group cohesion, and societal integration, since it is believed that group rights 
violate the equal rights and worth of persons. WLD privileges the atomistic, 
    3
possessive individual over/against the community, whereas humans are individuals 
embedded in social relations, values, and norms; it is founded on and evolved through 
all kinds of violence and wars, genocides, ethnocide… It is grounded on centuries old 
global structural and human violence: slavery, imperial conquests, colonialism, 
unmitigated resource wars and holdings. WLD is a child of racism or grew along with 
racism both at home and abroad. It is enigmatic as to how and why a project of 
Enlightenment meant to enshrine the noble ideas and ideals succeeded in sanctioning 
its antithesis on perceived and encountered “others.” WLD is based on distinctions 
like public/private, political/personal, and public/non-public reasons. Such 
distinctions are deeply rooted in the Enlightenment tradition. Similar in spirit is the 
distinction between the public and the nonpublic. As the argument from the public-
private distinction rejects government interference in decisions that are properly 
personal, so does the public/nonpublic distinction demand that laws, policies, and 
judicial procedures be articulated through discourse that is properly public. 
Furthermore, there is an undemocratic and elitist side to WLD, which stands in 
contradistinction to the definition of democracy as ‘rule of, by, and for the people’ 
and which is clearly manifested in the tension between the democracy and the liberal 
divide in the liberal democracy union. Given these features and limitations, Liberal 
democracy cannot be an option as a democratic future for Africa. Thus, the choice of 
democracy and a democratic path should not be mistaken for and equated necessarily 
with a liberal democratic course (of course, the importance of the knowledge of the 
liberal ways and its constitutional models to other countries is beyond dispute).  
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 The principle of unity in life, community society, individuality within 
community, humanness; the belief in responsibility for oneself and others - one’s 
friends and families, relatives, the community, and fellow human beings; generosity, 
friendship, truth, compassionate caring, etc. ought to be the value foundations of 
Africana democracy. Thus, deliberative and moderate communitarian view in which 
all humans are given equal regard and any concept of the individual ego is integrally 
tied to the community through the aforementioned values ought to serve as its 
founding values. The institutionalization of Africana democracy should be open to 
warrants and rationales that lie outside liberalism, one that would be open to language 
and concepts that are difficult to express through the language of rights, freedoms, 
equality, utility, and other familiar liberal concepts alone; Africana democracy ought 
to be grounded on a morally nourishing and spiritually re-centering democratic 
project. Since African societies are conflict ridden; democratic society is impossible 
without the development of common solidarity founded on sisterhood and 
brotherhood in our common humanity, ethnic and political tolerance, mutual 
understanding, economic development, and attentive justice. These demand the 
privileging of social-moral restoration and individual moral/spiritual transformation 
over retributive measures. Therefore, a system that would be flexible in its view of 
retribution, open to forms of accountability that might fall short of proportionate 
punishment is in order. Both the philosophy of ubuntu and the culture of mediation 
ought to inform this proposal. Africana democracy ought to refrain from demanding 
any strong version of the public-private distinction, viewing the restoration of the 
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victims of (political) violence, in all its dimensions, as a proper political end. Equally, 
it ought to renounce any strong reason for “public reason” and be open to importing 
into the political order concepts whose roots lay in comprehensive conceptions like 
religions. Africana democracy ought to be grounded on a holistic conception of the 
world that is pluralistic, responsive, bottom up or emergent, green, spiritual, 
dialogical, and that gets beyond the individual collective dichotomy. When the 
technologies of democracy are added to this world view transformation, Africana 
democracy would deliver exemplary democratic features. Since the destruction of 
political equality is inherent in economic inequality and since it is undemocratic for it 
deprives large numbers of citizens of equal political power, Africana democracy 
should envisage a society that is both economically just and democratically balanced.  
 Africana democracy should modernize and reenergize the indigenous 
democratic assets available in different parts of Africa. The community meetings, the 
palaver culture pervasive in Africa, the concept of earned leadership, consultation and 
the Shura, discussion, and consented consensus, mediation, etc. ought to be 
reinvigorated and made constitutive of Africana democratic norms. The indigenous 
concepts of politics as service to community and earned leadership are worthy of 
examining and instituting accordingly. The possibilities of leadership by rotation, 
executive power-sharing, the council of elders and scholars need not be discounted. 
Whether the conventional three branches of government are apt to Africa needs to be 
examined seriously and the Newtonian concept of “check and balances” based on 
opposition/confrontation should be given a serious second thought and it ought to be 
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seriously reconsidered or overhauled, for in Africa, opposition breeds conflict, 
permanent-looking instability, and war among competing interests. Furthermore, 
opposition politics is a post colonial investment in Africa and how costly it is, is 
terribly evident across our giant country. Lessons from successful liberal democracies 
shows that opposition politics is embedded in, tolerated, exercised, and has meaning 
in those societies that enjoy “cultural homogeneity,” to borrow from Mill. So, when 
the economies got moving and the technologies of democracy become common 
everywhere and, when these are added to the cultural values and assets all across 
Africa, the combination would enable a democratic culture and society on its own 
groundings.  
 In the light of this introduction, therefore, chapter one the dissertation presents 
a comprehensive reflection on democratic theory, both politically and philosophically 
with different ends in view in a nutshell. In chapters two and three, a comparative 
attempt is made to show the philosophical and cultural groundings of WLD against 
indigenous African values and traditions that would affect and shape the future and 
content of Africana democracy. Chapter four attempts to establish and argue for the 
feasibility and possibility of grounding Africana democracy on PanAfrica spatial and 
value foundations; whereas, chapter five presents the conditions, values, and 
principles underlying Africana democracy and shows why the liberal perspective, as 
world historical and profound as it is, cannot be aped and forced upon the African 
background.     
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CHAPTER I 
Reflection on the Philosophy, democratic theory and Democracy: what is it? 
 Political/social philosophy is not about conjuring up happier social 
circumstances by an act of free-wheeling imagination; rather, its major task should be 
to foresee what is yet to be accomplished in historical unfolding. The human quest for 
freedoms made possible the birth and development of democracy as an emancipatory 
project for human devolvement and empowerment. It is a freedom understood as the 
“positive” fulfillment of the potentialities of the human spirit. The question that 
follows would be, what would human life and society look like when everyone was 
genuinely free and genuinely equal?1 Any answer to this question must convincingly 
show that “only with liberty will democracy work but only with equality is there 
reason to believe that it ought to work.”2 Liberty, important as it is, should not trump 
democratic substantial equality.3 Social and political philosophy should help us see 
the problematic and ideologically perpetuated link between the “illusion of political 
                                                          
1 For a further elaboration of what is considered ‘genuinely free and genuinely equal’, 
see what Sidney Hook identifies as the content of “ethical democracy” see “The 
Philosophical Presuppositions of Democracy”, Ethics, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Apr., 1942) , 
pp. 278-79. It is wrong to base property right on both natural right and natural law 
while removing all the natural law constraints and limits from the regime of property 
rights.  
2 Cohen, C; Democracy, Athens GA: University of Georgia Press, 1971, p.274. A 
democratic thinking and practice that stops at political democracy or the equality of 
freedoms alone is vacuous because it fails to ground the emancipatory potential 
attached to democracy on other spheres of social existence that bear upon the 
effective exercise of equality of freedom itself.   
3 In this context, it is important to note Stephen Holmes’s warning about a common 
error in constitutional theory: “the view that the primary or even sole purpose of a 
constitution is to secure individual liberty by hamstringing the government and its 
agents.” Holmes, Stephens., Passions and Constraints: On the Theory of Liberal 
Democracy, Chicago: University of Chicago press, 1995, p.101.    
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freedom and the reality of moral slavery to economic passions and interests”4 also. In 
attempting to reflect on the questions of democracy, one gains a perspective on many 
related issues of political and social significance5 as well.  
I. Democracy: To begin with, if George Orwell is correct, “a word like 
democracy not only [has] … no agreed definition, but the attempt to make one is 
resisted from all sides. It is almost universally felt that when we call a country 
democracy we are praising it: consequently the defender of every kind of regime 
claims that it is a democracy and fears that they might have to stop using the word if 
it were tied down to any one meaning.”6 George Orwell is not alone. According to 
David Collier and Steven Levitsky, efforts to define democracy in terms of those 
necessary and sufficient for the existence of a democracy have not produced the 
intended uniformity of usage and high degree of inter-coder reliability, but rather led 
to the identification of hundreds of subtypes or what they term as “democracy with 
adjectives.”7 They reason that these findings confront scholars with a dilemma: on the 
one hand, there is an impulse to maximize analytic differentiation in order to capture 
the wide variety of democracies that have emerged across the globe; on the other, 
                                                          
4 Diggins, John P., The Lost Souls of American Politics: Virtue, Self-Interest and the 
foundations of Liberalism, Chicage: Chicago University Press, 1984, pp.20/217.  
5 For instance, some such issues include whether ‘American democracy is a 
totalitarian technological moral waste land’ and whether ‘liberal polities are 
disciplinary regimes grounded in discourses of power that legitimate elite 
dominance,’ reported as being claimed by Martin Heidegger and Michael Foucault 
respectively. See Rorty Richard; Achieving Our Country. Cambridge, MA, and 
London: Harvard University Press, 1998.  
6 Orwell, George., In Front of our Nose, 1945 - 1950: Collected Essays, Journalism 
and Letters of George Orwell, Vol.4, NY: Harper and Row, 1968, pp.132-3.   
7 Collier, David and Levitsky, Steven., “Democracy with adjectives: Conceptual 
Innovations in Comparative Research,” World Politics 49 (April 1997), pp.430-51.    
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there is a necessary concern for conceptual validity, that is, a need to avoid what 
Giovanni Sartori called “conceptual stretching” or “conceptual straining.” The 
application of a concept to cases for which it is inappropriate means “gains in 
extensional coverage” that “tend to be matched by losses in connotative precision.”8 
In the light of these methodological and epistemic hurdles, it is difficult to “tie down” 
the term “democracy”. Thus, I shall attempt to offer few conceptions of democracy 
along with some (even contestable) philosophical and normative claims and 
justifications about or related to it.  
Let me make the following points very clear from the outset, however: (1) 
much of the literature on democracy and democratization begins with liberal western 
democracy as a given, only taking side with and espousing either member of the 
liberal family. This is not surprising because democracy is viewed western both 
etymologically and practically. As to the debate on preferred models, few and strong 
exceptions come from research on East Asia and Latin America against the liberal 
tradition. These exceptions are no match to the intellectual force and political 
pressure from the long standing traditions, though. The picture gets a little murky and 
worrisome when it comes to Africa. For instance, scholars like Michael Bratton, 
Nicholas Van de Walle, Michael Chege, and Staffan I Lindberg, among others,9 
                                                          
8 Sartori, Giovanni., “Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics,” American 
Political Science Review 87 (December 1970), pp.103353, quote at 1035; Collier, 
David and Mahon, James E, Jr., “Conceptual ’stretching’ Revisited: Adapting 
categories in Comparative Analysis,” American Political Science Review 87 
(December 1993), pp.845-55.    
9See, Winder, Jennifer A. (ed.), Economic Change and Political Liberalization in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994; Bratton, 
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believe that concepts, models, and theories developed in the west by Westerners or 
based on the study of Western countries can and should be applied to politics in 
Africa, beliefs and recommendation premised on questionable assumption about 
Africa and Africans. (2) Much of the literature on democracy/democratization in 
“developing countries” and Africa in particular focuses on electoral democracy. Thus, 
democracy is defined in the minimal sense as ‘free and fair competitive elections 
under universal franchise for occupants of those posts where actual policy decisions 
are made.’ Democracy so understood is a procedure for filling of political offices 
through periodic elections.10 (3) Whether democracy is best understood as a 
‘dichotomous’ or a ‘gradualist project’is of importance also. Whereas dichotomist 
Scholars vigorously argue in favor of a rigid demarcation of what is democracy and 
what is not, since there are authoritarian actors with complete undemocratic 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Michael., “Deciphering Africa’s Divergent Transitions,” Political Science Quarterly 
112(1): 67-93, 1997; Bratton, Michael., “Second Elections in Africa,” Journal of 
Democracy 9(3): 51-66, 1998; Bratton, Michael and Nicholas van de Walle., 
Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997; Chege, Michael., “Between Africa’s 
Extremes,” In Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner (eds.), The Global Resurgence of 
Democracy, 2nd edition, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996; Van de 
Walle, Nicholas., African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-
1999; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; Van de Walle, Nicholas., 
“Elections without Democracy: Africa’s Range of Regimes,” Journal of Democracy 
12(2): 66-80, 2002; Lindberg, Staffan I., Democracy and elections in Africa, 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006; Lindberg, Staffan I., “The 
Democratic Quality of Multiparty Elections: Participation, Competition, and 
Legitimacy in Africa,” Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Studies 42(1): 
61-104, 2004a; Lindberg, Staffan I., “it is our time to ‘Chop’: Do Elections in Africa 
Feed Neopatrimonialism Rather than Counter-Act It?” Democratization 10(2): 122-
140, 2003. 
10For example, see Nathan, Andrew, “Chinese Democracy: The Lessons of Failure,” 
Journal of Contemporary China, no. 4 (1993), 3; Lindberg, Staffan I., Democracy 
and Elections in Africa; The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006.     
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credentials,11 others posit that democracy is a matter of continuum ranging from “full 
democracy” to “complete no democracy”.12 There are two variants to the degreeism 
argument: (1) categorization; for example, “limited democracy,”13 “restricted 
democracy,”14 “protected democracy,”15 “Tutelary democracy,”16 and “virtual 
democracy.”17 (2) Continuous indices.18 Added to these, (4) the literature on 
                                                          
11See, Collier and Adcock 1999; Lindberg, 2006: 22-27; Alvarez et al, “Classifying 
Political Regimes,” Studies in International Comparative Development 31 (2), 3-36, 
1996); Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, 
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, 11-12); Geddes, “What Do You Know 
about Democratization after Twenty Years?” Annual Review of Political Science 2: 
115-144, 1999); Linz, “Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes,” F. I. Greenstein and 
N. W. Polsby (eds.), Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 3, Reading, MA: Addison-
Wesley, 1975, 184-85; Cheibub et al, “What Makes Democracy Endure?” Journal of 
Democracy, 74 (1): 39-55, 1996; Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited, 
Chatham: Chatham House, 1987, p. 184.  
12See Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1971, 2, 8; Democracy and its Critics, New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1989, 316-317; Bollen and Jackman, “Democracy, Stability, and Dichotomies,” 
American Sociological Review 54: 1989, 612-621; Coppedge and Reinicke, 
“Measuring Polyarchy,” Studies in International Comparative Development 25 (1): 
51-73, 1990; Diamond, “Democracy in Latin America: Degrees, Illusions, and 
Directions for Consolidation,” in Tom J. Farer (ed.) Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively 
Defending Democracy in the Americas, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 
1996, p. 53.    
13See, Archer, Ronald P; “Part Strength and Weakness in Colombia’s Besieged 
Democracy,” in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully (eds.) Building Party 
Systems in Latin America, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995, p.166.    
14Waisman, Carlos H; “Argentina: Autarkic Industrialization and Illegitimacy,” In 
Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour M. Lipset (eds.), Democracy in 
Developing Countries: Latin America, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1989, p. 69.    
15Loveman, Brian; ‘Protected Democracies’ and Military Guardianship: Political 
Translation in Latin America, 1978-1993,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and 
World Affairs 36 (Summer): 108-111, 1994.   
16Prezworski, Adam; “Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflict,” in Jon 
Elster and Rune Slagstad (eds.), Constitutionalism and Democracy, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988, 60-61.   
17Joseph, Richard; “Democratization in Africa after 1989: Comparative and 
Theoretical Perspective,” Comparative Politics 29 (3): 1997, 367-368.  
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democratization in the 3rd world is flooded with variations on the theme of both 
types. Even more, these vast literatures come mainly from the disciplines of political 
science and sociology. The literatures on creation and consolidation of democracy are 
full of ideas and insightful case studies, but they have provided little or no theoretical 
generalizations about the circumstances that lead a society to become and remain 
democratic. So, although rich in its empirical content, it runs short of normative 
exploration and reflection.19 This is not to question Popper’s proposition that 
‘empirically falsifiable theories are evidence of robust scholarship;’20 rather, 
following Merkel, it is to indicate that normative questions in general are not 
addressed.21 So, many scholars in this area seem to follow Sklar’s suggestion that, 
since “political science is not moral philosophy, it doesn’t not prescribe the ends of 
political action;” “it is concerned with finding adequate means for achieving 
politically defined ends”22    
                                                                                                                                                                     
18Continious Indices are used, for instance, by Bollen, Kenneth; “Political Democracy 
and the Timing of Development,” American Sociological Review 44 (4): 527-587, 
1979;  Coppedge, and Reinicke (1990); Freedom House; Annual Survey of Freedom 
Country Scores, 1972-73 to 2003-2004; Rating on political rights and civil liberties, 
2004; Marshal, Monty G., and Keith Jaggers; Polity IV Project: Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transition, 1800-1999, 2001;Hadenius, Axel; Democracy and 
Development, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992; Vanhanen, Tatu; 
Prospects of Democracy: A Study of 172 Countries, London: Routledge, 1997.  
19As an exception, the late Claude Ake engages in a normative discussion as a point 
of departure for his empirical work. See, Ake, Claude; The feasibility of Democracy 
in Africa, Dakar, Senegal: CODRESIA, 2000.   
20Popper, Karl; The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London: Routledge, 1953/1999, 57 
ff.  
21Merkel, “The Consolidation of Post-Autocratic Democracies: A Multi-Level 
Model,” Democratization 5 (3): 33-67, 1998. 
22Sklar, “Towards a Theory of Developmental Democracy,” in Adrian Leftwich (ed.) 
Democracy and Development, Cambridge, England: Polity Press, (1996, p. 26.    
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 Etymologically, the word “democracy” consists of two Greek words: “demos” 
(the people”) and “Kratein” (“to rule”), thus meaning “people rule.” President A. 
Lincoln’s peroration in his Gettysburg address, “The Government of the people, by 
the People, for the people” is taken as synonymous to democracy also. And John 
Jay’s maxim cannot be ignored: “The people who own the country ought to govern 
it.”23 Characteristic of this definition is its indeterminacy and laxity. To begin with, in 
all cases who the people are and by what criteria24 remain indeterminate. Then there 
are other open ended issues: Does this mean it is “a form of government” as the vast 
body of literature on equality of freedom or political democracy suggests?25 Does it 
                                                          
23 Hofstadter, Richard., “The Founding Fathers: An Age of Realism,” in Robert H. 
Horwitz (ed.), The Moral Foundations of the American Republic, 3rd ed., 
Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1986, p.73. Had democracy meant the 
alienation and reification of the people in power from those who elected them to 
represent and govern them, Jay’s maxim could have gone to heart of democracy in 
practice. It has some attraction, for democracy seems hijacked and prevails but in 
name. Hasn’t what we have been taught to come to believe as democracy and 
freedom has become in reality an ingenuous and invisible form of economic 
dictatorship? Isn’t democracy, therefore, “an ingenious and invisible form of 
economic dictatorship? Or, did Marx have Jay in mind when he commented that 
‘Capitalist democracy is nothing other than the institutionalization of class inequality 
and the exploitation of unpaid labor’?  
24 If “democracy means rule by the people,” then “in modern times the people has 
come to mean two things,” writes Mann. “The first is what the Greeks meant by their 
word demos. This means that ordinary people, the masses of the population. So 
democracy is rule by the ordinary people, the masses. But in our civilization, the 
people also mean “nation” or another Greek term, ethnos, an ethnic group - a people 
that that shares a common cultur and sense of heritage, distinct from other peoples. 
But if the people is to rule in its nation state, and if the people is defined in ethnic 
terms, then its ethnic unity may outweigh the kind of citizen diversity that is central to 
democracy. If such a people is to rule, what is to happen to those of different 
ethnicity?” The answer looks simple: “democratically but tyrannically.” Mann, 
Michael; The dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing, Cambridge 
University Press, NY, 2005, p. 3.         
25 political democracy espouses a political arrangement in which an elite minority 
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mean “form of life” as Whitman-Dewey-Hook argue?26 Is it a political/social 
revolution,27 or is it coterminous with electoral democracy or democracy by election 
as some would like to argue? But, among others, Jane Mansbridge’s conception of 
democracy goes far beyond the symbolic gestures in elections. She reminds us that 
                                                                                                                                                                     
rules and insidious socioeconomic inequalities are allowed to pervade the society 
sanctioned by formal political freedoms and electoral rituals. This notion of 
democracy privileges civil and political rights over social and economic rights and 
focuses on how to reproduce the system of inequalities (Gills, Rocamora, and Wilson) 
through ‘ideological state apparatuses,’ ‘administrative and governmental state 
power,’ ‘social control,’ and ‘bio-political-power or biopower,’ to borrow from 
Foucault, Hardt and Negri. See, Gills, Barry J., Joel Rocamora, and Richard Wilson., 
Low Intensity  Democracy: Political Power in the New World Order, London: Pluto, 
1993; Foucault, M., “Governmentality,” in J.D Faubion, Michael Foucault: Power, 
Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, Vol. 3, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 2002a; 
Hardtm M. and Negri, A., Empire, London, Harvard University Press, 2000. For more 
literature on political democracy, See Note 13 below. 
26 See, Whitman, Walt; “Democratic Vistas” (1871), in Walt Whitman: Poetry and 
Prose, ed. Justin Kaplan, New York: Literary Classics of the United States, 
1982/1996, p.972; Dewey, John; “creative Democracy - The Task Before Us” (1939), 
in Dewey, The Political Writings, ed. Debra Morris and Ian Shapiro, Indianapolis, IN, 
and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994, p.244; Liberalism and Social 
Action, reprinted in Michael Levy, ed., Political Thought in America, Chicago: 
Dorsey Press, 1988,412; Hook, Sidney; “The Philosophical Presuppositions of 
Democracy,” Ethics, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Apr., 1942), pp. 275-296.  
27  See, Robinson, James A; “Economic Development and Democracy,” Annual 
Review of Poli Sci, 2006, 9: 503. Interesting about this article is that it treats 
democracy as species of social/political revolution, rearticulating the Leninist theory 
of Revolution. To this effect, it outlines certain conditions for a democracy to occur 
or to be created. He writes, “…democracy will be created when (a) there is a threat of 
collective action; (b) concessions are insufficiently credible; and (c) the cost of 
repression is high relative to the cost (for the elite) of democracy.” Ibid, p. 508. 
According a model he uses, “democratizations are more likely to arise in a situation 
of economic or political crisis that is consistent with the observation (Therborn 1977) 
that democratizations often follow wars and consistent with the evidence of Haggard 
& Kaufman (1995), Przeworski et al, (2000), and Acemoglu et al (2005b).  Of course, 
his model, as he himself admits, “encompasses Dhal’s theory of democratization, 
which is that incumbents will democratize when either (a) the cost of tolerating the 
opposition falls, so that they are prepared to enfranchise them, or (b) the costs of 
suppression become too high” (1971: pp. 15-16).  
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democracy is also a way of deliberating and reaching consensus among people 
sharing similar interests, which she refers to as “unitary democracy that is 
distinguished from the mere process of elections or “adversary democracy”. 
Democracy, then, is a process of selecting leaders and deciding policies when 
citizens’ interests conflict as well as deliberating and arriving at a consensus.”28
 If A. Arblaster is correct, the expression ‘people rule’ “says nothing about 
elections or representation in itself; it does not indicate who comprise “the people”… 
Nevertheless, it is necessarily the central element in any conception of democracy.”29 
Therefore, the idea of rule by the people ought to be adhered to if a particular 
interpretation is to warrant calling itself an interpretation of democracy, although 
there is no or little continuity between the historical ideal and modern representative 
democracy. Indeed, if Claude Ake is correct, the ‘substitution of government by the 
consent of the people for government by the people; the replacement of the 
sovereignty of the people by the sovereignty of the law, and the replacement of 
popular sovereignty (both Athenian and Jacobean in content) by a regime of 
individual property rights’30 is a huge departure from democracy as “people’s rule” of 
the ancients. There are competing conceptions of democracy that can be filtered out 
from the plethora of views from the market place of ideas on democracy: the 
representational or political conception of democracy (political) and the way of life 
                                                          
28See Mansbridge, Jane., Beyond Adversary Democracy, Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1980.   
29 Arblaster, A; Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 9.   
30 For a highly condensed critical insight, see Ake, Claude., The Feasibility of 
Democracy in Africa (in particular, chapter one), … 
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conceptions of democracy (philosophical).  
  I (a): A Political Conception of Democracy (PCD): From the standpoint of 
political democracy, democracy denotes a specific answer to the question of the 
source of the legitimate exercise of power through legal and political institutions. 
However, statements about “the people” are gratuitous to allow the concept of 
democracy to be applied in numerous settings where in fact, through complex 
symbolic, ideological, legal and military means, forced or voluntary, representation 
and usurpation31 have narrowed down the range of those who actually exercise the 
power. In classical Greek, women, slaves of both sexes, children and youths, resident 
migrants and citizens exiled abroad, could not participate in the process.32 Plato and 
Aristotle criticized the dhmokratia of their time not for being insufficiently 
democratic bur for being over-democratic, for becoming a mob rule (‘oclokrateia). 
Aristotle maintains that “democracy exists where the sovereign authority is composed 
of the poorer classes and not of the owners of property.”33
                                                          
31 For instance, what in essence was the federalist argument: representation was 
expedient in the conditions of a large republic or a large republic was desirable 
because it necessitates representation? Was it concession to expediency/complexity 
that necessitated the representative democracy argument or a philosophical alteration 
in meaning and principle that made possible such a detrimental shift? Was intended to 
preclude the possibility of popular power/sovereignty? Professor Ake offers an 
affirmative response to the last line and argues that a ‘large republic was desirable 
because it necessitated representation.’ See Ake, Ibid.  
32 See Glover, T.R., Democracy in the Ancient World, New York, Cooper Square 
Publishers, 1966/1927; Finley, M.I., Democracy ancient and modern, London : 
Hogarth, 1985; Raaflaub, Kurt, A. et al., Origins of democracy in ancient Greece, 
Berkeley : University of California Press, c2007. In what sense should one understand 
whether today’s invisible billions and alienated and dumbed down wage slaves are 
said to rule?  
33 Aristotle., The Politics, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981, p.115.   
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 A representational or Political conception of democracy as spearheaded by the 
procedural excessively dominates the literature on democracy. Accordingly, ‘at a 
minimum’, writes Freedom House Annual Survey, ‘a democracy is a political system 
in which the people choose their authoritative leaders freely from among competing 
groups and individuals who were not designated by the government;’ Encyclopedia 
Americana  defines Democracy as a ‘form of government in which the major 
decisions of government -- or the direction of policy behind these decisions -- rests 
directly or indirectly on the freely given consent of the majority of the adults 
governed.’ Tutu Vanhanen defines it as, “… a political system in which different 
groups are legally entitled to compete for power and in which institutional power 
holders are elected by the people and are responsible to the people.”34    
  Joseph Schumpeter defines democracy as “that institutional arrangement for 
arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by 
means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”35 In a manner that looks a 
prescription of how things should be, Schumpeter reminds that “Democracy does not 
mean and cannot mean that the people actually rule in any obvious sense of the 
terms’, people’ and rule’. Democracy mean only that the people have the opportunity 
of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them”36 Accordingly, the people are 
meant to be ruled, meant to be led. In short, ‘the people cannot rule’. Schumpeter 
                                                          
34 Vanhanen, Tutu., Prospects of democracy: a Study of 172 Countries, London: 
Routledge, 1997, p. 31. The book summarizes definitions of democracy of the last 40 
years on p. 28-31.   
35 Schumpeter, J., Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1947/1978, p. 269. 
36 Ibid., pp.284-5.  
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offers this elitist view of democracy as a substitute for the alleged inadequacy of the 
alternative classic theory that he defines as “that institutional arrangement for arriving 
at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the public itself 
decide issues through the elections of individuals who are to assemble in order to 
carry out its will.” Schumpeter asserts that there is no such thing as “a uniquely 
determined common good that all people could agree on or be made to agree on by 
the force of rational argument.” The justification for this claim is (a) “that to two 
different individuals and groups the common good is bound to mean different things” 
and (b) that even if a definite common good proved acceptable to all “this would not 
imply equally definite answers to individual issues.” He concludes from these that the 
concept of the will of the people vanishes.37 By debunking classical theory 
Schumpeter transforms democratic theory into a theory about the competition 
between elites thereby severing the alleged classical link between democracy and the 
conditions and possibilities of self ruling and popular sovereignty. Accordingly, 
democracy as a procedural system means that the people at regular intervals “have the 
opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them.38
 Samuel P. Huntington writes that his study “defines a twentieth century 
political system as democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision-
makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates 
clearly compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to 
                                                          
37 bid., 250-52.  
38 Ibid., p.285.  
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vote.”39 Anticipating criticism of his definition, Huntington argues that, while such a 
government may be “inefficient, corrupt, short-sighted, irresponsible, dominated by 
special interest groups, and incapable of adopting policies demanded by the public 
good,” he goes on to claim that such “qualities may make such governments 
undesirable but they do not make them undemocratic.”40 He goes on to argue that 
democracy is just one public virtue and not the only one. For him, the relationship of 
democracy to other public virtues and vices “can only be understood if democracy is 
clearly distinguished from other characteristics of political systems.”41   
  Robert Dahl is one of the first to introduce the word 'polyarchy' to describe 
modern democracies. He operationalized the Schumpeter-Huntington definition of 
democracy in his book Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. According to him, 
democracy is an inclusive participatory regime based on party alterations or 
contestation. It “provides opportunities for (1) effective participation, (2) equality in 
voting, (3) gaining enlightened understanding, (4) exercising final control by the 
people over the agenda, and (5) inclusion of adults.”42 The political institutional 
procedures that are necessary to pursue these goals are:  43
• Elected officials: Control over government decisions about policy is 
constitutionally vested in elected officials;  
                                                          
39 Huntington, Samuel P., The Third Wave, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1971, p.7.   
40 Ibid., p. 10.   
41 Ibid.   
42 Dhal, Robert. A., Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, New haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1971, pp.6-7.    
43 Dahl, R. A., Democracy and its Critics, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989, 
pp: 221-222.   
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• Free and fair elections: Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly 
conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon;  
• Inclusive suffrage: Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election 
of officials;  
• Right to run for office: Practically all adults have the right to run for elective 
offices…;  
• Freedom of expression: Citizens have a right to express themselves without 
the danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly defined, 
including criticism of officials, the government, the regime, the 
socioeconomic order, and the prevailing ideology;  
• Alternative information: Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources 
of information. Moreover, alternative sources of information exist and are 
protected by laws; and,  
• Associational autonomy: To achieve their various rights, including those listed 
above, citizens also have a right to form relatively independent associations or 
organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups. ...all 
the institutions of polyarchy are necessary to the highest feasible attainment of 
the democratic process in the government of a country.  
But, are issues of pressure and interest groups salient features and issues of 
democracy? Is “government by the people” compatible with joining groups that strive 
to influence policy or to realize interests? If democracy means that the people are 
sovereign, then government must be controlled by the citizens, not by interest groups 
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or invisible power elites.  
 If the above presentation is correct, it now is possible to identify the basic 
tenets of (political) democracy, features that are realized in modern democratic 
societies. According T. Christiano, “adult persons participate and vote in the process 
of electing representatives to the legislative assembly; such persons may run for 
election to public office;” in elections, “a number of political parties compete for 
political power by advocating alternative visions of the society;” that “the political 
campaigns of candidates and parties consist in large part in discussion and argument 
over the worth of these opposing views, and everyone is permitted to have a say in 
this process; and the society tolerates and often encourages vigorous debate on all 
issues of public interest.”44 Accordingly, democracy could be defined in the minimal 
sense as ‘free and fair competitive elections under universal franchise for occupants 
of those posts where actual policy decisions are made. Democracy so understood is a 
procedure for filling of political offices through periodic, free, and fair elections.45 In 
short, the political conception of democracy entails institutional mechanisms, usually 
elections that allow the people to choose their leaders among competing elites for 
office holding; competition by prospective leaders for public support and, restraint by 
those elected to rule.  
 If A. Sen is correct, democracy is not simply majority rule, because it involves 
                                                          
44 (Christiano, Thomas, The Rule of Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic 
Theory, Boulder: Westview, 1996, p. 3; also, see “WHY DEMOCRACY IS 
WRONG,” http://web.inter.nl.net/users/Paul.Treanor/democracy.html     
45 see for, example, Nathan, Andrew., “Chinese Democracy: The Lessons of Failure,” 
Journal of Contemporary China, no. 4 (1993), 3; Lindberg, Staffan I., Democracy 
and Elections in Africa; The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006.   
    22
certain constraints on the will of the majority. He argues, “one must not identify 
democracy, with majority rule, since democracy has complex demands” that 
“certainly include voting and respect for election results, but it also requires the 
protection of liberties and freedoms, respect for legal entitlements, and the 
guaranteeing of free discussion and uncensored distribution and exchange of ideas.” 
Even elections can be deeply defective if they occur without the different sides 
getting an adequate opportunity to present their respective cases, or without the 
electorate enjoying the freedom to obtain and consider the views of the competing 
protagonists. “Democracy is a demanding system, and not just a mechanical condition 
(like majority rule) taken in isolation.”46  These constraints are nothing other than 
rights, understood here as “trumps” against majoritarian encroachments, to borrow 
from Ronald Dworkin;47 or, because “individuals have rights, and there are things no 
person or group may do to them (without violating their rights)”.48  
 With the exception of “electoral democracy” running rampant in the polities 
of the Global South, the representational conception of democracy is grounded on and 
historically antedated by philosophical or Constitutional liberalism, ranging from 
many centuries to a number of decades such as The Magna Carta (1215), The 
Fundamental Orders of Connecticut (1638/9?), The American Constitution (1787), 
                                                          
46 Sen, Amartya, “Democracy as a Universal Value;” Journal of Democracy 10.3 
(1999) p. 3-17; http://muse.jhu.edu/demo/jod/10.3sen.html   
47 See, Dworkin, Ronald; Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1977.  
48 Nozick, Robert; Anarchy, State, and Utopia; New York: Free Press, 1974, p. IX.   
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and the Helsinki Final Act (1975),49 among others.  I think, it is to these traditions 
that Rawls points when he writes, “In a democratic society there is a tradition of 
democratic thought, the content of which is at least familiar and intelligible to the 
educated common sense of citizens generally. Society's main institutions, and their 
accepted forms of interpretation, are seen as a fund of implicitly shared ideas and 
principles 50(italics, mine). A very short review of this tradition is outlined here, since 
in some of the later chapters it is treated at length.    
 Western democracy is a political and institutional expression of a certain 
established way of life, both its liberal ways of life and its philosophically entrenched 
liberal values. Be it procedural, substantive, deliberative, etc., the underlying 
preferred ways of living and its values express themselves in western democracy as 
its form. If Fareed Zakaria is correct,51 western democracy differentiates the electoral 
[political] conditions (which I would like to refer to as its democracy condition) from 
the liberal [which I prefer to call its  philosophical condition] or constitutional 
liberalism. The first is all about free and fair election resulting in a majority system of 
governance. It is a procedure for electing governments based on principles of 
contestation and participation. Whereas, the later is about inalienable rights and basic 
                                                          




respectively.   
50 Rawls, John., PL, 14   
51 Zakaria, Fareed., “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy: The Next Wave,” Foreign 
Affairs, Nov. 1997; or see at 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19971101faessay3809/fareed-zakaria/the-rise-of-
illiberal-democracy.html   
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liberties with emphasis on property rights in particular, freedom of speech and 
conscience, and the rule of law. Thus, to borrow from Zakaria, “Constitutional 
liberalism has led to democracy, but democracy does not seem to bring constitutional 
liberalism.”52   
 At the heart of Liberalism are individual rights and their autonomy. This is the 
most succinct conception one might think of.53 Locke in his Treatises declared that 
people had natural rights which no government had the authority to abridge.54 In his 
Letters concerning Toleration and others, he made powerful arguments against the 
Church of England. He argues that political authority must be politically generated, 
and not based on extra-political authority for which transcendental claims are made. 
He also says that in conducting politics we cannot rely on private or incommunicable 
knowledge, but must try to persuade each other.55 Immanuel Kant was convinced that 
the moral law was intrinsic, which means that there are things that are intrinsically 
                                                          
52 Ibid.   
53 I don’t think an indisputable and comprehensive definition of liberalism exists or 
would exist, a limitation already acknowledged by many liberal philosophers and 
thinkers themselves. For instance, see, Cranston, Maurice., “Liberalism,” in Edwards, 
Paul (ed.) The Encyclopedia of philosophy Vol. 4, 1967, p. 461; Dworkin, Ronald., 
“Liberalism,“ in Dworkin, R., A matter of Principle, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1985a, p.183; Flathman, Richard E., Toward a Liberalism, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1989, p.2; Raz, Joseph., The Morality of Freedom, Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1986, p.1; Ryan, Alan., “Liberalism,” in Goodin, Robert E. and Philip 
Pettit (eds.), A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell, 
1993, p. 291; Waldron, Jeremy., “Theoretical Foundations Liberalism,” Philosophical 
Quarterly 37, 1987, p. 127.    
54  See, Locke, John., Two Treatises of Government, Laslett, Peter (ed.), Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988. Its contemporary critics and adherent mind 
soldiers are many in numbers and in their convictions.  
55See, Locke, J., A Third Letter For Toleration, J.H. Tully (ed.), Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1983.    
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right and there things which are intrinsically wrong. Thus his formulation: “Act upon 
a maxim that can also hold as a universal law.”56 This imperative was intended to 
provide a guide for determining which actions are in accord with the moral law, and 
which are contrary. For Kant, it was the actor’s intention that was determinative of 
the moral content of the action. This has an implication for political 
philosophy/theory: he is convinced of the centrality of morality in politics and his 
conception of autonomy (individual) is one of the lasting contributions in this respect. 
Kantian autonomy expresses the condition in which individuals are free from external 
determination such as coercion, force, or various forms of threat and manipulation 
and their choices are controlled by their reason, which is conformity to 
universalizable principles. He believed that all human beings are equal in their 
capacity for autonomy, that moral responsibility and human dignity both rest on this 
capacity, and that morality requires respect for everyone capable of autonomy. Also, 
Kant separated liberalism from democracy, by arguing that a government may be 
“republican” in content, but monarchical in form. He argued further that the project 
“of establishing a perfect civil constitution is subordinate to the problem of a law 
governed external relationship with other states, and cannot be solved unless the latter 
is also solved.”57 This suggests that sovereignty is relative to morality and, therefore, 
                                                          
56 Kant Immanuel., The Metaphysics of Morals, Gregor, Mary (Trans.) Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 51.  
57 Kant, Immanuel., “Idea for a universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose” 
(1784), Kant, I., Political writings, 2nd ed. Nisbet, H. B. (Trans.), Reiss, Hans (ed.), 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p.47.      
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governments should be held to the highest moral standards.58  
 One of liberalism’s geniuses was J.S. Mill. His On Liberty is best remembered 
for its assertion that even if the entire planet save one person were of one opinion and 
only one person holding to a contrary view, that person had every right to that view. 
Where Locke had championed the principle of tolerance in the religious sphere, J.S. 
Mill extended that principle to other spheres, being limited only by the harm 
principle.59 This principle, that one should never willfully do harm to another lies at 
the heart of the consequentialist position and receives explicit formulation in 
Utilitarianism, where he writes, “The moral rules which forbid mankind to hurt one 
another … are more vital to human wellbeing than any maxims, however important, 
which only point the best mode of managing some departments of human affairs.”60 
Where Mill respectfully disagrees with Kantian formulations, J. Bentham did more 
brusquely. According to Bentham, there are no such things as natural rights [hence no 
such thing as Natural Law - no such thongs as rights anterior to the establishment of 
government [as Locke had argued] - no such thing as natural rights opposed to, in 
contradistinction to, legal [rights]…. Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and 
                                                          
58 Is it in this spirit that Peter Singer urged a rethinking of the notion of state 
sovereignty, proposing that it be deconstructed and dispersed vertically? 
Characterizing the traditional concept of state sovereignty, as “no longer feasible,” 
Pogge argued instead, that citizens’ “allegiance and loyalty should be widely 
dispersed over these units: neighborhoods, town, county, province, state, region, and 
world at large.” See, Pogge, Thomas W., “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,” in 
Brown, Chris., Political restructuring in Europe: Ethical Perspectives, New York: 
Routledge, 1994, pp.3-4.        
59 Capaldi, Nicholas., “John Stuart Mill’s defense of Liberal Culture,” In Eisenach, 
Eldon J. (ed.), Mill and the Moral Character of Liberalism, University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998, p.85.   
60 Quoted in Ibid., p. 97.   
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imperceptible rights, rhetorical nonsense - nonsense upon stilts.”61  
 J. Rawls, Jurgen Habermas, and Hannah Arendt are among 20th century’s 
towering figures in the liberal philosophical tradition, just to mention a few. J. Rawls’ 
contribution included his defense of Kant’s moral philosophy and his own theory of 
Justice as Fairness (JAF), which he defined as consisting of two principles. He is 
known for his use of a fictive “original position”, which amounts to stating a 
hypothetical situation of bargaining in which people should design the world in which 
they wished to live without knowing their particularities and conditions in life. In 
such a situation, he argued, any reasonable person would seek to protect the weak and 
the sick, and therefore, this provided a reasonable standard to which societies should 
aspire. He is also known for his use of the term “reasonable” in contrast to the 
“rational“, and his argument for a pluralism of political ideas, among others. As he 
wrote in his Political Liberalism, “Holding a political conception as true, and for that 
reason alone the one suitable basis of public reason, is exclusive, even sectarian, and 
so likely to foster political division.”62 Rawls viewed public morality as reflecting the 
consensus of reasonable minds aspiring to a reasonable solution. This is different 
from Hobbes’ iron-fisted sovereign, who was empowered to dictate what was right 
and wrong. But it is also distinct from Kant’s conviction that there are some truths 
which are objective and which can be discerned by human reason alone. Although 
                                                          
61 Bentham, J., Anarchical Fallacies: Being an Examination of the Declaration of 
Rights Issued during the French Revolution (1823) (Bentham’s italics), extracted in 
Singer, Peter (ed.), Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, p.271,  
62 Rawls, John., Political Liberalism, New York, Columbia University Press, 
1993/1996, p.129.   
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original, his view of public reason has drawn critiques from many corners.63 
Habermas is the most influential living Kantian today. In The Inclusion of the other,64 
Habermas revives the Kantian project of organizing the international community on 
the basis of public reason and offers that project as a suitable basis for reducing the 
incidence of regional conflicts. Whereas, Arendt’s writings were (at least in part) 
stimulated by her personal outrage on anti-Semitism, totalitarianism, and imperialism, 
viewing the last of the three as a consequence of the first two.65 So, what Rawls, 
Habermas and Arendt have added to the liberal thinking may be summed by the triad 
of justice as fairness, a plea for public reason, and compassion.       
  In short, liberalism is a general philosophical conception about individual 
rights and autonomy, pluralism, freedoms, equality, justice, the rule of law, tolerance, 
respect for the harm principle, and the neutrality of the state in matters of religion.66 
                                                          
63See, Habermas, Jürgen , "Reconciliation Through the Public Use of 
Reason:  Remarks on John Rawls's Political Liberalism" in The Journal of Philosophy 
92:3 (March 1995), pp. 109-131; Walzer, Michael,  Interpretation and Social 
Criticism, Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard University Press, 1987;Okin, Susan Moller., 
"Political Liberalism, Justice, and Gender" in Ethics 105:1 (October 1994) pp. 23-43; 
"Justice and Gender" in Philosophy and Public Affairs 16: 1, 42-72 at 49; Justice, 
Gender and the Family, New York:  Basic Books, 1989 (chapter 5); Okin, Susan 
Moller, Carole Pateman, The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism and 
Political Theory, Stanford:  Stanford University Press, 1989, pp. 26-28, 58-70, 118-
140. MacKinnon, Catharine., Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, Cambridge, 
Mass., Harvard University Press, 1989, pp 45-47.  
64Habermas, Jurgen., The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, Cronin, 
Ciaran and Pablo De Greif (eds.), Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998   
65 Arendt, Hannah., The Origins of Totalitarianism, new ed., New York: Harcourt, 
Brace, & World, 1966.    
66Or is liberalism itself is an ideology?  If even so, however, in liberal democracies 
many of the main elements of liberalism tend to be generally accepted, even, in 
practice, by apparent critics of liberalism. For instance, within Rawlsian liberalism 
the argument is made that justice as fairness would be accepted on contractarian 
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Given the passionate debate surrounding liberalism (by its critics and ardent 
supporters), my contention is that rights and autonomy take precedence over other 
cherished liberal values, respectively. So, western democracy cannot be seen apart 
from these ‘traditions of democratic thought,’ a philosophical/intellectual ‘fund of 
implicitly shared ideas and principles,’ to borrow from Rawls.  
            I (b): A Philosophical conception of democracy (PCD)67: The “tradition of 
democratic thought” referred above points at a neglected side in the interpretation and 
conception of democracy also. An established tradition in thought (a form of life) 
cannot be seen apart from an established way of life lived by a people (a way of life). 
Thus, democracy is a form of life grounded on particular values and ways of that 
life.68 The statement, “democracy is a form of government” itself is rooted in and 
expresses a way of life valued and lived by a people; or better, democracy is not 
merely a set of institutions of governance as it is an expression of a larger way of life 
and the essence of the democratic way of life is more than the economic and 
governmental arrangements. As a form of life it serves to organize human 
relationships embodying complexes of moral and political ideals. So, the material and 
philosophical ideal a people aspire to and choose to pursue underlies and shapes its 
                                                                                                                                                                     
grounds by all reasonable citizens, and that it (and by implications, Rawls's two 
principles of justice) is therefore not a controversial political ideology.   
67In addition to the works cited under this section, a great article by Thomas A. Spragens, Jr. is 
extremely resourceful for the argument in the following few paragraphs. See, Spragens, Thomas 
A., Jr., POPULIST PERFECTIONISM: THE OTHER AMERICAN LIBERALISM, 
Social Philosophy & Policy Foundation, USA, 2007.     
68 This interpretation comes mainly from Whitman-Dewey. Given the vastness the 
literature surrounding the first option on the interpretation of democracy, the “way of 
life…” interpretation seems pushed to the periphery intellectual concern and 
philosophical neglect.     
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democratic course. For example, both the liberal way of life and constitutional 
liberalism as a philosophical ideal/doctrine preceded and determined the course and 
history of Western democracy; more still, whether one takes the Lockean path or 
Jacobian course or any combination of these to forge a democratic life-mode tells 
much about the predominance of a particular brand of liberal democracy in practice.69 
In short, democracy is a form of life that expresses a dominant and established way of 
living.  
 The political conception of democracy does not exhaust the hopes and 
purposes of democracy and democratic society. That is, aren’t there deeper, larger, 
and higher purposes of democracy also, i.e., doesn’t democracy entail some 
teleological conception of human fulfillment as well as the possibility of what 
Benjamin Barber calls “an aristocracy of everyone,”70 since for most of human 
                                                          
69 For instance, whether individual property rights and its protections and/or whether 
the general will comes before particular interest is detrimental in shaping the 
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inalienable in ones personal and national-societal life (for further inquiry, see Sabine 
George H; “The Two Democratic Traditions,” The Philosophical Review, Vol. 61, 
No.4 (Oct., 1952), pp. 451-474; LeGarrec, Gilles, “Moral sentiments, democracy and 
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Africa World Press, Inc., NJ/Asmara, 2007).   
70 See, Barber, Benjamin; An Aristocracy of Everyone, New York: Oxford University 
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history, the common folk were not able or entitled fully to pursue lives of their own, 
build their lives around purposes of their own determination, so much as they were 
extremely dominated functionaries in the service of the purposes of their masters and 
rulers? Doesn’t the ultimate aspiration of democracy and a democratic society extend 
to matters of the mind, heart, and their spirituality also? Wouldn’t the ultimate glory 
of democracy and a democratic society be its success in fashioning social institutions 
incarnating a “way life” conducive to the flourishing of the human capacities and the 
realization of an “emancipated social humanity”?71 Doesn’t democracy entail what 
J.S. Mill, by quoting W. V. Humboldt, calls “the absolute and essential importance of 
human development in its richest diversity”?72 because human beings are “not 
indistinguishably alike” but instead possess many different talents and capabilities in 
all their multifarious splendor, their “life becomes rich, diversified, and animated,” 
and they “become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation”73 as Mill argues. 
Any unpacking of the implication and logic of democracy and democratization that 
doesn’t show these, among others, falls below what the ideal entails.   
 A democratic and free society must be judged not only by the per capita 
income and the standards of living its citizens enjoy; no less important is the moral 
maturity, the spiritual strength, and the intellectual prowess it citizens. Other wise, as 
the say goes in indigenous Africa, ‘a house built on sand cannot help crumbling 
before our eyes.’ Accordingly, we can argue that democracy (with an moral and 
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72 Mill, S.J; On Liberty, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1859/1956, p.71. 
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spiritual contents) entails the fulfillment of higher human needs of citizens such as 
their spiritual, intellectual, and moral development without which human freedom and 
free society remain mechanical and formal, which, left on its own is undesirable and 
stifling. A society of dumbed-down “free looking” subjects is antithetical to the ideals 
of freedom and free society. An uninformed and uncritical mass of people is subject 
to elite manipulation and its politically engineered corruptions. Thus, the liberating 
potential of democracy cannot be seen apart from its liberating and flourishing 
potentials. Unfortunately (or deliberately?) the-this side of democracy’s potency and 
intellectual lineage has been given little or no attention compared to sacred status 
assigned to procedural norms and ideals.  
 Largely ignored and neglected by the predominantly representative conception 
of democracy, Walt Whitman’s “Democratic Vistas” offers an argument for a deeper 
and higher purposes of American democracy and the project of democratization in 
general. Whitman tells us that America should be understood as a “grand experiment 
of development;”74 it represents the leading edge in a vast cosmic process of spiritual 
unfolding animated by “divine purpose.” In the context of this cosmic drama, 
Whitman suggests, American democracy should be seen as only in the earliest stages 
of its own development. Its “fruition” and “the only large and satisfactory 
justification of it … resides altogether in the future.”75 This ultimate “fruition” of 
democracy will consist in its attainment of purposes that are not simply material and 
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ed. Justin Kaplan, New York: Literary Classics of the United States, 1996, p.972.     
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institutional but moral and spiritual in nature. He writes, “The world evidently 
supposes…that the States are merely to achieve the equal franchise, and elective 
government - to inaugurate the respectability of labor, and become a nation of 
practical operatives, law-abiding, orderly and well off. Yes, those are indeed parts of 
the task of America; but they not only do not exhaust the progressive conception, but 
rather arise, teeming with it, as the medium of deep, higher progress….For so long as 
the spirit is not changed, any change of appearance is of no avail.”76 Indeed, spiritual 
and moral decadence and starvation is no less cancerous and viral than material 
deprivation and economic poverty. Both are equally undignifying and belittling.    
 So, what then are these deeper and higher purposes of democracy? In view to 
answer this question, Whitman refers us to two famous documents. The first of these 
is A. Lincoln’s Gettysburg speech. Whitman write, “Few probably are the minds, 
even in these Republican States that fully comprehend the aptness of that phrase, 
‘THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE, BY THE PEOPLE, FOR THE PEOPLE,’ 
which we inherit from the lips of Abraham Lincoln; a formula whose verbal shape is 
homely wit, but whose scope includes both the totality and all minutiae of the 
lesson.”77 The second document is “John Stuart Mill’s essay On Liberty,” which is 
the place to look to understand “the distinctive points contrasting modern European 
and American political life with the old Asiatic cultus,” and which explains “the 
lessons of variety and freedom” with which Mill “begins his speculation.”78 What an 
                                                          
76 Ibid; 1001-2.    
77 Ibid; p.967.  
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imaginative leap on Whitman’s Part, for he wedded Lincoln’s insistence upon 
democracy as governance of, by, and for the people with Mill’s insistence that the 
criterion for judging political regimes is their contribution to the mental and moral 
development of its people.79 Whitman is proposing one of the most fundamental 
purposes of democracy and democratic government; he tells us about “the mission of 
government, henceforth, in civilized lands” and about “the ulterior object of political 
and all other government.” These ultimate purposes are the deeper meaning of the 
phrase “by the people” and “for the people” respectively. So it is no exaggeration to 
claim that the two axial social aspirations that Habermas identified, “Self-
determination and self-realization,”80 have their root in Whitman’s 1871 “Democratic 
Vistas.”   
 According to Whitman, since democracy’s insistence on government “by the 
people” is grounded in its moral conviction that “each individual person’ is entitled to 
be “a complete subject of freedom,” “the mission of government in civilized lands is 
not repression alone, and not authority alone, not even of law…but…to train 
communities through all their grades, beginning with individuals and ending there 
again, to rule themselves.”81 On the other hand, democracy’s insistence on 
government “for the people” translates into a dedication to the development or 
                                                          
79 see John Stuart Mill, Considerations on the Representative Government, Chicago: 
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80 Habermas, Jurgen; “Popular Sovereignty as Procedure,” a lecture given in 
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actualization of their personal capacities - the very “grand leading principle” of “the 
absolute and essential importance of human development” in the Von Humboldt 
quotation Mill uses as his epigram to On Liberty. This is what Whitman refers as “the 
grand experiment of development - whose end, perhaps requiring several generations, 
may be the forming of a full-grown man or woman.”82 So, argues Whitman, “the 
ulterior object of political and all other government” is “not merely to rule, to repress 
disorder, etc., but to develop, to open up to cultivation, to encourage the possibilities 
of all beneficent and …of that aspiration for independence, and the pride and self 
respect latent in all characters.”83    
 Although it will be incorrect to style Dewey as simply a later version of Walt 
Whitman, there are enough similarities between the two, however. Like Whitman and 
Mill, Dewey understands democracy not merely as a set of institutions of governance 
but as a larger way of life.84 According to Dewey, we must “get rid of the habit of 
thinking of democracy as something institutional and external and to acquire the habit 
of treating it as a way of personal life.”85 Like Whitman, Dewey sees the democratic 
society as very much a work in progress, with its realization something to hope for in 
the future rather than as a fait accompli. They both share a common conviction that 
democratization is ultimately a self realization of the human spirit in history; both 
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depict the essence of the democratic way of life as cultural and spiritual rather than as 
merely economic and governmental.86    
 John Dewey, in Liberalism and Social Action, argues that the “social control 
of economic forces” is necessary in the context of advanced industrial societies, but it 
is a necessity not in order to change the social goals traditionally associated with 
liberalism but rather to achieve them. These “enduring values,” he writes, “are liberty, 
the development of the inherent capacity of individuals made possible through liberty, 
and the central role of free intelligence in inquiry, discussion, and expression.”87 The 
first two of these “enduring values” are Habermas’s self-rule and self-realization, the 
“ulterior” purpose of democracy Whitman cited in his own rendering of what 
government “by the people” and “for the people” meant. And Dewey’s endorsement 
of the third of these values resembles the argument of the second chapter of Mill’s On 
Liberty, which Whitman cited as an inspiration for his “Democratic Vistas.” 
 Do Whitman and Dewey privilege individual freedom over social justice? If 
one follows the line of reasoning by Rorty the answer is yes, for he claims that they 
“substituted social justice for individual freedom….”88 This claim may be correct just 
in the sense that Whitman and Dewey thought that the promise of democracy was that 
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all should and could be free - that all the members of a fully developed democratic 
society should be “full-grown” men and women, as Whitman put it. However, for that 
to happen, the distribution of material resources in the society had to permit it - had to 
be less unequal than in previous forms of society, where the serfs, plebes, or 
commoners essentially served more as fodder for the lives and their betters than as 
“separate and complete subjects for freedom.”89 Thus, a demand for “social justice” 
is indeed an important part of their vision of a more democratic future. The point that 
remains to be reflected upon is whether there is any difference between Whitman-
Dewey (W-D) and other rights-based social justice theorists with regard to the content 
and status of social justice.  
 What is the principal goal of democratization and why democracy? What 
difference, if any, is there between, say, the Rawlsian project and W&D version? 
John Rawls rejects the kind of reasoning found in W&D. For one, the conception of 
social justice in the W&D tradition was unnecessarily vague and inadequately 
demanding. Instead of settling for the rather general and indeterminate conception of 
social justice found in this older tradition such as “decent wages and working 
conditions and the end of racial prejudice” as referred to by Rorty, one can ascertain 
much more precise standards for social justice, argues Rawls. By taking the moral 
intuitions at the foundation of contemporary liberal democratic societies as one’s 
axiom and working out their implications for distributive principles, one can produce 
a “moral geometry” whose conclusion will provide a determinate conception of social 
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justice. When one performs this rational choice thought experiment, moreover, one 
can say with confidence that the demands of social justice are highly egalitarian – that 
what justice demands is that our constitutional provisions and social policies operate 
so as to maximize the absolute welfare of the least well-off members of society. 
Returning to the earlier, more indeterminate, and less demanding account of social 
justice found in people like W&D, therefore, would constitute, in Rawls’s view, a 
kind of moral backsliding. 
 His (Rawls’s) second basic objection to the W-D tradition is the central 
difficulty he seeks to surmount in his political liberalism.90 The problem Rawls seeks 
to solve with his account of “political liberalism,” he would argue, is one that afflicts 
and ultimately morally invalidates the W-D version [and other related theories] of 
democratic hopes. The difficulty Rawls sees as common to such theories is this: if the 
highest goal of a society is to be “self-realization,” the society must de facto endorse a 
particular conception of the human good. We can orient our social enterprise around 
“mental and moral improvement” (Mill) or “the forming of a full-grown man and 
woman” (Whitman) only if we have and enforce a single determinate model of 
human perfection. In a morally and religiously pluralistic society, however, where 
citizens affirm multiple divergent conceptions of the good life, this must have the 
consequence of violating the norms of reciprocity at the heart of the equal protection 
of the laws and must also have the consequences of constraining the freedom of those 
who do not accept the officially endorsed account of human self-realization. In short, 
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all W-D type accounts of democratic purposes are discriminatory and oppressive. To 
retain the liberal bona fides, therefore, Rawls would insist, one must reject such 
accounts; limit the common purposes and the moral foundations of liberal society to 
the principles of justice upon which one can agree despite the variance in one’s 
conception of human fulfillment, and simply leave it to each of us freely to pursue 
happiness as one sees fit after one gets the distribution of social resources properly 
taken care of.  
 Despite their apparent difficulty and weightiness, these objections are not hard 
to respond to. To the complaint that their (W-D’s) conception of social justice is too 
indeterminate and insufficiently stringent by egalitarian standards, there are these 
rejoinders: first, any fully determinate account of absolute fairness in the distribution 
of social and economic resources is delusionary, because it is unrealistic and/or 
untenable; besides, justice is not a subspecies of fairness to resources. Second, the 
moral assumptions necessary to sustain a rigorously egalitarian conception of social 
justice, such as the one offered by Rawls91 are at odds with the considered judgments 
of many, if not most, of the members of contemporary democratic practices and 
principles. Given the moral tragedies, complexities, and uncertainties endemic to the 
human condition, that condition admits of no “moral geometry” when it comes to 
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least advantaged.”  
    40
arriving at principles of distributive justice. The various members of all societies, 
including democratic ones, differ in their natural talents, in the contingent 
circumstances in which life places them, in their levels of productive effort, in their 
willingness to delay or sacrifice gratification on behalf of future benefits or common 
purposes, and in the conceptions of the human good that shape their actions.
 Upon examination, it turns that the Rawlsian identification of distributive 
justice with the greatest degree of equality consistent with collective rationality 
depends upon the assumption that nothing people do can provide them any moral 
warrant for claiming they have “earned” anything. This denial of all pre-institutional 
deserts, in turn, seems to depend on a “naturalistic” account of behavior incompatible 
with the standard notion of moral responsibility. And the abandonment of that notion 
serves not only, as Galston observes, to “sever [liberalism’s] bonds with the moral 
convictions of the working class,” but also to “flatly reject the conception of the 
person underlying our beliefs and practice.92 So, the stringency of the content of their 
conception of social justice, which Rawlsian liberals cite as a sign of the superiority 
of their account to earlier liberal accounts, turns out instead to be a moral step 
backward in other respects.  
 Still more, Rawls’s charge that the political tradition represented by W-D is 
oppressive and violates liberal principles of legitimacy also seems unconvincing. This 
claim is based on the distinction Rawls seeks to make between “political” and 
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“comprehensive” models of liberalism. “Political” conceptions “remain on the 
surface” philosophically, resting only on moral assumptions regarding fair terms of 
social cooperation and eschewing any commitment to particular conceptions of the 
human good. “Comprehensive” conceptions, in contrast, endorse and depend upon 
some complete and particular account of the human good. Thus, the argument runs, 
“political” models of liberalism can deal even- handedly with all the citizens in 
pluralistic democratic societies, who govern their lives by different and incompatible 
moral and religious beliefs about the good life. In contrast, “comprehensive” models 
of liberalism cannot treat all citizens in such a pluralistic society with equal respect 
and will not allow them all the same freedom to pursue happiness as they see fit. The 
defect in this argument is that the contrast it rests on may make sense in abstract 
philosophical space but breaks down when applied to the real world. The fact is that 
no liberal theory – probably no public philosophy of any sort – can fulfill the 
neutrality condition of the abstract ideal-typical model of a “political” conception. 
None can be so teleologically teetotal. All are at least “minimally perfectionist,” 
(objective nature perfectionist ideal as opposed to human nature perfectionist ideal) as 
Galston puts it, and that certainly includes Rawls’s own favored model.93  
 Certainly, in any case, the norms of self-realization found in Whitman’s and 
Dewey’s democratic idealism do not answer to Rawls’s characterization. WD 
envision all the members of the democratic societies they hope for as displaying all 
the capacities people require in order to be able to be full subjects of freedom and as 
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exhibiting those civic virtues necessary for democratic self-rule to succeed. After that, 
the members of society are turned loose – free and able to pursue their own versions 
of personal fulfillment. Whitman, for example, hopes for “the copious production of 
perfect characters among the people,” but that refers to the democratic civic virtues. 
Whitman certainly does not envision or celebrate the kind of “narrow theory of life” 
that Mill attributes to Calvinism or the alleged “Chinese ideal of making all people 
alike” that Mill specifically denounces in the very text Whitman cites as the 
inspiration for his “Democratic Vistas.”94 Instead, although all citizens in the 
democratic future Whitman envision will share a “democratic character,” the lives 
they lead will be “rich, luxuriant, and varied;”95 he anticipates and exults in the 
prospect of the open-ended and unimaginable individual diversity that Mill celebrates 
as “noble and beautiful.”96 So, to construe this kind of democratic idealism as 
oppressive and inappropriate for a pluralistic society could seem plausible only to 
someone in the grip of a profoundly misleading kind of academic scholasticism.  
 To reiterate, therefore, Social Justice, for W-D, did not mean the greatest 
possible degree of social and economic equality. They presumed that some 
differences in social standing and economic achievement would be part the 
democratic future, even that such differences were “pre-institutionally” justifiable. As 
Rorty writes, “by ‘justice’ they all meant pretty much the same thing - decent wages 
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and working conditions, and the end of racial prejudice.”97 For W-D, social justice 
did not mean maximum feasible equality of what Rawls calls the “social primary 
goods” of power and opportunities, income and wealth, and social status. It meant the 
achievement of civic equality and an end to economic exploitation, political 
oppression, and social exclusion. As for its status among political goods goes, both 
considered it as an essential virtue of social institutions. But they would not have 
considered it to be the “first virtue of social institutions,” if that were to mean its 
attainment was the highest purpose of democracy. That pride of place goes instead to 
the good of self-actualization along with the self rule necessary for it. “What does 
civilization itself rest upon?” Whitman asks rhetorically; “What object has it, with the 
religions, arts, schools, etc., but rich, luxuriant, personalism? To that, all bends, and it 
is because towards such result democracy alone…breaks up the limitless fallows of 
humankind, and plants the seed, and gives fair play, that its claims now precede the 
rest.”98    
 Although cursory and cryptic, these accounts of the social hopes and moral 
preoccupations of Whitman and Dewey point towards another important (even, 
neglected?) liberal tradition in addition to those more commonly and dominantly 
accorded pride of place99 within attempts to characterize the philosophical genius of 
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American democratic politics. The ultimate political aspirations of W-D are that all 
democratic citizens should become enabled to rule themselves and to actualize their 
talents and capabilities to the fullest possible extent. Philosophically speaking, the 
inspiration for this orientation comes not so much from Locke’s account of legitimate 
government, or from rights-based philosophies more generally, or from the dominant 
themes of civic republicanism. Instead, it takes its bearings more from 19th Century 
philosophies of historical progress such as those of J.S Mill and G.W. Hegel. And it 
takes as its ultimate social aspiration not the protection of life, liberty, and estate or 
the creation of civic communities modeled on Sparta, Florence, or Geneva; instead, it 
sees it as the mission of democratic politics to achieve freedom for everyone - to 
create a form of social life in which everyone becomes, to cite Whitman once again, 
“a separate and complete subject for freedom” and a “full-grown man and woman.”   
 But, does this all mean that Whitman and Dewey can be disinterred fully 
intact and unmodified? Values may endure, but times do change; so, it would be 
unreasonable to expect that they need no revision to be serviceable in the altered 
circumstances. Accordingly, for instance, the residual influence of a Hegelian 
philosophy of history deserves critical scrutiny, since the dismaying evidence of the 
past century and many attempts in democratization undermine any belief in 
democracy as the inexorable wave of history. Moreover, conscious awareness is 
required with regard to the belief in providential guarantees and authorization, for it 
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can be dangerous leading to self-arrogating claims of “manifest destiny” and 
exceptionalism. Divine intervention is not essential to the democratic faith of 
Whitman or Dewey about the possibility of creating a society where all people can 
run their own lives, participate in communal self-governance, and have the 
opportunity and resources to pursue happiness. Still more, we should also understand 
that creating a stable, free, self-governing society is a difficult, even a fragile 
achievement. Although this recognition may be discouraging, it need not be crippling 
to the democratic hopes championed by Whitman and Dewey. What it all means is 
that, those dedicated to the promise of democracy may have to give up the comforting 
delusion of guaranteed triumph; but the enduring values and goals that Whitman and 
Dewey champion can be fully grounded in and logically derived from the basic moral 
premises and legitimacy claims of democracy. Civil rights, civil liberties, and popular 
sovereignty retain their moral purchase for all those who retain Hegel’s hope that all 
shall be free even after we abandon his assurance that the self-actualizing rationality 
of history will bring this freedom about. 
  II: Economy and Democracy. As already indicated, the vast literature 
on democratization comes mainly from the disciplines of political science, 
economics, and sociology. Although  full of ideas and insightful case studies, they 
provided little or no theoretical generalizations about the circumstances that lead a 
society to become and remain democratic; it also runs short of normative exploration 
on the matter. One possible reason is that many scholars of, say; comparative politics 
reject the possibility of the scientific study of politics. For example, Linz and 
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Stepan100 argued that “the historicity of macro-political processes precludes the 
highly abstract generalizing of ahistorical social scientific models…applicable to all 
past times and any future cases, and O’Donnell and Schmitter101 note, “We did not 
have at the beginning, nor do we have at the end of this lengthy collective endeavour, 
a ‘theory’ to test or to apply to the case studies and thematic essays in these 
volumes.” Thus, many scholars in this area seem to follow Sklar’s suggestion that, 
since “political science is not moral philosophy, it does not prescribe the ends of 
political action;” “it is concerned with finding adequate means for achieving 
politically defined ends.”102  
 So, in the face of the shortage of normatively rich literature in the ocean of 
abundant works to guide our research at present, it would be rational to begin by 
reiterating an already existing sound claim at work: the development and 
institutionalization of western democracy cannot be seen apart from the history and 
development of Laissez-fare capitalism,  (as “economic rationality,” “market 
rationality” and as “societal disposition of power”),103 (possessive) individualism, 
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liberal conception of rights and freedoms, the birth of both the metaphysical and the 
religious self,104 along with its secular and rational course and its quest for the Nation 
state. Unlike the fictitiously rampant conditionality driven electoral democracies105 of 
the Global South, Western democracy is preceded and accompanied by powerful 
combinations of material and intellectual/spiritual capitals at work and; capitalist 
modernization and its constitutive elements are the materials and intellectual/spiritual 
bedrocks in which western democracy is deeply embedded. So, from the history of 
the modern west, we draw correlation between its democratic traditions and the 
existence of an empowering/enabling material security and existential security, 
among some others.  
 The literature on modernization and developmental state theory confirm this 
claim also. Both theories accept the link between capitalist development and 
democracy and that economic development precedes successful democratization. 
Indeed, Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens have observed that in some analyses 
“democracy and capitalism are often seen as virtually identical.”106 Modernization 
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theory views change in societies as immanent and focuses on specific domestic causal 
sequences linking economic development to democratization, a view and focus that 
come under attack by scholars such Cumings, O’Donnell, Schmitter, among others.107 
Developmental state literature unmasks the role played by the government and 
political systems in the economy. The literature contends that the active pursuit of 
economic policies has been an integral element of high growth economies as 
observed in East Asia, for instance.108 As Shelly writes, “In addition to highlighting 
the adoption of strategic trade and industrial policies, authors of developmental state 
literature point out that this model of development contain certain undemocratic 
features such as political domination by one party combined with elements of 
authoritarian rule. Political legitimacy in this context derives from economic success, 
not from the ‘consent of the people.’”109 While Johnson regards the economic miracle 
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of East Asia as a trade-off between “greater economic performance but less political 
participation,”110 Wade calls it “governed market theory” after the developmental 
state and development economics’ models.111 Wade argues that the corporatist and 
authoritarian political arrangements in east Asia have provided the basis for market 
guidance.112 But, although both theories accept that economic development precedes 
democracy, developmental state literature does not necessarily accept the need for 
democracy.113 Clearly, democracy is “no precondition for a capitalist market 
economy;”114 nor is the relation between capitalism and democracy necessarily a one 
way casual link effect. Nor is capitalist development destined to wind up in 
democracy automatically under all circumstances. Certainly, however, where there is 
no material/economic grounding, democracy remains an ideological fiction intended 
for subversive and destructive ends, an opium both for the masses and its alleged 
defenders.      
 Given these sets of claims, I argue that freedom of choice and the emphasis on 
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democratic values emerge and evolve as increasingly favorable material and 
existential conditions of life allow the desire for autonomy to take priority. As Marx 
reminded, the rise of industrial capitalism has in a fundamental sense changed the 
way in which the individual was perceived in relation to her or his self-identity, labor, 
and community as a whole115 and, from the historical point of view economic 
activities have contributed enormously to the ascendancy of liberal values and 
practices such as self-sufficiency and self ownership.116 Whether richer countries are 
more democratic is another question; countries tend to become more democratic and 
more open when they are getting well off in each successive transition in their 
economic wellbeing. Other things equal, “socioeconomic development tends to make 
people more secular and more tolerant” thereby making possible emphasis on and 
development of democratic values. “With socioeconomic development, people 
become materially more secure, intellectually more autonomous, and socially more 
independent”117 to make and live their choices. Next to disasters and wars, no other 
phenomenon affects people’s daily lives more massively and brings changes that are 
more immediately felt than socioeconomic development;118 it changes a society’s 
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basis of material subsistence and its social fabric,119 thereby making possible and 
desirable the transition from subsistence-centered demands to freedom of choice 
centered demands. Material and economic constraints belittle the human spirit 
thereby limiting its activities to fight for daily survival. Socioeconomic development 
directly affects people’s sense of existential security, determining whether physical 
survival is uncertain or can be taken for granted. And “throughout history, survival 
has been precarious and human choice has been restricted for most people”120 thereby 
conditioning one’s entire life strategy to be shaped by the Hobbesian norm of brutish 
struggle to stay barely alive. So, socioeconomic development is crucial because it 
impacts powerfully on people’s existential conditions and their chances of survival.   
 There are different ways in which socioeconomic development “diminishes 
objective constraints on human autonomy, creativity, and choices.”121 Reduction of 
despicable misery and poverty diminishes material constraints on human choice and 
nourishes a sense of existential security; “it tends to increase people’s levels of 
education and give them greater access to information from various sources, 
including the mass media;”122 and “access to knowledge empower people by 
enhancing their cognitive development.”123 In short, “socioeconomic development 
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diminishes cognitive and informational constraints on human choices thereby fueling 
their sense of intellectual development;” Still more, “it increases specialization, social 
complexity, and diversifications of human interactions.”124 This has liberating 
consequences: it frees people from ascriptive communal ties and closed social circles, 
bringing them to interact with others on a bargaining basis, making possible a shift 
from “mechanical solidarity” to “organic solidarity”125 and from “community” to 
“association”.126  
According to Simmel, “there is an individualizing and liberating effect when 
people begin to develop ties that bridge social circles.”127 Thus, “diversification of 
human interaction frees people from prefixed social roles and social ties, making 
them autonomous in defining their social roles themselves and in shaping their social 
ties to other people;”128 or as U. Beck puts it, there is a shift from “communities of 
necessity” to “elective affinities” to others.129 Thus, “socialization and socializing 
become a matter of choice” where “people are free to connect and disconnect with 
whoever they want and rigidly fixed roles for such categories as gender and class are 
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eroding, giving people more room to express themselves as individuals.”130 Thus, 
material security, intellectual autonomy, and social independence relieves people 
from constraints to their choices and contribute immensely to rising self expression 
values, because it allows them to move beyond sheer survival and to focus on other 
goals. So, relative freedom from wants and their satisfaction is a prerequisite in 
exercising expression values; in the absence of existential security or under the 
regime of survival crisis, these values cease to be a priority and pushed to the 
periphery of concern. Thus, it would be no exaggeration to state that 
material/socioeconomic security has a lasting impact and effect on successful 
democratization and the success stories of western liberal democracies stand witness 
to this claim.  
 The argument here is not that there is a casual link between prosperity and 
democracy. Rather, it is to show that any society that is on the brink of existential and 
survival crisis is and cannot serve as a fertile ground for democratic ideals and values 
to flourish, on the one hand,  and, that there exists a relation of correlation between 
prosperity and democracy on the other. This means that material and economic 
wellbeing plays an important role in shaping whether a society becomes democratic. 
This is what James Robinson suggests when he writes, “just as some countries started 
to become much more prosperous than others in the nineteenth century, some started 
to become much more democratic than others.” He adds, “Increasingly, these groups 
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of countries are the same.”131 There is another side to the economy-democracy 
correlation also: for instance, how much feasible is democracy in an agrarian society? 
To paraphrase Robinson: ‘according to Bates132, Rodowsky133 and Tilly,134 
democracy is a concession from authoritarian rulers necessary to raise taxation. The 
more elastic the tax base, the harder it is for authoritarian rulers to raise taxes without 
the consent of the citizens, and the greater the likelihood of concessions - thus 
democracy. Hence, Bates135 points out that democracy is less likely in an agrarian 
society than it is in a society dominated by physical or human capital, because land is 
easier to tax.’136 That the promise and opening up of the market is more conducive to 
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democratic freedoms has been proven since the early days of capitalism, which again 
stands testimony to the claim: no prosperous economy, no functioning democracy. 
One can have the economy without the democracy (for instance, illiberal democracy); 
how long that will last is another issue. But, one cannot run a democracy where the 
economy and the material floor does not exist to stand afoot, for what counts in a 
democracy are loci of power, not simply a façade of popular rule such as elections. 
To paraphrase G. Warren Nutter, there exists a clear connection between democracy, 
property, and power. Power is needed if one is really to be free; individual power 
comes from property ownership. “Broadly dispersed and predominantly private” 
property regime supports democracy.137 Condition of exclusion from ownership of 
property is inimical to virtue, individuality and autonomy, qualities indispensable for 
citizenship. Such persons or groups of persons lack the will of their own because they 
are forced to rotate around someone else’s economic axis. Since no dependent person 
is capable of fulfilling the responsibilities of democratic citizenship, people should 
own property so that they would have power over their lives thereby making possible 
their respective societies run democratic.     
 In other words, poverty and suffering is as inimical and detrimental to 
democracy as a concentration of wealth in few hands is. Democratic existence ought 
to come clean from these extreme excesses if democratic life forms were to flourish. 
Such condition of wealth concentration gives rise to the view that the ‘people who 
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own most should own the country and they ought to govern it.’ According to John 
Hill, J. P. Diggins reports that Henry Adams was disturbed by the thought “that the 
American constitutional system was powerless to prevent the purchase of influence 
and power by money,” and that “in the face of corporate wealth,” the constitution 
seemed useless.138 Robert N. Bellah states, quotes Hill, that “in the age of robber 
barons, the unconstrained pursuit of wealth, while ignoring social justice, “was 
destroying the fabric of a democratic society.”139Accordingly, “…unless social justice 
was speedily granted,” warned other thinkers, “the oppressed might seek redress of 
their own through violent revolution.”140According to Charles E. Merriam, writes 
Hill, “concentrated wealth was destroying the economic basis of democracy and thus 
the masses are losing power: “The forms of power … cannot long remain in conflict 
with the actual forces and facts, and as the organization of industry has become 
undemocratic, the organization of government must soon follow in the same 
direction.”141 Diggins, Bellah, and Merriam were not alone in this respect. For 
example, Herbert Croly advocated a “national democracy” which would include a 
social balance, “the amelioration of social conflict through national government 
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policy.” Political leaders would have to be responsible to the electorate as a whole, 
not just to economic elites.142 Like wise, John Kenneth Galbraith was concerned 
about social imbalance evidenced by opulent private production leaving public 
services poverty-stricken.143             
 According to Dahl, quotes Hill, “Through a highly successful case of 
ideological transfer, the Lockean defense of private property, which in the agrarian 
order made good sense morally and politically, was shifted over intact to corporate 
enterprise.” He sees this type of political-economic management affecting democracy 
in two ways: “First, the new order generated much greater differences than the old in 
political resources, skills, and incentives within the demos itself.” And second, the 
hierarchical nature of corporations means that most people spend most of their lives 
working in a despotic system, instead of a democracy.144 Given such  concerns, it is 
legitimate to raise further questions about whether a society be democratic when there 
is a great inequality in political resources and whether democracy is not affected 
when most people spend so much of their lives within authoritarian workplaces. 
Bellah fears that the role of citizens has been destroyed by the economic man thereby 
undermining the virtue of public good or public spirit. He writes, “The tension 
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between private interest and public good is never completely resolved in any society. 
But in a free republic, it is the task of the citizen, whether ruler or ruled, to cultivate 
civic virtue in order to mitigate the tension and render it manageable.”145 So, since 
individualism often expresses itself in the economic realm and because economic 
individualism replaces citizenship for many people, the very concept of democracy is 
vitiated.”146 In short economic inequality is undemocratic for it deprives large 
numbers of citizens of equal political power, and if inequality is too extreme, it can 
lead to revolutionary attempts to replace a democratic system with a perfect utopian 
system. Besides, one can never be a free individual, even in a supposedly democratic 
polity, when one is subject to materialist conformity pressures. That is why the 
understanding of the conflict between what Thoreau terms “the illusion of political 
freedom and the reality of moral slavery to economic passions and interests”147 serves 
a larger philosophical purpose.       
 So, whether the relation between economy and democracy is one of causation 
or correlation, the truth of the matter is that the quest for democratic values cannot be 
fulfilled unless people are owners of themselves and their lives in the first place. The 
enslaved are un-free and such condition of servitude is antithetical to democratic 
freedoms, no matter where. In Africa the quest for democracy is primarily a quest for 
self ownership, that is, a quest for material security and well being; it is a quest for 
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the freedom of development. I argue that freedom of choice and the emphasis on 
democratic values emerge and evolve as increasingly favorable existential conditions 
allow the desire for autonomy to take priority. One does not have to be a millionaire 
to uphold and die for the values of democratic existence; but one cannot stand up for 
such values when one is trapped in a lifeless existence. Socioeconomic development 
and well being diminishes objective constraints on human autonomy, creativity, and 
choices and overcoming despicable misery and poverty diminishes material 
constraints on such choices thereby helping to nourish existential security; it 
diminishes material and cognitive constraints on human choices thereby fueling their 
sense of intellectual and moral development. So, relative freedom from wants and 
their satisfaction is a prerequisite to exercise the liberty of democratic values; in the 
absence of material and existential grounding or under the regime of survival crisis, 
these values cease to be a priority and would be pushed to the periphery of concern. 
Thus, it would be no exaggeration to state that material/socioeconomic security has a 
lasting impact and effect on successful democratization of societies and 
democratically anchored way of living are incompatible with despicable conditions of 
economic deprivation. The success stories of western liberal democracies stand 
witness to this claim.  
 But material/economic security is constitutive of the packages necessary for a 
successful democratization; it is not the only condition. The emergence, for instance, 
of “illiberal democracies” stands witness. As already indicated, economic success 
does not guarantee a democratic way of life; it only is a necessary presupposition. 
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Both the conception of rights and individualism historically antedated the arrival of 
western democracy; these shaped the evolution and ascent of western traditions of 
democracy, no less than Laissez-fare capitalism did. I shall turn to this reflective 
exploration in the next chapter.   
 III: Democracy and its justification/s. Why and how is rule by the people an 
appropriate way by which to live? In addition to the four justifications Hook provides 
in section III of his article,148 here are additional ways to look at it. One possible 
justification for ‘people rule’ would be that there isn’t a feasible and desirable non-
democratic alternative. To borrow from Dahl, “A hard-headed look at human 
experience, shows that among political societies that have actually existed or now 
exist, those that most nearly satisfy the criterion of the democratic idea are, taken all 
around, better than the rest.”149 This justification rests on the view that democracy is 
lesser evil than the alternatives and ‘the burden of proof’150 lies with the alternatives 
to show that there are sound grounds for rejecting ‘people rule’/democracy. When 
this argument is pushed a little further, we get the justification that democracy is the 
best defence against tyranny. Institutionalized or in persons, avoidance of and 
protection from harm is a desirable good and democracy is said to provide safeguards 
against undesirables such as tyrannical rule. So, whether democracies produce just 
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governments or not, they at least tend to prevent serious injustices.151 The argument 
here is that, if power rests with the people, the cruel and the arbitrary use of authority 
will be averted, even if all this amounts to is ‘voters having the right, at periodic 
intervals, to remove from office governments that they have come to dislike.’152 
Indeed, as W. H. Ricker argues, all that we can expect from democracy is a popular 
veto by which it is “sometimes possible to restrain official tyranny.”153 In short, the 
justification of democracy as being the best defence against tyranny could serve as 
sufficient defence for everyone who is not prepared to defend tyranny.   
 This aside, democracy also is held to have further desirable consequences. For 
example, W.N. Nelson argues that democracy is desirable due to the fact that it tends 
to produce good laws and policies or at least to prevent bad ones.154 Dahl is more 
specific, claiming that democracy tends to provide a more extensive domain of 
personal freedoms than any other kind of regime can use. He argues that certain 
valuable rights including rights to free expressions, political organizations, opposition 
and fair and free elections are essential to the democratic process. Moreover, “these 
fundamental rights are unlikely to exist in isolation. The political culture required to 
support the democratic order…tends to emphasize the value of personal rights, 
freedoms and opportunities. Thus not only as an ideal but in actual practice, the 
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democratic process is surrounded by a penumbra of personal freedoms.”155 His 
optimism seems tentative, though: if the view that democracy is said to tend to 
promote a broad range of human freedoms is not realized, democracy is still 
defensible through recourse to the desirability of safeguarding against tyranny. So, at 
the very least we can comfort ourselves with the knowledge that there are not any 
desirable or feasible alternatives.  
 But these broadly negative reasons given in support of democracy identify 
nothing of value in the idea of democracy itself. So, the question remains whether 
they amount to enough to justify democracy. In other words, if there is nothing else to 
recommend democracy other than the absence of desirable or feasible alternatives, it 
is reasonable to think and feel that one has not justified democracy at all. Indeed, such 
a justification would be based on the highly contingent prediction that a more 
desirable and feasible alternative will not be forthcoming. But this does not seem to 
be congruent with democracy being highly valued and there is nothing to recommend 
democracy as an ideal or a process in itself. There is no reference to the justice 
implicit in the democratic ideal. Consequently, it can be said that this notion does not 
justify democracy: it merely amounts a highly relative vindication. It is interesting to 
note that, while negative vindications of democracy are often thought to be sufficient, 
different democratic procedures have little choice but to stress their congruence with 
underlying values when asserting their superiority. As J.R. Pennock writes, “The 
democratic ideal is constantly being appealed to as a test for what is “really 
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democratic.”156
 But, isn’t the idea that democracy provides a safeguard against tyranny a 
compelling justification? The justifying force of this is determined by the extent to 
which tyranny is seen as a bad thing and the extent to which its avoidance is seen to 
be of value. If the cruel and arbitrary use of authority is seen to be a fundamental evil 
and democracy ‘tends’ to safeguard against that use, then one might be in a position 
to say that democracy is justified by the ideal of non-tyrannical rule. However, even if 
one were to concede this, it would not get her/him very far. So, the question would 
remain unanswered as to why tyranny is seen to be a bad thing if we keep sticking to 
this line of reasoning. Wouldn’t further investigation along this trail help us uncover 
the values implicit in the assumption that tyranny is bad and, by implication, the 
deeper ideals that serve to justify democracy? Indeed, there must be something about 
tyranny to which we are deeply averse. This is not a matter of a simple distaste; 
rather, it is plausible to assume that our wish to avoid tyrannical rule is motivated by 
the belief that we should not be bypassed or oppressed, that despotism violates us in 
some way. There must then be something that we value which tyranny jeopardizes 
and democracy respects. It follows from this that the motivation to have that 
something of value respected ultimately provides the reason to endorse democracy 
and to reject tyranny. Now unless the idea of democracy has an arbitrary relation to 
the outcome of democratic procedure, it must also respect whatever it is that we hold 
to be of value. This in turn implies that, if our adherence to democracy is based on the 
                                                          
156 Pennock, J.R; Democratic Political Theory, Princeton: Princeton University press, 
1979, p.159.   
    64
fact that the idea of democracy and the result of democratic procedures, which is non-
tyranny, respect whatever it is that we hold to be of value, democracy may indeed be 
justified by its respect for the very same thing. So, rather than looking to what 
democracy is supposed to be safeguarding against, we should look at the values that 
those safeguards imply. The outcome of democratic methods must ultimately reflect 
an ideal and, unless the outcome is incidental, it should reflect the democratic ideal. 
That democracy safeguards against tyranny only tells half of the story to the neglect 
of the values implicit in the motivation to make such a safeguard. So, in order to 
complete the story we must therefore discover what values are implied by the 
rejection of tyranny, that is, what values justify that we be democratic instead. 
 Isn’t unjustified coercion of individuals wrong? Of course it is this belief that  
is implied by the rejection of tyranny. The idea of the rule by the people could thus be 
said, as opposed to tyranny, to respect individuals as ends in themselves rather than 
mere means to the tyrannous few. Hence, Dahl’s tentative optimism with regard to 
the propensity of democracy to extend the realm of personal freedom. Indeed, the 
political rights157 identified by him as being essential to the democratic process can 
be seen to ensure that people are not treated as mere means.158 It is the idea that 
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158 Dahl’s resulting optimism about freedom being extended through the practice of 
democracy only makes sense as a justification, as opposed to a vindication, if the 
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people should be treated as ends and thus be free; that they should be self-governing, 
that every person must be respected as a source of claims and not be treated as a mere 
instrument, that drives and justifies democracy. So, democracy is recognition that no 
authority can be keeper of a man’s conscience.”159
 The essence of democracy is self-government or autonomy (when expressed 
as a moral ideal), if C. Cohen, following Kant, is correct. Autonomy and self 
government are interchangeable, for there is no relevant difference between the 
freedom and capacity to govern one’s own life and pursue one’s own ends in ones 
own ways (self-government) and the capacity to “reason self-consciously, to be self 
reflective and to be self determining” (autonomy).160 According to Cohen, the 
principle of autonomy is clearly and fully embodied in democracy as in no other 
system of government. He writes, “community autonomy - the interpersonal correlate 
of autonomy in the life of the individual - is fully realized only when the community 
is democratically governed. Only under democracy do the members of the community 
at large develop their own rules governing joint affairs and impose these rules upon 
themselves… the autonomous character of democratic government is its most 
fundamental and perhaps most important feature.”161 Similarly, Held shows that the 
concept of autonomy or self-government underlies the justification of (liberal) 
                                                                                                                                                                     
promotion of such freedom is reflected in or forms part of the ideal of democracy. 
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159 Benn, S.I., and Peters, R.S., Social Principles and the Democratic State, London: 
George Allen and Unwin, 1963, p.268.  
160 Held, D; Models of Democracy, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987, p..270.  
161 Cohen; Ibid, pp.269-70.  
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democracy. He writes, “The specification of the condition of enactment of the 
principles of autonomy amounts to the specification of the conditions for the 
participation of citizens in decisions about issues which are important to them.”162 
Accordingly, the principle of autonomy requires that political society be 
democratically organized.  
 If the above lines of reasoning are correct, it looks that democracy can follow 
directly from the ideal of self government or autonomy: rule by the people is the 
natural expression of self government in society. But if self-government/autonomy 
were an absolute ideal, it is unclear as to whether any form of government could 
follow from it, let alone democracy. That is to say, “with government, even 
democracies, laws come to someone from outside. The individual citizens have to do 
things because they are the law, even if it is a law which they helped create… once 
people engage in a community and are bound by that community’s decisions, then to 
that extent they lose their autonomy.”163 Given this, once again, we would only seem 
to be left with recourse to a somewhat negative defence of democracy, that it violates 
the ideal of self-government less than any feasible alternative. If this were true, we 
might still be able to argue that the justification of democracy does lie in the ideal of 
self-government. However, it is not at all obvious that it is, because the ideal of self 
government is dealt a ’democratic’ blow given the tendency of democracies to 
endorse the principle that “where there cannot be universal agreement, matters should 
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be settled according to the will or wishes of the majority.”164 This effectively means 
that the ideal of self-government will not be respected by democracy where there is a 
minority, since the autonomy of a minority will be compromised for the sake of the 
rule of the majority.  
 Still more, there is a sense in which the self-government of individual 
members of a majority is sacrificed through democracy, if Harrison is correct. He 
write, “In a democracy it is true that the individual members of the majority do 
choose the result which in fact happens. But it does not happen just because they 
individually choose it. It only happens because a certain number of other people want 
it as well. Of course each person does have input into the decision procedure. But so 
in this sense, do the individual member of the minority.”165 So, whether justified by 
an ideal of self-government or not, then, if all democracy amounts to is that everyone 
has an input into a decision process that has the effect it does because of the input of 
others, only a minimal notion of self government can be satisfied by democracy. But 
one might still maintain that democracy safeguards more autonomy than any other 
feasible alternative, especially if we admit that autonomy should not be taken an 
absolute ideal. That is to say, given that the realization of self-government as an 
absolute ideal can be seen to be incompatible with any form of government, 
democracy is still a good candidate for being the system that secures more autonomy 
than any other. Even though the realization of one’s self-governing choices is 
dependent on the choices of others, at least democracy has the effect that the self-
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governing choices of those comprising the majority are reflected in a decision. 
Moreover, it is said to safeguard the individual rights and freedoms cited earlier as 
essential to the democratic process. Such rights and freedoms are in turn essential to 
real choice. Democracy could thus be said to respect individual autonomy more than 
other systems since it secures the conditions of individual choice and, “more often 
than not”, it will allow an individual’s choices to be effective. If autonomy is a good, 
“democracy is a good thing, and its promotion of autonomy is why it is a good 
thing.”166   
 But we are still faced with the problem of the compromising of the autonomy 
of a given minority. They would be unlikely to agree that democracy safeguards their 
autonomy or that it at least reflects their autonomous choices more than any other 
feasible alternative. This is especially true, for example, in the case of a society’s 
permanently disadvantaged groups whereby the majority will always tend to have the 
advantage. Members of such groups may find that their choices are never effective, 
that democracy gives them no opportunity to govern themselves. So, “from the point 
of view of” such groups…“democracy gives them no more control than an oligarchy 
would.”167 The lesson is that whenever one is in such a minority, what one thinks 
ought to happen will not happen. To the extent that one’s living autonomously 
requires that one does what one believes s/he ought to do, democracy will bypass or 
violate her/his autonomy whenever one is in that minority. It will require that one 
abides by a majority decision that one believes to be wrong. If self-government is an 
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ideal essential to the justification of democracy, then, one may justly ask why 
democracy requires that one defers to a majority of which one is not a part of. The 
answer to this question will show that the justification of democracy does not lie 
solely in the ideal of self government.  
 In our discussion above, we have seen that democracy purports to respect the 
idea that people should be treated as ends in themselves rather than as means to the 
ends of a tyrannical few. Yet a conflict has been unearthed between the ideal of self-
government and democracy. The ideal of self-government can potentially gain very 
little expression through democracy. However, this does not entail that democracy 
disrespects the ideal that people should be treated as ends in themselves. Rather, 
democracy requires that all people should be treated as ends in themselves, which in 
turn necessitates that we show an equality of respect to all other people. Harrison 
writes: “If all moral agents are to be equally respected, then I must give weight (or 
moral consideration) to everyone expressing their moral views. If they are doing it by 
voting, then I should give them these votes equal respect. If I give these votes equal 
respect, then the view I should respect as superior is the view supported by the 
majority. Every vote counts equally and that is the view with more votes.”168 It is this 
consideration that requires that we compromise our autonomy. Democracy embodies 
the idea that “when binding decisions are made, the claims of each citizen as to the 
laws, rules, policies, etc. to be adopted must be counted as valid and equally valid.”169 
That all interests must be weighed impartially gives the reason to respect a majority 
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view “quite independently of any view I myself have about the truth of the matter.”170  
 According to Harrison, the conception of equality fundamental to the idea of 
democracy is a “kind of second order equality”: it doesn’t say that goods should be 
distributed equally; it doesn’t even directly recommend egalitarian practical 
procedures. But it does say that, when considering anything at all, equal respect 
should be given to all moral agents.171 Democracy is justified once one recognizes the 
idea of natural equality among humans, which means that “claims to  rule cannot be 
based on natural superiority.” Without equality, there is no reason to believe that 
democracy is an appropriate ideal and/or method by which to rule. To borrow from 
Cohen, the central claim here is that “Only with liberty will democracy work, but 
only with equality is there reason to believe that it ought to work.”172 So, although the 
justification of democracy does lie in the ideal of self-government, the latter is 
regulated by the ideal of equality of respect for persons. In other words, the 
justification of democracy must lie in both the ideal of self-government and the ideal 
of equality of respect for persons.173 If the ideal of self-government is regulated by 
the ideal of equality for persons, equality of respect will also protect self-government. 
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This means, as Harrison argues, the equality of respect for persons gives us a reason 
to follow the majority view (sometimes at the expense of our autonomy), but it will 
also imply fundamental rights that should be secured to each person whatever the 
majority might say. Since equality of respect provides a reason as to why we should 
be democratic, “democracy should not be allowed to do anything that conflicts with 
such respect. We may therefore shield individuals with rights to prevent such 
depredations by the majority. This may be undemocratic; but it is as morally justified 
as democracy itself is.”174      
 So, to windup our reflection, believing that democracy is justified means 
believing in the ideal of equality of respect for persons also. That ideal will both 
regulate and protect our autonomy. It follows from this that, at the very least, the 
conditions of self-government ought to be safeguarded for all, including those who 
find themselves in a minority. The practical implications of this cannot be ignored 
only because we are undertaking a theoretical journey here. For example, it is a 
necessary condition for the realization of both equality of respect for persons and self 
government that people ought to have a roof over their heads. The same can be said 
about basic freedoms to do with education, health care and mobility. To deny these, 
to borrow from T.W. Pogge, is to deny the fundamental role that basic social and 
economic needs actually play in a human life.175 Provisions of Pogge‘s “basic social 
and economic needs” would encourage that the penumbra of personal freedoms that 
Dahl lauds as surrounding the democratic process becomes an actuality for more than 
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a very fortunate majority. In short, justification of democracy ultimately appeals to a 
value; the ideal of self-government tethered to the ideal of equality of respect for 
persons determines what we judge to be democratic. Without reference to these 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Liberal Tradition of Thought and Practice:  
Reflections on some Foundational instances of WLD 
 In this chapter I will argue and show how liberalism tacitly espouses and 
privileges a particular way and view of life, namely, the individual and rights 
associated with it that incubated and nurtured western democracy. Both the classical 
(Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Paine, Jefferson) and contemporary political/moral 
philosophers alike have observed that the notion of individual rights and individual 
freedoms lie at the core of the western political tradition and176 show how it nurtured 
                                                          
176Shapiro, Ian; The Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986, p. 5; (a) For detailed discussion on classical and medieval or 
the non-liberal conceptions of rights see Plato., The Republic, Indianapolis, IN: 
Hackett, 1974, Book 1,2,4,6,7 and The Laws, NY: Basic Book, 1980, Book 
1,3,5,6,12; Aristotle., The Politics, London: Oxford University Press, 1946, Book 
2,3,4,7 and Nicomachean Ethics, Indianapolis, IN: The Liberal Arts Press, 1962, 
Book 1,2,5; Cicero., On the Commonwealth, Indianpolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill 
Company, 1929, Book 1,3,6 and On the Law, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1928, Book 1 and 2; Aquinas, Thomas., The Political Ideas of St. Thomas 
Aquinas, Dino Bigongiari (ed.), NY: Hafner Press, 1953, pp.96-104; Strauss, Leo., 
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the course and contour of western democracy. So, the intention here is to show how 
some core values preceded and underlie the WLD and by implication, to show that 
such values are radically lacking in Africa.  
  I. The Privileging of Rights: to begin with, western democracy is held to be 
synonymous with a particular arrangement of rights in a liberal political system, 
implicitly or otherwise. In other words, the extent to which a system is democratic is 
measured at least in part by its record for protecting and promoting such rights. For 
instance, among others, R. Dahl develops (seven) institutional guarantees for his 
Polyarchy (democracy), guarantees that are nothing more than a set of rights founded 
upon Anglo-American traditions. It is these rights, according to him, that define a 
given political system as being actually, not nominally, democratic.177 So, the 
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conception of rights lies at the core of western political tradition.178 To borrow from 
A. P. d’Entreves, ‘the entire tradition of western political thought is natural rights writ 
at large.’179 As Ian Shapiro writes, the liberal concept of rights can be understood as 
“an ensemble of related doctrines, beliefs, and assumptions” about the nature of 
human beings, society, and government.180   
 What is a right, to begin with? A brief presentation of the term and arguments 
for its justification along with a critical look at these grounds will be made here. Hugo 
Grotius saw it as “a moral quality annexed to the person;” it is a liberty which permits 
us to act justly and according to reason and a power which enables us to demand what 
is due us.181 While embracing this view, Hobbes added a negative element to it; 
namely, one’s liberty to abstain from action, Locke didn’t depart fundamentally from 
the meaning that Grotius and Hobbes had given to the term.182 Bentham regarded 
rights as a fictitious entity dependent on the legislature’s will; it may be a privilege, a 
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power, or a benefit from a discharge of a duty, but the request for its precise meaning 
cannot be met except by illustration in a relation to situations in which questions of 
rights arise.183 Following Bentham, other thinkers tended to emphasize the nonfactual 
and non descriptive characters of concepts like rights. According to them (Austin, 
Hohfeld and Hart), statements containing such concepts do not state any facts…and 
thus they must be distinguished from statements made to ascertain the truth value of 
certain facts.184  
 The oscillation between “right” as fiction and “right” as reality is very much a 
characteristic of political and legal discourse on rights. But, according to Alan R 
White, although a “right” does not denote any entity, physical or otherwise, this 
should not lead to the conclusion that “Since ‘A has a right’ does not state those facts 
in virtue of which it is true to say it, it, therefore, does not state a fact at all.”185 The 
mistake committed by Hart and others is, argues White, “their equation of facts with 
something in the physical world (original italics)” For “facts are not, and do not have 
the characteristic of, any part of the world.” They are not themselves items, like 
objects, events, situations, or states of affairs, that “exist in time and space.” “A 
factual statement,” writes White “tells us how things are in the world, no more and no 
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less.”186 In short, he argues that statements containing such terms like a right can be 
both non-denotative and fact-stating. White’s view seems to have been an implicit 
assumption underlying many of the arguments about human rights, for instance. On 
the one hand, few would deny that rights such as the right to free speech or the right 
from fear does not have a counterpart in the world and having it is not like having any 
particular object; on the other hand, we are often reluctant to say that sentences 
containing the notion of rights merely express an evaluative judgment or a moral 
prescription about what we should do and do not tell any truth about “something” we 
as human beings naturally or inherently possess. In legal usage, rights can hardly be 
conceived independently of legal rules which ascribe and give effect to them by 
imposing duties on those against whom they are claimed. This makes the concept of 
rights a seemingly artificial and imaginary product of the law. At the same time, 
however, the bearer of right187 is supposed to possess it; it is hers or yours or mine in 
the sense of owning it as if it were a real thing. What the law does is simply pass 
judgments on, or in Hart’s words draw a conclusion about, whether to affirm or to 
deny, but never to create, what already belongs to the right bearer. So, rights such as 
the right to liberty describe neither a physical entity nor a psychological state, and 
having it is not equivalent to having an object or having an idea. It cannot be seen, 
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felt, pictured, or otherwise represented; it does not exist in space-time; nonetheless, it 
is regarded as something which is true and self-evident, as something which is 
objectively discoverable in human nature. It is in virtue of the moral qualities inherent 
in human nature, considered also as true and self evident, that we are said to hold, 
claim, and exercise it; it in fact is one of our moral qualities.     
 J. P. Plamenatz defines “right” as a “power which a creature ought to possess, 
either because its exercise by her is itself good or else because it is a means to what is 
good, and in the exercise of which all rational beings ought to protect her.”188 What is 
contestable here is the definition of “power”. Does it mean physical strength or 
mental capability; does it mean might or authority? A handicapped person or a 
comatose patient may not have the physical strength or mental capability of 
a ’normal’ person, but she or he may certainly have rights; someone or some entity 
may have no right to do or affect something yet this someone or entity may possess 
might or authority. It is for this reason that H.J. McCloskey rejects the definition of 
right as power. For him all rights are entitlements that enable us to act as we choose 
or refrain from action or receive positive assistance where and when needed in 
accordance with certain rules and standards, and which, if denied, would provide 
grounds for making demands or claims on others. So, if he is correct, having the right 
to drive a car is not the same as having the power to do so, for one may be too ill to 
drive a car or too poor to buy one. Thus, “a right may exist and be possessed in the 
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absence of the relevant capacity, rights are distinct from power.”189 Neither is a right 
a claim against someone. A right is generally a right to, not against, except in specific 
cases. For example, some ones right to live is not primarily one against others, and 
“the actual existence of other human beings is irrelevant to whether rights may or 
may not be possessed.”190 It is also true of the right to vote, for instance, which is not 
simply a claim against others but rather a right to act as one pleases within the 
definition of the law.           
 But, despite McCloskey’s objection, some insist that a right is a claim or a 
valid claim. This, for instance, is Joel Feinberg’s position. He points out that 
McCloskey is wrong in assuming that all claims are claims against rather than to and 
all rights are rights to rather than against. He sees no paradox in saying that rights are 
essentially held against others, whether against specific persons or against hundreds 
of millions of what Bentham calls “unassignable individuals.” Rights so conceived, 
according to Feinberg have two dimensions, as suggested by the prepositions “to” and 
“against,” and they seem to merge entitlements to do, have, omit, or be something 
with claims against others to act or refrain from acting in a certain ways.191 The idea 
of merging hints at a complex nature of a right, which, of course, was noted by 
Hohfeld. He distinguishes four different conceptions of a right as involved in legal 
reasoning and seeks to elucidate them in terms of their correlative and opposite 
concepts. A right, according to him, may in a given case be understood as a privilege, 
                                                          
189McCloskey, H.J; “Rights,” Philosophical Quarterly 15:59: (April) 1965, p. 117.   
190Ibid; p. 119.  
191Feinberg, Joel; “The Nature and Value of Rights,” Journal of Value Inquiry, 1970, 
p. 256.    
    80
a power, an immunity, or a right in the strictest sense, namely a claim, and the 
indiscriminate use of a right or a claim to cover all legal relations has led to a 
“confusion or blurring of ideas.” Thus different legal relations should be separately 
represented by different terms accurately expressing them rather than lumped together 
under a single protean word “right.”192 He defines the four terms as follows: “A right 
is one’s affirmative claim against another, and a privilege is one’s freedom from the 
right or claim of another. Similarly, a power is one’s affirmative “control” over a 
given legal relation as against another; whereas immunity is one’s freedom from the 
legal power or “control” of another as regards some legal relations.”193 Despite its 
merit, this definition looks circular, characteristic of many synonymous definitions. 
Until one locates a right in the context of social relations that it purports to regulate 
and in the principles and theories which it presupposes and is embedded in, one 
cannot bring an end to such circularity.    
 II. Arguments for the Justification of Rights: There are some compelling 
justificatory arguments for rights. Among these, the intrinsic and moral worth of the 
individual qua person is the most defended idea on which rights are said to be 
grounded. This idea finds its forceful expression in the Kantian (and Mill’s) maxim 
that each and every individual be treated as an end rather than merely a means and 
has been well assimilated into and become a staple of the liberal tradition. According 
to this view, each human being is a moral person, irreplaceable, self-owning, and 
capable of free action. To respect her or his moral worth is nothing less than to 
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respect those properties intrinsic to the value of one’s very being. Whichever course 
of life one chooses for oneself is ultimately one’s own decision; others ought not to 
interfere with one’s freedom without legitimate reasons and ought to assist or provide 
for one in cases in which one lacks the ability or resources to exercise such freedom. 
The only justification for interference is to prevent harm to others. Rights, thus, are 
regarded as a fundamental guarantee, and a manifestation, of the individual’s moral 
autonomy and dignity. It is this intrinsic moral worth of human beings that provides 
the ultimate basis for making free choices, being treated equally, claiming what is 
one’s due, being entitled to have and enjoy certain things, or engaging in autonomous 
action.194 According to some critiques, however, to ground rights on the intrinsic 
moral worth of the individual qua person is question-begging. More importantly, to 
assert on the basis of a vague notion such as dignity that individuals have 
fundamental moral rights, say, to autonomy or to equal respect and to regard these 
rights as pre-social, pre-political and preinstitutional is to invoke and commit a non 
sequitur and groundless first place principle. Grounding rights on such basis distracts 
us from arguing about what R. G. Frey identifies as “substantial moral issues”195 such 
as claims of conscience that closely touches one’s integrity and identity.   
                                                          
194Hart, H.L; “Are There Any Natural Rights?” Philosophical Review 64:2 (April), 
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 A quasi-utilitarian or what Joseph Raz calls humanist argument for human 
well-being, constitutes another justification. By terming it ‘quasi-utilitarian’ one 
admits the following claims: first, act utilitarianism is at heart hostile to the idea of 
rights. The view as advanced by Mill, Hare and the like can and does accommodate 
the idea of rights and as such it can no longer be regarded as a strictly act utilitarian 
argument, at least on one level on which individual rights are judged not solely in 
virtue of the consequences they incur, but also in terms of their own logic and 
structure in moral thinking, of their relationship with other equally important moral 
concepts.196 According to John C. Harsanyi, “The most important advantage that rule 
utilitarianism as an ethical theory has over act utilitarianism lies in its ability to give 
full recognition to the moral and social importance of individual rights and personal 
obligations. It is easy to verify that action-by-action maximization of social utility, as 
required by act utilitarianism, would destroy these rights and obligations. In contrast, 
rule utilitarianism can fully recognize the moral validity of these rights and 
obligations precisely because of its commitment to an overall moral strategy, 
independent of action-by-action social-utility maximization.”197 Second, more or less 
there are scholars/thinkers who recognize the instrumental role that rights play in 
promoting human welfare198 without professing a utilitarian position. Lying at the 
                                                          
196See Mill, J.S; Utilitarianism, On Liberty, and Considerations on Representative 
Government, London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1972; Hare, R.M, Moral Thinking, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982.      
197Harsanyi, John C., “Rule utilitarianism, rights, obligations and the theory of 
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198Raz, Joseph; “Rights-Based Moralities,” in Theories of Rights, Jeremy Waldron 
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core of the mainstream rights theory, quasi-utilitarians' claim is an exclusive and 
institutionist concern with the individual and her or his inherent dignity. This is not 
only an impoverishment of moral discourse, but also a misconstrual of the ground on 
which rights can be founded. Rights are grounded not in such a formal, intuitive and 
presocial notion as dignity or freedom or equality, but in human well-being and in the 
interests, needs, and goods that are constitutive of it.199 Unlike pure utilitarianism 
which considers the general welfare in undifferentiated terms, the idea of well-being 
here includes both the individual and the collective dimension. While the ultimate end 
of rights is to facilitate the moral, intellectual, and material development of the 
individual as a human person, and as a member of the human race, collective goods 
such as a tolerant society are values indispensable and intrinsic to such development. 
Thus conceived, rights are nothing more than a means of the advancement of 
humanity, individually and collectively. Here again, critics argue that it is 
indefensible to ground rights solely in the individual’s interests, needs, or goods, even 
if such interests, goods, or needs are said to be of ultimate or intrinsic value to his or 
her well-being. For one thing, it is extremely difficult to determine the meaning of 
ultimate or intrinsic value; in addition, simply because something is in one’s interest 
or need or for one’s good does not necessarily give her or him a right, that is, justify 
holding some other person under a duty or obligation. Nor is it persuasive that the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Laws and Natural Rights, London: Oxford University Press, 1980.   
199Raz, Joseph., “On the Nature of Rights,” Mind 93, 1984, pp.194-214; McCloskey, 
H.J., American Philosophical Quarterly 13, 1976, pp.1-17; Lyons, David., “Rights, 
Claimants, and Beneficiaries,” American Philosophical Quarterly,6:3 (July) 1969, 
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interest, need, or good itself rather than what someone is interested in or in need of 
the benefits from provides either a sufficient or a necessary ground for her/his 
rights.200
 Another justification is contractarian in nature, like Rawls in recent times. 
Although Rawls’ concern is the idea of justice, not that of rights, he links the two 
ideas in such a way that a theory of rights can be reasonably constructed out of the 
two principles he has advanced for a just society.201 According to him, what can 
justify the claim that ‘X’ has certain basic moral rights is neither the inherent 
quality/qualities of ‘X’202nor some teleological argument for human flourishing. 
Rather, rights are created and held as a result of deliberation and agreement among 
individuals or groups of individuals in a hypothetical original position of equality, 
rationality and uncertainty, and they are the requirements of the principles of justice 
arrived through such deliberations and agreement. In other words, rights can be said 
to be grounded in a contract agreed to unanimously by all interested parties or their 
representatives in the hypothetical original position and in the principles of justice 
reached through such a contract which lay the foundation for and are built into the 
basic structure of a just society. 203 The principles which are chosen behind a veil of 
ignorance in the initial situation can be deemed as a general right and they are 
arranged in a lexical order that requires the first to be fully satisfied before the second 
                                                          
200White, Alan R., Ibid, pp.100-106.   
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203Rawls, John., A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1971, (esp.) pp. 3-194.    
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can be considered. The 1st is a general right to “the most extensive total system of 
equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all,” and the 2nd, a 
general right to equality of opportunity and fair treatment in the social and economic 
sphere.204 From these two general rights flow a set of basic rights, be they civil, 
political, socio-economic, which are institutionalized and built into the basic structure 
of society; and these basic rights then provide groundings for secondary and non-
basic rights which may arise under special circumstances.  
 Justifications such as Rawls’ also pose certain difficulties. For instance, 
Gewirth charges that it is circular in reasoning in the sense that a general equal right 
to liberty is concluded only by postulating a universal right to equality as its 
premise.205 Even more challenging is, insofar as the Rawlsian argument is viewed as 
giving justificatory answer to the grounds of rights as follows: in addition to the 
indeterminacy and arbitrariness of how much to know or not to know in the original 
position, which would have direct bearings on what is to be agreed upon 
subsequently, rational and self-interested individuals in such a position have no good 
reason to choose either his two principles or the lexical order in which they are to be 
satisfied. This is a conservative strategy that “maximizes the minimum pay-off” and 
rational choosers may look at the average, not just the minimum, and then “pick a set 
of principles which would lead to a high average…depending on “their taste for 
                                                          
204Rawls, John., A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
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gambling.”206 On the other hand, they would not necessarily choose the priority of 
liberty over equality in order to play safe in the face of future uncertainties. They 
may, for instance, prioritize absolute equality considering certain facts of life such as 
old age, infirmities, or sheer unluckiness, for this would insure that they be provided 
for when and if these situations arise.  
 So, given the limits and flaws indicated in each case, it looks correct to draw 
the conclusion that no single definition, theory, or formula of justification in itself can 
provide a conception of rights sufficient to capture the subtlety and complexity of this 
notion. Thus, a right may in a given case be defined as a power, a claim, or an 
entitlement; it may imply or entail a duty or obligation that one perform or refrain 
from certain acts; it may be grounded in individual dignity, well-being, or in rule, 
principle, policy, deed, antecedent behavior and characteristics of the right-holder. 
There are different kinds of rights and these differences are not differences in the 
concept of a right as they are related to the different areas in which the question of a 
right is raised; there are different contexts in which rights are asserted and different 
sources from which they are derived and these differences cannot be settled 
beforehand by conceptual analysis. All this suggests is that an adequate understanding 
of rights requires an assessment of the “various moral, legal, institutional, 
conventional, etc. relationships in the complex systems to which [right-holders] 
belong;”207 thus, a pluralistic understanding. And such rich and pluralistic view of 
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Richard Flathman (ed.), NY: MacMillan, 1973, pp.427-429.   
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rights and liberal assumptions and beliefs about the individual, society, and 
government existed long before western (liberal) democracy took root also.   
   I would like to wind up this section by borrowing a brief closing touch from 
the history of western philosophy.  Hobbes’s distinction between “private rights” and 
“public obligations” later become a weapon in the hands of liberal rights theorists to 
shield the individual from the power of the state; his postulation of human beings’ 
natural state of freedom and equality, his conception of the individual as self 
interested and a rights-bearer, his negative definition of rights as the absence of 
restraint, his contractarian view of the relationship between the individual and the 
state, between individuals, etc., sets the preliminary stage for the emerging liberal 
arguments for individual rights. Locke helped usher in a conception of (political) 
rights that “formed the armature of modern liberal ideology,”208 a conception 
predicated on the assumption of the individual as ontologically distinct, private, 
autonomous, and self-interested. Such conceptions helped in setting a pattern of rights 
thinking that political thinkers in successive generations would appropriate critically. 
Though it would be unfair to Rawls’ theory to read it simply as rights-based moral 
argument, it may not be inappropriate to see it as exhibiting certain essential 
characteristics of or being keenly informed by the conception of rights which is found 
prevalent in the writings of contemporary liberal thinkers.209 He makes many 
assumptions about rights in his A Theory of Justice and others. One key Lockean 
                                                          
208Shapiro, Ian., Ibid, p. 273.  
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based Rawlsian assumption, for instance, is that individuals are ontologically primary 
and self-interested. Such a conception of the individual vis-à-vis society seems to lead 
naturally to a conception of justice in which rights play a pivotal role; it is not that 
social cooperation is unimportant, but that it is only secondary to the interests and 
expectations of the self thus understood. Indeed, Rawlsian individuals are essentially 
self-interested and seek social cooperation primarily to advance their self interests.210 
Also, Kantian like concepts such as deliberative rationality, rational self 
determination, and autonomy make their way to the liberal discourse via J. Rawls and 
continue to inform and shape the debate on rights, a tradition and conception radically 
lacking in Africa and other nonwestern, non contractarian societies.  
 III. Possessive Individualism and the Cartesian Cogito: Lying at the center 
of the above conception of rights is a view of the individual as an ontologically 
irreducible, rational, and autonomous being in our moral and political universe. 
Individualism is an all-embracing way of living, acting, and thinking. The centrality 
of the individual to liberal rights, and to the liberal doctrine as a whole, is readily 
apparent in both classical and contemporary liberal thought. Primarily, liberalism is 
about the individual - about her nature, value, interests, and about her self-perceived 
relationship with others and with society at large. The liberal notion of rights and that 
set of values and beliefs which is often described under the rubric of individualism 
are so closely related that it cannot be exhausted in the expression “individual rights.” 
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If Lukes is correct, the basic components of individualism go directly to the heart of 
liberalism.211   
 Like many concepts “individualism” is shrouded with competing and 
conflicting definitions and conceptions. For instance, some view it as a “vast complex 
of interdependent factors;”212 others suggest that it is a belief system;213 still others 
consider it as a form of modern ideology.214 According to K.W. Swart, in its 19th 
century usage,215 individualism is used to designate at least three clusters of meaning: 
First, it conveys a sense of egalitarianism as manifested in the rights of man. This 
sense is closely linked to political liberalism and has its root in the French 
Revolution; second, it suggests the economically self-made man under the auspices of 
the doctrine of free market and laissez faire. Third, it was seen as a romantic 
sentiment which glorifies a cult of individuality and exalts such qualities as creativity 
                                                          
211Lukes, Steven., Individualism, Oxford: Blackwell, 1973, pp. 125-145.   
212Watt, Ian; The rise of the Novel, Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1957, 
p. 60.   
213Shanahan, Daniel; Toward the Genealogy of Individualism (Amherst, MA: 
University of Massachusetts press, 1992, p. 20.   
214Dumont, Louis; Essays on Individualism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1986, p. 62.   
215The term may have been coined in the 19th century, but its intellectual roots go 
much further back in time. Shanahan, Dumont and others remind us that the roots of 
individualistic cultures are deep. To borrow from Shanahan, if it can be said that the 
Greek period “represents the virtual emergence of the human-self concept,” the 
Christian era “represents the evolution of the self-concept into a vessel of moral and 
spiritual …self-creation” (Shanahan, Daniel., Towards a Genealogy of Individualism, 
Amherst, MA: University of Mass. Press, 1992, pp. 13-34). See also Dumont, Louis., 
Essays on Individualism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986; Watt, Ian., The 
Rise of the Novel, Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1957; Morris, Colin., 
The Discovery of the Individual, NY: Harper & Row, 1972. So, the idea of the 
individualism can be traced all the way back to the ancient world.      
    90
and self sacrifice.216 Individualism is a way of relating that gives preponderant weight 
to the individual’s consciousness as the arbiter of truth; the individual’s values as the 
basis of morality; and, to the individual’s interests and needs as the ultimate 
justification of social and political arrangements.  Individualism with these features is 
a modern and western phenomenon. It even looks logically sound to argue that 
modern individualism historically antedated liberalism itself. Or, liberalism 
presupposes and is predicated on a particular conception of the individual itself. It 
wouldn’t be wrong to argue then that there exists a causal link between individualism 
and liberalism. Accordingly, while individualism may be described as an all 
embracing way of living, acting, and thinking that sweeps and penetrates virtually all 
facets of modern life, liberalism is primarily a moral and political doctrine concerned 
with the relationship between the social and political order. This means that 
individualism provides the grounding both for the liberal notions of rights and for the 
liberal democratic form of life. 
 The claim here requires some qualification, though: (a) not all liberal theories 
fit the descriptions given above. For instance, ‘communitarian’ liberals, while 
emphasizing the significance of individual values and interests, oppose the idea of 
individualism in so far as it fosters atomism. (b) What kinds of individualism liberal 
theory is said to endorse is another gray area also. For example, endorsing moral 
individualism does not necessarily involve endorsing economic individualism or 
sharing the view of Rawls does not entail sharing the view of a Hayek or a Nozick. 
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(c) Recognizing individual rights does not have to lead to a rejection of group or 
minority rights.217   
 There are others who view individualism as a corrupting and dismembering 
force in society thereby making it synonymous with social atomism, political 
anarchism, and economic egoism. For instance, Tocqueville saw individualism as one 
of the most powerful forces likely to breed social isolation and threaten the fabric of 
modern life. It draws the individual away from public life into “a little circle of his 
own,” fosters a sense of loneliness, and encourages dependence and conformism in 
judgment. Comparing selfishness with individualism, Tocqueville noted that the 
former is “a passionate and exaggerated love of self” and “originates in blind 
instinct,” whereas the latter is “a mature and calm feeling,” proceeds erroneous 
judgment” and “disposes each member of the community to sever himself from the 
mass of his fellows.” He concludes, “Selfishness blights the germ of all virtue; 
individualism, at first, only saps the virtues of the public life; but in the long run it 
attacks and destroys all others and is at length absorbed in downright 
selfishness.”218This criticism of Tocqueville is echoed in Louis Blanc’s remark on 
individualism also: “the principle by individualism is that which, taking man out of 
society, makes him sole judge of what surrounds him and himself, giving him a 
heightened sense of his rights without showing him his duties, abandons him to his 
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own powers, and, for the whole of government, proclaims laissez faire.219 Like wise, 
J.S. Mill, while defending individuality as a main ingredient of social progress, 
believed that such a principle, according to which each is for himself and against the 
rest, is antithetical to the idea of social progress. And agreeing with Mill on the basic 
principle of individuality, Hobhouse set before him the task of renovating classical 
individualism which he believed to be closely associated with laissez faire theory. 
The result is “socialist individualism.” “The foundation of liberty,” Hobhouse 
claimed, “is the idea of growth.” To the extent that it is consistent with the end, 
liberty “becomes not a right of the individual as it is a necessity of society. It rests not 
on the claim of ‘A’ to be let alone by ‘B‘, but on the duty of ‘B’ to treat ‘A’ as a 
rational being.”220               
  V: The philosophical individual: Modern individualism is a product of 
multiple forces: philosophical and religious; capitalism and changes in technology, 
politics, and demographics.221 Here I would like to focus on a short review of the 
philosophical roots of modern liberal individualism.222 In this context, the pride of 
place goes to the Cartesian creation of a metaphysical self, which is no less 
revolutionary and historic than that of the creation by the Reformation of the religious 
self. Rene Descartes’ total doubt served as a philosophical catalyst that undermined 
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the old foundation of knowledge and, by extension, of all the social and political 
arrangements. The philosophical individualism ushered in by the cogito assigns the 
individual and his or her mind a privileged and first-order place in the entire universe. 
It infuses the individual with a strong and certain sense of self-sufficiency, autonomy, 
and uniqueness. As Watt observes, with the arrival of Cartesianism “the pursuit of 
truth is conceived of as a wholly individual matter, logically independent of the 
tradition of the past thought, and in deed as more likely to be arrived at by a departure 
from it.”223  
 To begin with, Cartesianism constitutes the corner stone of modern 
individualism; it has in the most fundamental sense determined the entire way in 
which we have come to think about ourselves qua individuals and to relate to the 
world around us since the dawn of the modern times.224 Though Descartes “did not 
write a politics” his thought “encapsulated in his cogito contains the seed from which 
the lineage of individualist liberal political theory has sprung,” writes William 
Bluhm.225 All begins with his philosophically arresting conclusion he arrived in his 
philosophical theorizing: “Cogito ergo sum; I think, therefore I am,” a certainty that 
overcomes and fixes his own radical doubt he started from. Cartesian doubt is not a 
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doubt in the ordinary sense of being merely suspicious. It is a denial that anything has 
ever existed and a negation that reduces the entire creation to nothingness. It is a 
process of purging ourselves of inherited ideas and beliefs, which promises total 
freedom for the intellect. What it aims to create is a metaphysical state of nature, an 
Archimedean point of absolute certainty on which knowledge can stand. Given his 
methodic thinking, therefore, in the beginning, there is the mind, individuated and 
autonomous. It is from there that one proceeds to contemplate other things such as 
our idea of God. This Cartesian account of the mind has its own problems,226 which I 
will not go in detail, for my purpose is to briefly show the Cartesian foundation of 
liberal individualism in social and political life of the liberal tradition. So, despite its 
problems, Cartesianism has exerted a profound impact on the modern-liberal 
conception of the individual.  
 The kind of individualism ushered by the cogito assigns the individual mind a 
privileged and first-order place in the entire universe. This infuses the individual with 
a sense of self-sufficiency, autonomy, and uniqueness thereby making individual self 
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perception and individual self-determination the defining features of individual 
identity. Ian Watt observes that with Cartesianism “the pursuit of truth is conceived as 
of as a wholly individual matter, logically independent of the tradition of past 
thought, and indeed as more likely to be arrived at by a departure from it.”227When 
each individual is considered as an independent center of consciousness and each 
mind an arbiter of the truth, the ground work is laid for a society composed of distinct 
individual minds, each deciding independently on its own what is right and true. If 
there is a sociality at all, as Weissman points out, it exists merely as a formality, “one 
mediated by each thinker’s determination to do nothing that every other thinker could 
not do also.”228 Taylor offers a well articulated view from which to consider the close 
relationship between Cartesianism and individualism. According to him, the 
Cartesian self is characterized essentially by three distinct features: “The first is the 
picture of the subject as ideally disengaged… as free and rational to the extent that he 
has fully distinguished himself from the natural and social worlds, so that his identity 
is no longer to be defined in terms of what lies outside of him in these worlds. The 
second… is a punctual view of the self, ideally ready as free and rational to treat these 
worlds - and even some of the features of his own character - instrumentally, as 
subject to change and reorganizing in order the better to secure the welfare of himself 
and others. The third is the social consequence of the first two: an atomistic construal 
of society as constituted by or ultimately to be explained in terms of, individual 
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purposes.229  
 The entrenched traditions of rights, individualism and laissez faire capitalism 
constitute Constitutional Liberalism, the liberal grounding of western democracy. 
Constitutional liberalism refers to the tradition that seeks to protect an individual’s 
autonomy and dignity against coercion by the state, church or society; it developed as 
a defense of individual‘s rights to life, liberty, property, freedom of religion and 
speech. It is termed liberal because it draws on the philosophical strain that 
emphasizes individual liberty and constitutional because it rests on the tradition of the 
rule of law.230 So, constitutional liberalism or the liberal condition antedated western 
liberal democracy also.    
 Now, neither the conception of the individual as an ontologically irreducible 
and autonomous being in the moral and political universe, nor the interests and 
happiness of the individual as constituting the ultimate end of society, which entitles 
her to certain liberties and privileges that society as a whole has a duty to protect and 
promote, even at the cost of overall social welfare, are features of the hitherto lived 
African ways of life. Although individualism as an all-embracing way of living, 
acting, and thinking and as central to the liberal rights and to the liberal doctrine as a 
whole is readily available in both classical and contemporary liberal thought, that 
pattern of thinking and ways of living is not readily available in Africa.  Primarily, 
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liberalism is about the individual - about her nature, value, interests, and about her 
self-perceived relationship with others and with society at large. But it is this very 
conception that runs short, even radically absent in Africa. In the next chapter I will 
argue for the prevalence and sanctioning of different sets of values that prevail in 
Africa and show how mere transplantations and grafting of western democracy would 
not serve a far reaching emancipatory purpose in Africa. In short, none of the 
conditions that enabled the liberal tradition, including its democratic ways of life 
characterize the African modes and philosophies of life. Now, I will turn to the 
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CHAPTER 3 
Ontological Reflection on the indigenous Africana values 
In this chapter I will attempt to show some relevant features of African values 
and traditions prevailing and informing African lives at many levels, a modest 
summary of African world views and its social/political philosophy. African rooted 
terms and concepts like Ubuntu, spiritually holistic ontology, community of life 
and/or community society, etc will be discussed as succinctly and clearly as 
possible.231 It will be argued and shown that the African ways of ordering life differs 
fundamentally from the west and this difference must be recognized in the first place, 
whatever project one intends to carry out in Africa. A legitimate question that might 
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arise is whether there is a unifying way or tradition in as vast and populous a 
continent as Africa. While there is a point to this doubt, evidences seem to indicate 
that there is and has always been a remarkable unity and shared ways of relating that 
underlie African diversity and multiplicity, a material adequate to undertake 
philosophical reflection. The primary aim of this chapter, therefore, is to show that 
the groundwork laid by Western liberal values such as rights and individualism for 
the emergence and development of Western liberal democracy are radically lacking in 
the African values and traditions. This in turn means that “democratization” cannot 
simply be a matter of designing the right constitution/institution or of having elites 
who are committed to democratic norms. Rather, it basically is about values and ways 
of living grounded on material and existential security: one cannot institute liberal 
democracy in the absence of those values which made it possible in the first place, 
because liberal norms stand in contradiction to the prevalence of dehumanizing 
existential circumstances that I referred to in chapter one.  
 Any project, including democratization, cannot be seen apart from peoples’ 
view about itself, its culture, and its world. The way they interpret their world shapes 
their understanding of that world and how they relate themselves with others. This 
means that an organizing framework underlies and accompanies the way people see, 
picture, interpret, and live their lives.232 To substantiate this claim, I would focus on 
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Africa’s holistic worldview (its Ubuntu) and its two main constitutive and derivative 
concepts: its community of life and its community-society, respectively.  
 Ontological peculiarity: the Philosophy, values and practice of Ubuntu: 
Despite local and ethno-linguistic variations in wording and terming, Ubuntu has a 
common meaning in diverse African cultures and languages. There are different 
words and terms for Ubuntu in different parts of Africa and the plethora of its 
language families that connote the same meaning. They have and share “family 
resemblances” to borrow from Wittgenstein. At bottom, Ubuntu is the philosophical 
grounding of the African ways of life. According to Mogobe B. Ramose, ‘Ubuntu 
consists of two words: Ubu, which evokes the idea of general being and; Ntu, the 
concrete manifestation of Ubu.’ So, Ubo “is enfolded being before it manifests itself 
in the concrete form or mode of ex-istence of a particular entity. Ubu - as enfolded 
being - is always oriented towards unfoldment, that is, incessant continual concrete 
manifestation through particular forms and modes of being.”233 It is the foundation 
and edifice of the African ways of life, its philosophical grounding, so to speak. As a 
philosophical base, it underlies the discourse of all facets of life in Africa: religion, 
the law and justice, politics, society, development, and the environment, among 
others.  
 Simply put, Ubuntu describes the essence of being human through other 
human beings, a way of life that characterizes the holistically connected nature of 
community-society in Africa. At its core is the conception that ‘a person is a person 
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through another person,’ which means that one cannot think of encroaching on the 
humanity and dignity of others. According to Ntate Koka, Ubuntu is “a universal 
concept that embraces all humanity within the circle of the human race. It is a 
philosophy that transcends ethnic and racial boundaries, religious affiliations, 
ideological and political limits.”234 In the philosophy of Ubuntu, all human beings are 
united in their humanity. Ubuntu philosophy emphasizes the need to be human by 
being humane. And to be human is to affirm one’s humanity by recognizing the 
humanity of others and, on that basis, establish respectful and polite relations with 
one another. Ubuntu affirms one’s humanity in direct relation or reciprocity with the 
other fellow-human. It is the “principle of caring for each other’s well-being… and a 
spirit of mutual support… (where)… each individual’s humanity is ideally expressed 
through his or her relationship with others and theirs in turn through recognition of 
the individual’s humanity.”235 Interdependence, sensitivity towards others, respectful 
and dignified reciprocity, and caring for others are aspects of Ubuntu as a way of life.   
 B. Nussbaum conceptualizes Ubuntu as the “capacity in African culture to 
express companion, reciprocity, dignity, harmony and humanity in the interest of 
building and maintaining community with justice and mutual caring;”236 it expresses 
“our connectedness, our common humanity and the responsibility to each other that 
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deeply flows from our deeply felt connections.”237 Ubuntu brings to the fore images 
of supportiveness, cooperation, caring concern and justice anchored in compassion. 
Since Ubuntu calls upon people to “believe and feel that your pain is my pain, my 
wealth is your wealth, and your salvation is my salvation,”238 any possessive conduct, 
inhuman and undignifying practices are immoral and antithetical to community-
society. Desmond Tutu characterizes a person with Ubuntu as one who is open and 
available to others, affirming of others, does not feel threatened that others are able 
and good; for she or he has a proper self-assurance that comes with knowing that he 
or she belongs to a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated, when 
others are tortured or treated as if they were less than who they are.239 Ubuntu and 
denial of one’s respect and unfreedom stand in contradistinction. Mandela writes, “I 
am not truly free if I am taking away someone else’s freedom, just as surely I am not 
truly free when my freedom is taken away from me.”240  In Ubuntu, human beings are 
invited to see themselves in relation to the others facing them. Hence: “I am because 
you are.”  
Ubuntu describes the essence of being human through fellow human beings. 
All human beings are united in their humanity since they share the same basic needs, 
human potentials and the capacity to do good or evil. It contains elements of 
universality and inclusiveness in its scope and application. All humans are united in 
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being part of the greater universe, part of one human family with its common and 
divergent features. Of course, this unity and oneness does not deny the diversity of 
the human family as well. Where such diversity is acknowledged, interdependent 
relations are seen as necessary. As the maxim goes, ‘you are somebody only through 
others; I am because we are; we are therefore I am.’ This privileges the community 
before the individual, but having a good community leads to the flourishing of good 
and responsible individuals also. As p’Bitek Okot reminds, “Man is not born free. At 
birth he is firmly tied to his mother through the umbilical cord. He is physically cut 
free from her. But this cutting free is not merely a biological act. It is symbolic and 
most significant… he is an individual, who through upbringing is prepared to play his 
full role as a member of society…. Man has a bundle of rights and privileges that 
society owes him. In African belief, even death does not free him. If he had been an 
important member of society while he lived, his ghost continues to be revered and 
fed: and he in turn is expected to guide and protect the living…. Should he die a 
shameful death, his haunting ghost has to be laid.”241  
 Thus, Ubuntu has a universal appeal and transcends known boundaries such as 
ethnicity, race, sex, gender, religious affiliations as well as ideological and political 
limits. Taking another human being’s needs seriously, looking beyond one’s own self 
interest, caring, generosity, including supererogatory moral acts, etc. are natural 
extensions of exercising ubuntu as a way of life. Being concerned for the wellbeing of 
‘others’ as one’s own and enlarging the circle of these concerns characterizes ubuntu 
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and the ethics and morality rooted in it. It emphasizes creative cooperation rather than 
adversarial competition, consultation rather than opposition, social bondedness rather 
than self-centeredness, sacred meaning rather than material consumption. Not to have 
and exercise ubuntu (love, forgiveness, generosity) is a moral deficiency, according to 
Desmond Tutu. He writes, “…when someone doesn’t forgive, we say that person 
does not have ubuntu. That is to say he is not really human.242 Ecologically, it 
promotes the view that humans are part of the natural harmony of the whole of nature, 
not its master; politically, it focuses on finding consensus within community. Political 
power is seen as a means to empower others, not as a vehicle of mere control, 
contrary to the imported and uprooting practices that pit Africans against each other 
at present. At the heart of this indigenous politics is a set of embedded and webbed 
relationships based upon mutual respect emphasizing both the community and the 
individual, so that in a very important sense the whole is equal to the part. Ubuntu is 
rich with values related to “inclusive wellbeing” both in thinking and living, in 
politics and ethics. It implies and informs the need for a more moral political order 
where we pay attention to our everyday conditions and also think clearly about where 
humanity had gone wrong to jettison morality in our political and public life. It means 
that human dignity and self-worth must be restored in politics and attention be given 
to the voices of victims against the moral silence and complicity enjoyed erroneously 
at present. Since everyone suffers to some degree from injustice, a truly caring 
society must extend compassion not only to its obvious victims but also to those who 
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in some ways are its beneficiaries. So, meaningful and purposeful politics, a shared 
conception of the Good, and fullness of opportunity can be derived from ubuntu for 
our days. Without some shared commitment to the search for the common good, the 
higher and the larger, democracy becomes formal and vulnerable to cynical 
manipulation; even degenerates into the idiocy of the lowest common denominator - 
the notion that every opinion is equally significant.    
  Spirituality and sacredness are constitutive of Ubuntu informed human lives. 
Spirituality here should not be confused with any rigid adherence to any code, ethical 
or religious. It refers to a state of being that transcends the material world and 
connects humans with something greater and larger than themselves - the “where am 
I from;” “what is the meaning of life and the purpose of existence” quest realm. 
According to Zohar and Marshall, “if we are to experience deep satisfaction in our 
social lives, we must be able to see society in a larger context of meaning and value, a 
context that transcends the concerns of materialism /consumerism and limiting self-
interest. Our social vision must have a teleological dimension. That is, we must be 
able to answer questions like what is society for, what is its purpose and direction, in 
what dimension of underlying reality do we find its roots, its systems of value, its 
moral foundations? These are ultimately, spiritual questions. They have to do with 
how we understand, the ultimate meaning and sanction of our actions and projects. 
Such concerns were the motive force behind the founding of most religions, but 
spirituality itself is less organized than religion, less tied to any specific dogma or 
practice. A spiritual dimension in society need not be identified with any particular 
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organization or group.243 The sacred and the spiritual provide inspiration, guidance, 
and a sense of meaning and purpose that propel us and many political actors beyond 
the self-interest and the self-centeredness of the politics and consumption-as-usual 
world. So, when the spiritual diminishes and human morality hits the floor, the rule of 
law prevails as a standard natural norm and brute force rules.  
In short, Ubuntu is a form of relational spirituality that connotes the basic 
connectedness of all human beings, which is different from systems that encourage 
retribution, adversarial and eliminative competition and selfishness; it entails 
community interdependence and the healing of the land; emphasizes forgiveness and 
conciliation as a method of restoring the moral harmony among peoples; promotes the 
view that people are made for togetherness, people are made for fellowship. We are 
(you and I) made for interdependency; ‘to whom am I going to be a neighbor, who is 
in need and whose need must I meet as a neighbor with this privilege and this 
responsibility? You and I are the ones who are to be judged for failing to be neighbor 
to those in need,’ to paraphrase from D. Tutu.    
There is a legitimate concern whether ubuntu is free from dark sides such as 
tribalism, oppression, exclusion and whether it is forceless in the face of evil. As an 
ontological orientation and a worldview perspective, Ubuntu does not privilege any 
group of people over others nor is it a tribal ideology. It is a philosophy that stresses 
unity in diversity, consented consensus, etc. It does not espouse oppressive sameness 
or uncritical unanimity. A philosophy that stands for human equality in dignity, 
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attentive justice and care, respect of persons for what they are cannot derail and stand 
against our common humanity, because it revolved around such a center in the first 
place. There are people and times when noble ideas and principles can equally be 
used for evil ends. Who suspected the precious ideas of the enlightenment would lend 
a justification for slavery and colonialism in history? So, in Africa, state socialists and 
extremist political parties used ubuntu’s communitarian elements to execute and 
justify projects antithetical to the spirit of ubuntu itself. This is a case of an 
ideological abuse and misappropriation of the philosophy; it does not emanate from 
any bad nature inherent to ubuntu as such. Ubuntu is part of the great African 
tradition and it is necessary to make it fit to the needs of changing demands and 
times. Since the intellectual neglect and failure to modernize this tradition is 
constitutive of the current crisis looming large in Africa, no amount of dishonest, 
apish, and uncritical imitation of the liberal civilization deliver the needed remedy.        
    Now I will attempt to present and discuss Africa’s community of life and 
Community-society conceptions as anchored in and grounded on the Ubuntu view of 
the world.  
 1. The Community of Life - Spiritual-centered ontology: In indigenous and 
unadulterated Africa, the whole universe is a unity and temple of life; the greatest 
thing in life is life itself, which manifests itself in everything and everywhere. The 
visible and the invisible are bonded to one another and commune with each other and 
with their source. Life is all and everything at once; everything intermingling with 
everything else. Life is not dichotomized into the sacred and the profane, the religious 
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and the secular, the material and the non material. The physical and the non physical 
are but two dimensions of one and the same creation, for “nature in the broadest sense 
is not an empty impersonal object or phenomenon;” it is filled with spiritual 
significance.244 Even natural objects and phenomena that appear to have no biological 
life are taken to symbolize or manifest the presence of life and creation. The invisible 
is understood or manifested by the visible, concrete phenomenon and objects around 
us. Africans ‘see’ the invisible when they look at, hear or feel the visible and tangible 
world. According to Kwesi Dickson, “… the various elements of the human 
environment are meaningful to the African because they point to something beyond 
themselves. Man is in concert with nature; not only is he subject to nature’s fierce 
wrath, but also he is sustained by nature’s bounty and kinship with the things that 
make up nature.”245 The physical and the spiritual therefore are coterminous concepts 
and the western distinction between the rational and the spiritual is untenable here. 
The African life is permeated with spirituality; it is no less real than the rational. To 
be successful or to obtain the sense of well-being one is dependent on a positive 
interrelationship between the spiritual world, the material world and all human 
beings. In African societies there are no persons who negate or totally abandon 
rituals, beliefs, and expressions of their ancestors, for to do so is to cut oneself from 
their roots, their kinship, and their context of security. This is what Mbiti suggests 
when he writes, “in traditional society there are no irreligious people. To be human is 
to belong to the whole community, and to do so involve participating in the beliefs, 
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ceremonies, rituals, and festivals of that community… to be without religion amounts 
to a self-excommunication from the entire life of society.”246 Indeed, “life as a whole 
is religious” summarizes how spiritual centered is the African way life.247  
 Characteristic of the African world is the connectivity that runs at the core of 
what some Africanists call “community of life.”248 The universe as a community of 
life is a foundational principle and exclusive polarities don’t define the African way 
of life and thought, a condition that remains intact among the hundreds of millions of 
African despite its brush with failed and destructive modernity. The community of 
life is holistic. This means that Africans don’t view nature as separated from them 
and people are not seen outside of nature because it is firmly believed that nature is 
part of the web of life and part of themselves. Nature is life and nature and people are 
one. Since the destiny of nature is the destiny people, bondedness to life entails an 
inescapable obligation to respect nature.  
 Part of the community of life principle is the veneration extended to ancestors. 
The relationship between the living and the deceased is characterized by solidarity, 
reciprocity, and communication. The indivisible world and the ancestors who inhabit 
there exemplify the idea that life doesn’t end in death. “In Africa,” to borrow from 
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Mbiti, “death means the disappearance of a being whose ultimate reality is entirely 
relative to entities that existed before it and will exist after it: the lineage, the society, 
the world. Here lies true reality, not in the individual. The African is never wholly 
separated from these entities while he is alive, and she does not see her death as a 
total breach with them.”249 Since the departed are believed to continue to live, they 
are remembered at numerous events through the act of libation and prayers for 
blessing, guidance, and strength. And veneration is not a worship, since “respect for 
the departed does not amount to worshipping them; they show people’s belief that the 
departed up to four or five generations should not be forgotten.”250Nor are the 
ancestors mere memories of the dead, for Africans feel the dynamic presence of their 
departed fellows. They are the links between the long past and an insignificant 
present; they provide meaning to the lives of the living because “they represent an 
exemplary past. As people bound in time and space, people seek to understand life 
within the temporal context. This is to say, people try to understand their present in 
the light of their past.”251 This is the reason for the ancestral veneration existing 
among Africans.  In Africa, the past is everything, which means that Africans are 
past-anchored peoples; they are peoples “with long past…”if Mbiti is correct. 
Everything is in the past and unfolds from the past. It “becomes the final store house, 
the point beyond which a phenomenon can’t go, the ultimate destiny of all things that 
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may be caught up in the rhythm of motion.”252 So, the concept of time is closely 
related to the concept of “life” after death and to the concept of the “hereafter” and 
the personality of humans. There is uniqueness to this view of time, which is easily 
misunderstood and denigrated. Since the African lives time and because the future is 
not yet lived, unlived future cannot be part of her conception of time. Thus, an 
overarching past exists only because it was a lived time. In Africa, humans make 
time; they are not made by time. Time is not something already there, something to 
be filled with. So, the African does not live in time; s/he lives time.253   
 What one learns from this brief ontological reflection is both the difficulty and 
impossibility of attaining formal distinction between the sacred and the profane, the 
religious and the secular, the spiritual and the material realms of life in Africa. To 
borrow from Senghor, “… the African does not draw a line between himself and the 
object; he does not hold it at a distance, nor does he merely look at a distance, nor 
does merely look at it and analyze it…”254 It suggests the need for participation in 
and caring for total life and harmony with nature. The ontological priority here is not 
‘controlling’ or dominating’ nature; rather, it means that the relation between the 
human and the natural realm is not based on relation of antagonism and subjugation. 
Nature neither presents a law to which humans must adapt themselves nor is an 
enemy whom human must fight. Nature shouldn’t be reduced to a means whence 
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humans derive their means of substance, because humans do not live by bread alone; 
they “truly live and solely on the myths that are their spiritual nourishment.”255 The 
western procedure of reason, which is based on the assumption of humans as agents 
and thinkers external and superior to the natural world, stands in contradistinction to 
this ontology. Neither is history treated and understood as a process of the 
subjugation of nature as external to and the enemy of humans. Such formulations and 
views remain incompatible with African spiritually permeated ontology. Given such 
an ontological background, modern projects including the project of democratization 
are bound to fail unless such grounds are examined, understood, and appropriated 
critically in the realization of all viable and meaningful projects.     
 2. An Embedded Community Society – the social ontology in brief: 
embedded in the “community of life” is the concept of community society. The 
African conceptions of persons and community cannot be separated from its holistic 
metaphysics. Both concepts arise out of the understanding of being bonded to natural 
life and the feeling of being in the network of life. Since people are common life, they 
belong to each other. There is no material tie with their fellow humans as distinct 
from the spiritual tie. Humans cannot be divided into self-actualization and self-
alienation. As Nkrumah writes, “man is regarded in Africa as primarily a spiritual 
being, a being endowed originally with certain inward dignity, integrity, and 
value”256 and therefore complete human beings.257 S. Senghor complements this 
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when he writes “the Negro-African society is collectivist or more exactly communal 
because it is rather a communion of souls than an aggregate of individuals.”258 
Society is a real tie of people, a bond founded on the unity of souls.  
 It is clear then that community is a central concept in the African world view; 
it constitutes “Africanness”259 or what Jacques Maquet calls “Africanity,”260 the point 
of reference in defining the social and political philosophy of Africa. Community 
refers to a thoroughly fused “we” where an organic relation exists between and 
among those who live together. It is not constituted out of but born from the oneness 
relating and cohering them together. In such a conception, commitment to a common 
destiny takes precedence over the pursuance of individual self interest. As Senghor 
puts, “Negro-African society puts more stress on the group than on the individual, 
more on solidarity than on the activity and needs of the individual, more on the 
communion of persons than on their autonomy. Ours is a community society.”261 
Jomo Kenyatta, the founding father of independent Kenya made similar observation 
when reflecting on his Kenyaian-Gikuyu society.  “According to Gikuyu way of 
thinking” writes Kenyatta, “nobody is an isolated individual. Or rather, his 
uniqueness is a secondary fact about him; first and foremost, he is several people’s 
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relative and several people’s contemporary.”262 From their stand point, 
“individualism and self-seeking are ruled out… The personal pronoun ’I’ was used 
very much rarely in public assemblies. The spirit of collectivism was (so) much 
ingrained in the minds of the people.”263 The community is the locus of where/what 
the ’I’ is and nothing happens to ‘me’ which does not happen to my community in the 
first place and what happens to me happens to my community also. From best to 
worst things that happen and affect me happen and affect the community; both my joy 
and sorrow are ours. Insult me and you insult my community; attack it and you are 
attacking me; conquer it and you dehumanize me. What ever you do to me, you do to 
my community and vice versa. Thus, “the whole of African society is a living 
network of relations almost like that between various parts of an organism. When one 
part of the body is sick the whole body is affected. When one member of the family is 
honored or successful, the whole group rejoices and shares in the glory… 
Ontologically, each member of the group is part of the honor.”264 Given this 
conception of community, “… the reality of the communal world takes precedence 
over the reality of the individual life histories, whatever these may be.”265  
  
This emphasis on the ontological primacy of community means that it is in 
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terms of other people that persons become conscious of their own being, choices, 
privileges, and responsibilities towards one another, mainly because “it is the 
community that defines the person as a person, not some isolated static quality such 
as rationality, will or memory.”266 Furthermore, the “the notion of personhood is 
acquired,”267 that is; it is “something to be achieved, and not given simply because 
one is born of human seed.”268 In other words, a human being is said to be a person 
when s/he has been imbedded into the community and who has placed in his or her 
heart the virtues and values that the community views as being essential to be a 
person. It is in being rooted in an going human community that the individual comes 
to see herself/himself as a full-fledged human person, one who knows her duties and 
meets his obligation to other persons and to the whole of life. If an individual fails to 
meet his duties or is ineffective at it or cannot do it for reason of immaturity, etc., s/he 
is not a person yet, since ’personhood is something at which individuals could fail, at 
which they could be better or worse, competent or otherwise.’ Personhood is an 
achievement, it is not an entitlement. So, Africans are community-individuals so to 
speak, because “only in terms of other people does the individual become conscious 
of his own being…”269 S/he is an indispensable instance of the reality of the 
community-society.   
 From the standpoint of this social ontology, society consists of interdependent 
individuals. Premised on this, the African is reared, nurtured, and lives through this 
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life world. Accordingly, ‘from their first contact with the world, the children of Africa 
receive response that is very different from that received by the children of Europe or 
North America. She has many homes in her village and she is never isolated since 
several persons are assimilated into one parental role. She owes her place in this 
network of rights and obligations, which is also a network of solidarity.’ In Africa the 
conception of a human being as a “unique individual” is less important than the 
human being as a link in the chain of relations, in the chain of generations. The 
African sees herself more modestly as part of the great streams of life that transcends 
her own life.270 Mbiti’s expression, ‘I am because we are and since we are, because I 
am’ stands in direct contrast to the western view of community as a “a collection of 
self interested persons, each with his private set of preferences, but all of whom get 
together nonetheless because they realize, each to each, that in association they can 
accomplish that which they are not able to accomplish otherwise.”271 Such 
instrumentalist-centered utilitarian conception is not constitutive of the conception of 
community in Africa so far. Having said this, however, one has to be cautious not to 
misread this conception of community society as an absence of human individuality. 
The individual does exist, but as a community individual. Such an individual, 
obviously different from the tradition of the west, reveals its own individuality and its 
own beingness through her community. As Senghor puts it, “the member of the 
community society” may claim “his autonomy to affirm himself as a being. But he 
feels, he thinks that he can develop his potential, his originality, only by society, in 
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union with all other men.”272 The community-individual is constituted by and 
constituting of a social world that is primarily communal. In the light of this, 
Enlightenment rooted attributes of free agency, freedom, and autonomy extended to 
the western individual are not sanctioned and glorified as a point of departure in 
theoretical analysis or social practice in the African social ontology.  
 Here, too, are some lessons to draw for our purpose: The idea that the African 
“cannot exist alone except corporately” does not seem to follow from the western 
view of human being as an individual who is free and self determining. Whereas 
individualism is cardinal to the western conception of persons, “the African abandons 
his personality to be identical with the other; dies to be reborn in the other… He lives 
a common life with the other; he lives in a symbiosis.”273 This ontology is at once 
both a liability and an opportunity. It might have delivered a complementing 
civilization had it been left alone to its own course, which it wasn’t. The most hideous 
thing we made out of this ontology goes to the liability side: As if Africa’s 
community society is not our “formation”, and our “cultivation,”274 our heritage and 
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our grounding; as if it is not our way in the world, we treated it as an easily 
disposable good, believing in the universals we imitated and mimicked without 
success whatsoever. The most that we gained from our ridiculous and dysfunctional 
wedding was “western consumption …rather than western production; western 
taste… rather than western skills; the profit motive… without ethics, and capitalist 
greed rather than its disciplines.”275 As a result, Africa lost at least three options 
simultaneously: it “neither fully destroy the economy of the traditional society and 
replace it with western capitalism (as in Singapore), nor adapt and integrate with the 
local culture (as in Japan), nor leave… indigenous knowledge and practices free to 
develop in their own ways.”276
 Not all hope is lost though and there exists an opportunity side to look for. 
There is no doubt that the colonial experience in Africa introduced ideas of 
individualism and egalitarianism from the metropolitan or colonizing centers (without 
significant success, though). It is also true that both colonialism and the struggle for 
‘liberation’ from colonial oppression gave rise to new African States that crossed 
many boundaries and espoused principles such as ‘individual rights.’ Unfortunately, 
because the post colonial derive towards modernization failed at its core, both the 
values of communalism and individualism suffered. Since it did not succeed in 
rooting out and substituting the indigenous modes, both the community of life and the 
community-society conception, the values of embeddedness commands priority in the 
                                                          
275Mazrui, A., The African, A Triple Heritage, BBC Publications, 1986, p.14.   
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African life, both urban and rural. Values such as solidarity, cooperation, caring, 
friendship, reciprocity, respect, genuine concern for fellow humans, social well being, 
mutual trust/help, associations, sympathy, compassion and generosity continue to 
shape the moral landscape and practices of Africans and are generally held to be of 
more importance than the values associated with possessive individualism and 
rights.277 From such values flow sense of responsibility of individuals to their 
community and obligations to one’s society. Among others, Simone Weil argues for 
the philosophical value of prioritizing one’s obligation to community and the 
importance of “self-denial” as unconditional.278 And in a moral universe and frame 
work where such values prevail and characterize such as in Africa, for example, 
solely rights-based claims serve a disruptive and destructive role. Writing in line with 
Weil’s  line of affectionate reasoning, Gyekye reminds us that, “neglect of , or 
inadequate attention to, the status of responsibilities and obligations on one hand, and 
the obsessional emphasis on, and privileging of, rights on the other hand, could lead 
to the fragmentation of social values and, consequently, of social relationships and 
integrity of society itself. Responsibility, like rights, must therefore be taken 
seriously.279 Since humanity has come of age and went through traumatic experiences 
for millenniums now, lessons must carefully be learned and further errors should be 
                                                          
277see Gyekye, Kwame., Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the 
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avoided, if and when necessary.   
 As shown and argued in this chapter, the worldviews and values that shaped 
the African ways for millennia stand in direct contrast to that of the west. Among 
others, neither the metaphysical self of Descartes nor the free, self determining and 
autonomous self define Africa. Africa has always been a society of interdependent 
persons where both individualism and rights are immensely lacking or just slowly and 
painfully emerging. Despite the many interruptions and impositions Africa went 
through, it still is a predominantly a community-society of interdependent human 
beings and this has radical implications for the “democratization” of Africa. Almost 
all modernization projects failed to bear the right fruit in Africa280 and we must learn 
our lessons carefully and critically before the current democracy euphoria lands us on 
unchartered territories or even in hostile takeovers. For instance, one dominant 
characterization of modernity is its insidious separation of the social and the natural 
spheres of existence, to borrow from B. Latour.281 This attempt ‘to create two 
ontological zones - the zone of human life and culture and the arena of the non-
human and the natural’ hasn’t been achieved in Africa. Community society is 
embedded in the chain of the community of life and its umbilical cord hasn’t been 
severed yet. Part of the remedy lies in reaching back to Africa’s un-severed 
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connection between the human and the natural and to its pre-colonial past so as to 
critically appropriate values that could help us democratize Africa in its own 
potentials and terms without depriving it the best of values from the western 
experiences.  
 In general, from this succinct review of Africana Philosophy, it would be 
correct and fair to draw the idea that one cannot democratize by indiscriminately 
ignoring one’s life-world, formation, ways and cultivations. Equally it is not enough 
to acknowledge and worship ones history and tradition without critical examination 
when one talks about projects like democratization. One’s world, one’s philosophy of 
life must be taken seriously with the care it deserves and the critical reflection it 
cannot escape. In the absence of such critically-cautious intervention, neither the 
force to export nor the will and euphoria to import democracy will bring about the 
transformation needed to reclaim Africa as a totality. Africa’s spiritualistic ontology 
stands in contrast to the world view that shaped the now dominant brand of western 
democracy; its social ontology clearly stands in contrast to the 
sociological/philosophical foundations that nurtured western democracy. The 
indiscriminate annihilation, cleansing and genocide Africa went through didn’t lead 
to strong nation states; in the contrary, it leads to a total human loss and tortured and 
tormented spatial arrangements. Given this picture, Africa cannot bear the burden and 
consequences of another wholesale and fashionable mindless project. This does not 
lead to the conclusion that Africa cannot democratize; on the contrary, it suggests the 
critical need to transcend the traps of both “traditionalist-antiquarianism” and 
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“abstract-liberal universalism.”282 Thus, perhaps it is time for Africans to revisit 
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CHAPTER 4 
PanAfrican Grounding of Africana Democracy 
 I. Nationhood and Democracy: the history of western democracy and the 
relation it has with the history of western nation states and vice versa deserves some 
reflection in the context of the work at hand. Western democracy is deeply 
intermingled and embedded with the question of and aspirations for a nation state; it 
cannot be seen apart from the total modernization project, reminder that “liberty 
presupposes national homogeneity,”283 although liberty preceded democracy. One 
expression of this modernization drive is its success in the making of nation-states. 
An important question that comes to one’s mind would then be whether nation-states 
resulted from democratic engagements or whether democracy antedated by the birth 
and development of nation states? Although there is no easy answer to this question, I 
argue that, reflection on the history of established democracies and nation states 
shows the privileged dominance of the power of the sword over the power of 
pen/words. I will make a brief presentation of this link and would try to show the 
groundings for the possibility of an Africana democracy in this chapter.   
 In his now classic work, Barrington Moore, Jr. shows that modernization of 
the first industrial powers ended up as democracies. But, like Feyerbend and Mann 
after him, he maintains the view that in all the paths to modernization, there has been 
a great deal of injustice. He cites how peasant societies in particular have been 
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demolished or exploited in every modernizing society.284 Whereas Moore reminds the 
economic side of the dark side befallen on peasants, Paul Feyerbend articulates the 
epistemological and scientific dimension of the project when he writes, “the rise of 
modern science coincided with the suppression of non-western tribes by western 
invaders.”285 Mann links modernization and the rise of western liberal democracy 
with genocidal cleansing. In his book, The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining 
Ethnic Cleansing,” he makes a number of hypotheses, the first of which is that 
“Murderous cleansing is modern because it is the dark side of democracy…. 
Democracy has always carried with it the possibility that the majority might tyrannize 
minorities, and this possibility carries more ominous consequences in certain types of 
multiethnic environments.”286 This thesis contains two core concepts: modernity and 
democracy. He comments, ‘although not unknown in previous history, ethnic 
cleansing is modern; and such cleansing is a hazard of the edge of democracy since 
amid multiethnicity the ideal of rule by the people began to entwine the demos with 
the ethnos, generating organic conceptions of the nation and the state that encouraged 
the cleansing of the minorities.’ “In their past, cleansing and democratization 
proceeded hand in hand. Liberal democracies were built on the top of ethnic 
cleansing…murderous cleansing has been moving across the world as it has 
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modernized and democratized.287 Mann is not alone in making such a claim given his 
paraphrasing of A. Wimmer, who argues, “modernity is structured by ethnic and 
nationalist principles because the institutions of citizenship, democracy, and welfare 
are tied to ethnic and national forms of exclusion.”288 Thus, the modern project that 
ignited western democracy entailed national exclusion and there exist both causative 
and correlative relations between democratization and the cleansing of “the other”, if 
Mann and Wimmer were correct.  
 According to G. Chailand, from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment, the 
notion of divine right gave way to those of national sovereignty; the ‘source of all 
sovereignty,’ declared the revolutionaries of 1789 France, “is essentially the 
nation.”289 Whether the conception of the nation is contractual or organic, the central 
idea was that the right to self-determination belongs to the nation. So, by the time 
‘wars of national unification’ engulfed 19th century Europe there was a consensus that 
the rightful destiny of every nation was to establish its own state.290 So, as Bohannan 
and Curtain succinctly put it, “Europeans begin with the nation which then wanted to 
become an independent state.”291 If this claim stands contest292, it clearly is different 
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from the African path/experience. Most contemporary African states were born from 
anti-colonial struggles, not from struggles for a national statehood. Whereas 
Europeans went from the nation to the state, African “wanted independence for the 
units so that they could become nations;”293 from a colonial state to a search for a 
nation, where national statehood remains a dream that has not been fulfilled for so 
many yet. Although important and unavoidable, it should be borne in mind that the 
important issue at stake is the need for state/nation building, not the theoretical 
concern whether it is the state or the nation that is the vehicle in the process.   
 For our purpose, “a nation is a population that purportedly has a right to state 
of its own.”294 This definition of the term “nation” derives from Max Weber’s 
definition that “a nation is a community of sentiment which would adequately 
                                                                                                                                                                     
“Nations” do not just exist, rather they emerge like many other social phenomena in a 
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manifest itself in the state of its own; hence a nation is a community which normally 
tends to produce a state of its own.”295 In other words, “Nations are the cultural 
systems and modes of ethnic identification that bind groups of people together. They 
embody the collective signs and symbols with which people of the same nation 
identify, invest cultural meaning in, and invoke at key sociopolitical moments.”296 In 
his now celebrated book, Benedict Anderson describes nations as “imagined 
communities,”297 which among others means that, the cultural artifacts of nations 
essentially act to ensure that, while individuals will never meet all of those who share 
their national identity, it is possible to imagine a community of fellow citizens 
experiencing nationhood in a similar way. According to scholars like Hobsbawm and 
others298 who studied the emergence of nationalism in the modern world, a nation is 
“a social entity only in so far as it relates to [a] certain kind of modern territorial state, 
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the ‘nation state;’”299 in other words, nations can only be fulfilled in their own 
states.” The relationship between ethnic homogeneity and political liberty was 
recognized by J. S. Mill, who believed that the former is necessary for the later.300 
States, on the other hand, are understood as “demarcated political entities, with 
bureaucratic systems of administration, rules of law and sovereign powers.” They 
“represent the real-politick of a given country, its official political system…”301 The 
cultural myths,  foundation legends, and imaginary geography of nationalism are 
often used to undergird state authority. States often make reference to key national 
motifs, historical events, and cultural values in order to support their own legitimacy 
and policy decisions. Thus, a territorial jurisdiction (the state) and a political 
community (the nation), constitute the “Nation State.”      
 II. African States are Nation States? given this conception of a ‘nation’ 
where would African states be placed? Or, are they unfit for “nationhood”? One 
cannot answer this without some kind of reflection on the injustices and afflictions 
rooted in colonialism and its legacies. Colonization is a project of dehumanization 
pursued rationally: (1) it sanctioned ontological gradation that confers humanity and 
superiority to some while squarely denying the humanity and equality of the other; 
for instance, racial divisions and apartheid, separate, segregated, and unequal 
residential townships. (2) It instituted spatial balkanization and/or imbricated and 
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multiple spaces. The current political map of Africa and the various entrapped voices 
crying for unity because they were unjustly separated or those who struggle for just 
separation because they were forcefully united against their wills and their ethnic and 
cultural groups confirm this. (3) Colonialism resulted in human affliction enmass that 
goes beyond ordinary human suffering and poverty. The structural violence, loss of 
natural human environment, personal/psycho-social crumbling and destruction are its 
existentially and empirically observable and sanctioned consequences.  
The states carved out by the Europeans were created with no or accidental 
regard to human roots/relations and systematically destroyed or supplanted local 
traditions. Artificial boundaries and imbricated peoples are constitutive of partitioned 
and “decolonized” Africa. Although simplistic it seems to say that ‘the boundaries 
separating African States were… arbitrarily drawn, separated peoples, linguistic 
entities, and cultural and political communities that formed natural and homogeneous 
wholes before colonization,302’ it is the most damaging and lasting seal in the 
                                                          
302This view is said to be simplistic because there are competing geneses to African 
boundaries or/and to state that current African boundaries are merely a product of 
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project’s history. “Before colonization” writes Mbembe “Africans’ attachment to the 
territory and to the land was certainly relative. In some cases, political entities were 
delimited not by boundaries in the classical sense of the term, rather by an 
imbrication of multiple spaces constantly joined, disjoined, and recombined through 
wars, conquests, and the mobility of goods and persons…pre-colonial territoriality is 
an itinerant territoriality”303 where “various centers of power might have authority 
over a single place, which might itself fall under the control of another place that was 
nearby, distant, or even imaginary.”304 As Lonsdale,305 Adel and Aron306 contend, 
“Before the conquest, they represented spaces of encounter, negotiation, and 
opportunity for Europeans and Africans.” According to Ali Mazrui, “balkanization is 
a breeding-ground for political violence,” he reminds us that, “It was…in Africa that 
Europe practiced the art of partition at its most elaborate. Where Europe attempted to 
unify those who were different, it sowed the seeds of future separatism… Where 
Europe divided, it left behind latent passions for reunifications…307 By any standard, 
the partition is a work of malicious and ominous craftsmanship that underlies and 
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explains why a number of African states are engulfed in destabilizing confrontations 
and adversarial conflicts and wars that make them fragile, chaotic, and ‘failing’. 
 With the precision and mathematical indifference inherent in Colonial 
cartography, colonial boundaries divided peoples sharing common ethnicity, 
language, cultures… and forced them to “settle” in different, even hostile bordering 
states. Such artificial constructs created borders that separated homogenous cultural 
and linguistic groups and mechanically merged groups on the basis of access to 
privileged natural resources. The configuration of pre colonial traditional empires and 
kingdoms in Africa had nothing or little to do with the colonial borders imposed after 
the Berlin Conference, for indigenous African allegiances followed kinship, ethnic, 
linguistic, and cultural affiliations. This claim can be confirmed by checking against 
authoritative maps of Africa where there were no “national” boundaries and divisions 
before the 1891.308As Denis Wood reminds us, “maps are windows onto the societies 
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that shaped them as much as they are windows onto the world itself,”309 although 
cartographic-epistemology (map making in this case) is infested with a contradiction 
from the outset: “a claim to represent objectively a world they can only subjectively 
present, a claim made to win acceptance for a view of the world whose utility lies 
precisely in its partiality.”310  
 Colonial division and colonial cartography largely and actively erased the-
then existing social and cultural formations in the making of a new map and the way 
was cleared for the projection and subsequent establishment of a colonially 
sanctioned orders and borders. It succeeded in creating the other out of the owner; 
served as a “…reinscription, enclosure and heirarchization of space as analogue for 
the acquisition, management and reinforcement of colonial power.”311 The 
cartographic knife that mutilated Africa into its current boundaries is driven purely by 
the principle of land acquisition (or the “height-of-land principles”) thereby negating 
the cultural, ethnic, and linguistic connections between and among the populations. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the Cartography of West Africa,” Journal of African History, 32: 367-413; 
“Cartography and Empire Building in Nineteenth Century West Africa,” 
Geographical Review 84 (3): 316-335, 1994.   
309Wood, Denis., “The Power of Maps;” Scientific American, May 1993: p. 91. See 
also Wood’s, The Power of Maps; Guilford Press, 1992; Hall, Stephens S., Mapping 
The Next Millennium: The Discovery of New Geographies, Random House, 1992; 
McIlwane, J; Maps and Mapping of Africa: A Resource Guide, East Grinstead, UK: 
Hans Zell Publishers, 1997; Monmonier, M., How to Lie With Maps, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991.   
310Ibid., p. 93.   
311Huggan, Graham., “Decolonizing the Map: Post-Colonialism, Post-Structuralism 
and the Cartographic Connection,” Ariel 20.4, 113-31, 1989, p. 117, see also Belyea, 
B., Images of Power: Derrida/Foucault/Harley., Cartographica 29 (2): 1-9, 1992; 
Harley, J. B., Maps, Knowledge, and Power, in the Iconography of Landscape ed. D. 
Cosgrove and S. Daniels, pp. 277-305, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988; Deconstructing the Map, Cartographica (26 (2): 1-20.   
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Such physical compartmentalization resulted in antagonistic and hostile 
neighborhoods with overlapping populations separated and displaced across artificial 
boundaries. Thus, colonial cartography made a bleeding continent of endless refugees 
out of Africa and its current crises were rationally planned and planted at the dawn of 
the partition. It created a continent of boundless wounds, therefore. A system based 
on a functional relationship between mechanical settlement and expropriation leaves 
millions and millions of Africans in a position in which the task of physical survival 
determines everything else312 with all its attendant consequences. Although reasons 
for current African conflicts cannot solely be explained in terms of colonial divisions 
alone, its most heinous and senseless wars, ethno/genocides that occurred and 
continue at present go back to this colonial spatial mechanics. From the Biafra war in 
Nigeria to the Rwanda and the Darfur Genocide and many so called “civil wars“ and 
“border wars” in between, were/are massive negative realizations of political time 
bombs planted just about Berlin’s partition of Africa. It is evident from these that 
most African States are not nation-states.      
 III. The cause/s of Africa’s balkanization: Europe’s hunger and lust for 
resources. This resulted in a political framing of nature as a national/imperial 
property. In other words, colonial partition is a political framing of nature as a 
national/imperial resource. Nature, in the form of geographical landscapes and 
geomorphologic forms, conditioned the geopolitical context for imperial partition and 
                                                          
312If the concentration camps are the ultimate essence of modernity, so is colonial-
capitalist partition which succeeded in creating millions of suffering wonderers in 
Africa. Isn’t every refugee-camp itself a concentration camp?     
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colonization of Africa. Since then, territorial expansion and the enclosure of ‘good 
nature”313 continues to drive the boundary and territorial feuds and open wars 
between and among African states of today. Colonial partition is an act and method of 
mobilization for both space and resources that crafted and created pieces of 
disproportionate and unequally balkanized African states. Therefore, the 
territorilization of the natural lurks behind Europe’s detrimental project and still 
remains one of the most difficult hurdles fueling multiple conflicts reigning in Africa 
today. The following conflict over water is a case in point.  
 The conflict surrounding the Nile Basin shows what is meant by the ‘political 
framing of nature as a national/imperial resource.’ To reiterate the obvious, Egypt 
depends on the River Nile for much of its water needs. The head waters of the Nile 
pass through and supply many African states before it eventually reaches Egypt. This 
of course makes Egypt exceptionally vulnerable to attempts by other riparian states to 
capture water from the Nile through irrigation schemes and dam-building projects. 
From the late 1970s onwards, the supply of water has been the top geopolitical 
priority of the Egyptian state - even more important than its political relations with 
the state of Israel.314 Egypt’s concerns with water supply issues stem from the fact 
                                                          
313For more on the relationship between nature and the formation and expansion of 
states, see Mackinder, H., “The Geographical Pivot of History,” Geographical 
Journal 23, 421-37, 1904; “The Territorial Growth of State,” Scottish Geographical 
Magazine, 12, 1896, p. 35-61; Harvey, D., The New Imperialism, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003a; Spaces of Hope, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2000; Justice, nature and geography of Difference, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996.        
314In deed, the key focus of Egypt’s foreign policies and international relations 
strategies now appears to be Sudan and Ethiopia, two states with influence over the 
flow and utilization of the Nile water. For more detail on the geopolitical significance 
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that without water the state would simply stop functioning. Although water supply 
has obviously been an issue in the Nile basin ever since its settlements by a large 
number of people, it is the colonial and post colonial carving up of the basin into 
individual states that is the key to understanding contemporary conflicts in the region. 
Post colonial states of the Basin continue to use territorial strategies to control facets 
of nature that are aterritorial in essence. Despite the dam-building projects 
undertaken by the Egyptian state, the River Nile is not the exclusive property of any 
of the states, including Egypt. The Nile continues to flow through other states and 
across other territorial borders in the region. Thus, in contradistinction to the 
argument that the persistent leakage of nature across sovereign territorial boundaries 
in places like the Nile basin makes discussions of the state meaningless, 315 it is the 
historical legacy and continued desire of modern post colonial states to territorially 
frame nature that is generating the conflict in the region.  
 Accordingly, the Nile River, like most international rivers or water courses, 
came under a regime of international principles that territorially frame the river as a 
national resource, which in turn gave birth to the escalation of life threatening 
conflicts in the region. The same remains true in other areas of the globe where the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
of water supply and review of water resources management conflicts in the Nile 
basin, see Klare, M., Resource Wars: The New Landscapes of Global Conflict, NY: 
Henry Holy, 2002; Elhance, A.P., Hydro-Politics in the Third World: Conflict and 
Co-operation in the International River Basins, Washington, DC: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 1999.    
315See, Kuehls, T., Beyond Sovereign Territory: The Space of Ecopolitics, 
Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1996; Young, O. R., 
International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society, 
London: Cornell University Press, 1994.     
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right to a river basin is contested. One such principle is referred to as “the Absolute 
Sovereignty/Territory principle (or “The Harmon Doctrine”316). It states that a state 
has the right to use the river that lies within its territory without any limitation 
whatsoever, regardless of the effects of its utilization on other states. Accordingly, 
territorial sovereignty is “the sovereignty applied to a specific country or basin, the 
right to make decision with regard to this country or basin, without having to consult 
other countries and their citizens.”317 This principle is advantageous to the upstream 
countries, in that they maintain the right to utilize the water source in any way that 
they deem it necessary. In short, the Absolute Sovereignty/Territory principle gives 
the upstream riparian the right to all water resources originating in its territory. The 
Absolute Integrity Principle, on the other hand, states that “a river which flows 
through the territory of several states or nations is their common property…Neither 
nation can do any act which will deprive the other/s of the benefits of those rights and 
advantages. The inherent right of a nation to protect itself and its territory would 
justify the one lower down the stream in preventing by force the one further up from 
turning the river out of its course, or in consuming so much water for purposes of its 
                                                          
316This is named after J. Harmon, Attorney General to the USA, who argued and 
defended in 1890’s that the US could do what it pleased with the Rio Grande River 
irrespective of the down stream consequences to the neighboring Mexico. See Kliot, 
N., Water resources and conflict in the Middle East, NY: Routledge: London, 1994. 
P.5.        
317Quoted in Scheumann, W. and Schiffler, M. (eds.), Water in the Middle East: 
potential for conflicts and prospects for Cooperation, Springer: Berlin; New York, 
c1998, p. 15. Also see Klare, Michael., Resource Wars: the New landscape of global 
conflict, Metropolitan Books: New York, 2001 for compelling arguments.   
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own as to deprive the former of its benefits….”318This principle favors the 
downstream riparian states, because a downstream state typically takes the position 
that the natural course of the flow of the river must be respected and preserved. It 
gives rise to the conflict between prior right and existing use of a river. The lower 
riparian might claim that its prior use of the water along the lower course of a river 
endows it with historical rights that must be respected by the upstream riparian 
sates/s. In short, Absolute Integrity Principle gives the down stream riparian the right 
to an unaltered flow. In either case it is easy to observe how the attempt to nationalize 
nature lurks behind the conflict surrounding international rivers like the Nile. Even 
more, contiguous petroleum reserves and other strategic energy supplies are driving 
warfare from the Red Sea, through Darfur, to the Great Lakes of Central Africa, 
where private military companies operate alongside petroleum contractors and 
“humanitarian” agencies thereby causing less reported genocides and structural 
violence almost everywhere in Africa.319           
                                                          
318Henry Farnham quoted in Scheumann, W. and Schiffler, M. (eds.), Ibid, p.5.     
319For instance, see Snow, Keith Harmon., “Darfurism, Uganda and the U.S. War in 
Africa: The Spectre of Continental Genocide,” Dissident Voice, November 24th, 2007 
or see at  http://www.dissidentvoice.org/2007/11/darfurism-uganda-and-the-us-war-
in-africa/; Keith Harmon Snow and David Barouski., “Behind the Numbers: Untold 
Suffering in the Congo,” Thursday, 30 March 2006; 
http://www.towardfreedom.com/home/content/view/787/; also at 
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www.allthingspass.com ; Zalik, Anna and Michael Watts, “Imperial Oil: Petroleum 
Politics in the Nigerian Delta and the New Scramble for Africa,” Socialist Review, 
April 2006 or online at 
http://www.socialistreview.org.uk/article.php?articlenumber=9712 ; Sprocket., 
“High-Tech Genocide,” Earth First! Journal, August 2005;  
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 The lesson to be drawn from the case given is that such a spatial crisis fuels 
and reinforces various types of related predicaments in Africa.320 African states of 
today suffer from both political and spatial legitimacy where both political consent 
and territorial legitimacy are in short supply. There are countries drumming for wars 
because of aterritorial claims; there are large nations whose dreams of forging 
statehood were frustrated; and there are states that are dismally failing from the 
center, handing over the fate of their subject-citizens to the private armies of the war 
lords (thereby hastening the privatization of the state in Africa321), the international 
NGO’s, or even to the brute luxury only known and enjoyable in the state of nature 
alone. Given this dismal history, in Africa, spatial justice is no less important than all 
other kinds known and claimed so far. Furthermore, the compartmentalization of 
space or spatial mutilation of Africa and the infusion of values alien to Africa went 
together. These weakened the indigenous values without any dependable value 
alternative. To borrow from F. Fanon, traditional community is described as society 
lacking values, the enemy of values, it is the absolute epitome of evil. It is a corrosive 
element, destroying all that has to do with beauty and morality; it is the depository of 
flagitious powers, the unconscious and irretrievable instrument of blind forces. Its 
                                                          
320Obviously, Africa is a conflict ridden country. Yet it would be a mistake and an 
exaggeration, however, to categorically declare that all such conflicts have their 
immediate point of origin in border disputes resulting from colonial incisions. For 
further discussion, see under Mbembe’s “Cultural and Symbolic Territorialities,” 
Ibid., pp. 61-64.     
321Mbembe, Achille., “At the Edge of the World: Boundaries, Territoriality, and 
Sovereignty in Africa, in Beissinger, Mark R. and Young, Crawford (eds.), Beyond 
State Crisis? Post Colonial Africa and Post-Soviet Eurasia in Comparative 
Perspective, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, D.C, 2002, pp.53-80.  
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customs and traditions were taken as a proof for and the very sign of the poverty of 
spirit and their constitutional depravity. The result: (a) a deep sense of cultural and 
psychological alienation, self hatred, self-rejection, and a futile and tragic attempt on 
the part of the colonized to regain their humanity through the apish imitation of the 
white people;322 (b) it helped the proliferation of primordial political ideologies and 
centers of kin attachments and loyalties.  
 This again has further implication for many projects. If the view that 
ideologically mediated civic integration is a pre/condition for a democratic ways323 is 
correct, partitioned and “decolonized” Africa has a poor record in this respect. Civic 
integration means that the people's preferences for identities have changed from an 
ethnic or sub-ethnic loyalty to a higher and greater civic, national or patriotic one, be 
it imagined or real. Without transcending (or submerging) the multiplicity of ethnic 
identities populating Africa with a civic-citizenry identity or with a larger civic-value 
identity (or somehow separating the two), a successful transformation of Africa 
wouldn’t be easily tenable, whether in peace making or democratization or other 
spheres undertaking lasting projects. In “de-colonized” Africa, no civic integration 
successfully took place and, at present, African societies and states lack ideologically 
mediated civic unity beyond “ethnic morality.” Both ethnicity and primordiality 
                                                          
322For detailed analysis, see Fanon, F., The Wretched of the earth, NY: Grove Press, 
1963; The Wretched of the Earth, 1st ed., Philcox, Richard (Trans.) with commentary 
by Jean-Paul Sartre and Homi K. Bhabha, New York : Grove Press: Distributed by 
Publishers Group West, c2004.   
323Gottlieb, G. 1993. Nation Against State: A New Approach to Ethnic Conflict and 
the Decline of Sovereignty. New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1993, pp. 
43-44; McGarry, J. & B. O'Leary (eds.) The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation. 
London: Routledge, 1993, p. 16ff).   
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characterize different African societies and states today. Although, an ethnic identity 
and ethnic membership transcends the range of face-to-face relationships324 like clans 
and tribes, it falls short of being a civic or national community, unless the 
ethnic/nation succeeds in forging identity with the state - thus, a nation state. The 
latter is rooted in geographic space, integrating laws and institutions, citizenship and 
shared values, which is not the case in Africa yet.  
 IV. Ethnos and Demos? This has a critical implication for democracy: the 
“demos” of democracy shift from what the Greeks meant by the word to “ethnos”- an 
ethnic group or ethno-hegemony, Ethnocracy325 or/and ethno-democracy.326 Where 
the nation-state is forged, the link between the “demos” and the “people” is taken as a 
                                                          
324Anderson, B; Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of 
Nationalism. London: Verso, 1983, p. 14; Horowitz, D. L; Ethnic Groups in Conflict. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, p. 53.   
325Ethnocracy is a regime that promotes an ethnic agenda. Oren Yiftachel, for 
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of Conflict Management in Ethnically Divided Societies,” Nations and Nationalism 8 
(4), pp.423-31, 2002; Smooha, Sammy and Theodor Hanf., “The Diverse Mode of 
Conflict-Regulation in Deeply Divided Societies,” International Journal of 
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given. Where such transformation and identification doesn’t exist and where various 
ethnic groups remain packed along side one another without being together in 
arbitrarily devised artificial boundaries, (in the above quoted Mazrui’s sense of the 
statement), the “people” of democracy become the ethnos of different ethnic groups, 
people adhering to their primordial loyalties thereby vying against each other in a 
power struggle for dominance, space, and survival. Such competition lead to the 
formation of ethnic hegemonies, ethnocracies, and ethnic despotism which in turn 
pave the ground for civil wars, ethno and genocides in parts of Africa . Where there 
are no binding common-civic-societal values and where the repressive and oppressive 
structure of the central state is the only “unifying” force, ‘rule by the people’ turns 
insular. Thus, what John Lonsdale terms as “moral ethnicity” (practice, conviction, 
and attitude that makes “one a good member of a local community”)327 became 
inevitable thereby precluding the flourishing of wider civic responsibility; deeply 
embedded and duty-bound personal ties and relations take an absolute precedence 
over the concept and practice of the rule of law. Richard Joseph’s “prebandalism” 
(‘competing’ for existing state offices and utilizing them for the personal benefit of 
office-holders as well as that of their reference and support group)328 becomes a 
morally sanctioning and binding norm rather than an exception. The failure in 
                                                          
327Lonsdale, John; “Moral Ethnicity and political Tribalism,” in Preben Kaarsholm 
and Jan Hultin (eds.), Invention and boundaries: Historical and Anthropological 
Approaches to the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism, Denmark: Institute for 
development Studies, Roskild University; 1994, pp. 131-50.    
328Joseph, Richard; “Class, State, and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria,” in Peter Lewis 
(ed.) Africa: Dilemmas of Development and Change, Westview Press, Boulder: CO, 
1988, pp. 44-63.   
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nation/state making or the inability to forge an inclusive multiethnic/multicultural 
state gave rise to clientelism (patron-client politics, state patronage, and consequently, 
“the politicization of ethnicity”). “Citizenship” is conceived in ethnic and territorial 
terms, and a person’s enjoyment of some existing or imagined rights depends on 
her/his appurtenance to her/his ethnic group loyalty and locality. Thus, practices such 
as use of formal public institutions for personal or clientele gains are the standards; 
concepts like “impersonal but equal citizenship,” individual rights, rule of law; 
majoritarian rule and minority rights, accountability, transparency, etc. fly in the face 
of the values and practices presupposed and implied by Westerners conception of 
democracy. For instance, liberal citizenship “holds that rights inhere in individuals, 
exist prior to community, and are guaranteed with minimal obligation to the 
community;” whereas, under the regime of moral ethnicity rights are “acquired 
through practices that upholds obligations to the community.”329 Or, for instance, the 
mere application of an egalitarian principle such as “one person  
one vote” might give rise to “demographic hegemony,” “demographic prominence” 
or “demographic advantage”330 respectively and may result in the domination of an 
ethnic group with the largest voting population over others or even in ethnic cleansing 
                                                          
329Ndegwa, Stephen; “Citizenship and Ethnicity: An Examination of Two Transition 
Moments in Kenyan Politics,” American Political Science review 91 (3): 599-616, 
1997.   
330See, Central Intelligence Agency, World fact Book, 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ ; Freedom House, Annual Survey of 
political Rights and Liberties; Dowty, Allan., The Jewish State: A Century Later, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000 (Table 7, 212).   
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and ethno/genocides at worst.331   
 In cultures where primordial loyalties are serving as safety nets and social 
insurances; in societies where both nation and state building didn’t happen in the 
modern western sense of the term or where accommodative and inclusive politics 
remain an expensive political good, corrupt-looking condemnable practices such as 
“Clientelism”, “moral ethnicity”, “political tribalism”, “prebandalism,”332 corruption, 
etc. are options available for people having no shared national-societal goals and 
visions, people who happened to came together by external forces or repressive 
authorities from some geopolitical center of power. So, where society is not 
nationalized and the state is not socialized and, where there is no common societal 
national value uniting people living in territorially shared space along one another, 
the first step in establishing a democratic regime should commence with the 
development of national society and a socialized state. D. A. Rustow reminds us that 
societal-communal solidarity must precede the acceptance of political conflict, the 
institutionalization of rules governing political conflict, and the habituation of 
political struggle.333  
 Both nation and state building remain crucial in this regard and 
                                                          
331See, Mann, Michael; The dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing, 
Cambridge University Press, NY, 2005; Roeder, Philip G., Where Nation States 
Come From: Institutional Change in the Age of Nationalism,  Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2007.   
332See Linsdale, John 1994: 131-50; Joseph, Richard 1998: 44-63; Ndegwa, Stephen 
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democratization in Africa has this challenge to meet and overcome, since the relation 
between political stability and ethnic homogeneity cannot easily be ignored.334 In 
their work on pluralistic societies, for example, Alvin Rabushka and K.A. Shepsle 
have noted that these societies are often polarized because political elites rationally 
appeal to the interests of their constituency, a conclusion that seems to have been 
confirmed by numerous ethnic conflicts all over.335 (Although ethnic homogeneity is 
an ideal condition for political stability, it does not follow that multi-ethnicity is an 
insurmountable barrier to political stability either,336 since the political will to include 
and accommodate ‘others’ is a democratic and human possibility as well). 
Accordingly, nations whose statehood dreams were frustrated and whose just claims 
remained unanswered need to be redressed; disproportionate, unjust, and 
ungovernable spatial and territorial possessions handed down from the carving and 
curbing of the partition era need to be revisited in ways contributing to the shaping of 
peaceful, just, and friendly societies in Africa. The issue of the so called “failing” 
centers should be seen in the light of the logic of the compartmentalization itself. 
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Plural Societies, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977/1997; Democracies: 
Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries, New 
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Peoples who were forced to come to live along one another without any integrating 
common ideology or identity building value/s, who don’t share an integrated society 
or where there is no social integration and where a functioning state apparatus is 
absent, cannot be blamed for falling apart; it should be seen as a miracle if such 
peoples remain living ‘together’ along each other in an artificial space created for 
them.   
  
V. Towards United Africa: So, peoples political and psychological thirst for 
statehood cannot and shouldn’t be stopped in the name of territorial unity and 
integrity of the post-colonial states, for an imposed and illegitimate sovereignty 
doesn‘t deserve recognition and respect in the first place; moreover, it is international 
law as written and sanctioned by the very colonial powers that gives precedence to 
state sovereignty over peoples’ quest for their political and spatial rights and 
freedoms. Unity is the most powerful asset Africans have; it must, however, be 
centered around on reasoned choices of the people concerned and not merely around 
on an already imposed geophysical and spatial criteria. If territorial unity and 
integrity violates peoples right to their lives, the enjoyment of their cherished values 
and shared cultures, their rights to freedom of movement, their desire to live together 
with their kin brothers and sisters from the other side of the geopolitical divide and, if 
resources are valued over peoples rightful demands, there is no reason to sanction any 
legitimately and morally contested statuesque. There should be no trade off between 
territorial integrity of countries and the inviolable rights of peoples dreaming and 
    146
seeking freedoms. Territorial integrity and sovereignty of states shouldn’t be given 
precedence over the injustice and national oppression of peoples seeking the 
legitimate reaffirmation of their pride and dignity as human beings. Thus, 
Ethnic/national demands and grievances resulting from an actual or perceived 
national oppression and one’s preferred or imagined national identity should be 
acknowledged and addressed properly.   
 No people go to war nor would they refuse to a peaceful coexistence where 
there is no actual exclusion or visible sense of neglect. So, quenching the thirst for 
freedom from oppression is a legitimate right people are owed because they are 
subjugated and excluded. This is neither a destabilizing nor a radical proposal. It is 
reminder that it should always be the consented will and desire of the people to live 
together that should determine the validity and force of sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, not the obsession with territorial unity and integrity nor the mere adherence 
to and enforcement of international law. It should be human interest in general and 
the interests of the nationally oppressed and the excluded in particular that should 
define the legitimacy of powers to be. It should be human interest, not national 
interest that be given the pride of place when addressing national afflictions and 
grievances inherited from the history of cumulated injustices. Governments and 
international communities should look for consent among peoples to live together as 
criterion in tackling the dilemma present in the quest for national self-determination 
on one hand and territorial unity and integrity of countries on the other. It is immoral 
and unsustainable to purchase “territorial unity and integrity” at expense of the 
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legitimate quest for self-determination and national freedoms. Morally, politically,  
and constitutionally sound arrangements in addressing the excluded elite’s demand 
for inclusion in the exercise of power and the excluded peoples quest for equally 
sharing the benefits and burdens of living in a common state would maximize the 
sense of living together with respect and understanding with each other. Accordingly, 
imposition of authority337 should no longer serve to justify claims for sovereignty and 
the fear of erosion of territorial sovereignty should not preclude the possibility of 
restructuring of spaces,338 if this is the best alternative to conditions of undignified 
national life as perceived by those who feel and live the burden of affliction and 
indignity.  Besides, control of and access to what Thomas W. Pogge terms as 
“International Borrowing Privileges” (IBP) and “International Resource Privileges” 
(IRP)339 shouldn’t be ignored in the process of righting the wrongs. There are peoples 
all over Africa (and in many parts of the globe) that find themselves under unlivable 
brutal conditions because of such privileges, people who were made strangers and 
aliens in their own lands.  
 It is possible to imagine counter arguments against the need to privilege the 
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Clapham, Christopher., “Sovereignty and the Third World State,” Political Studies 
47, No. 3: 522-37, 1999.     
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rights and dignity of the oppressed over national/territorial integrity, however. For 
instance, if belonging to the nation is to be determined according to criteria like 
language, ethnic origin or religion rather than on the basis of neutrally inclusive civil 
values/principles, it can easily have serious problematic consequences. For instance, 
there is a danger that ethnicizing the political discourse in the context of latent 
conflicts and social mobilization will lower the threshold for violence and trigger 
vicious conflicts which are ethnically structured. Still more, such a context transforms 
the nation-building process: instead of striving for or achieving the integration of 
society as a whole, the alternative then arises to conduct nation-building either as a 
repressive project of hegemony by one ethnic group over others or bring about a 
situation of competition between different nation-building projects conducted by the 
various ethnic groups. Both lead to the intensification of conflicts and the risk of 
these being waged in a violent manner at present or in the future.340 Although with 
merit, this argument ignores the mere empirical fact that Africa is ethnicity 
objectified as a way of life, whose negative implications and amplifications are 
                                                          
340see Hippler, Jochen; Nation-building : a key concept for peaceful conflict 
transformation?/edited by Jochen Hippler; translated by Barry Stone, London; Ann 
Arbor, MI: Pluto; Bonn: In association with the Development and Peace Foundation, 
2005; The democratization of disempowerment : the problem of democracy in the 
Third World/edited by Jochen Hippler, London; East Haven, CT: Pluto Press with 
Transnational Institute, 1995; Atwood, J. Brian, 1994: “Nation Building and Crisis 
Prevention in the Post-Cold War World,” in: Brown Journal of World Affairs, year 
2/1 (Winter), p. 11-17; Eriksen, Thomas Hylland, 1993: “A Future-Oriented, Non-
Ethnic Nationalism? – Mauritius as an Exemplary Case,” in Ethnos, year 58, p. 197-
221; Greenfeld, Liah; Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge 1992; 
Lipset, Seymour Martin, 1963: The First New Nation: The United States in Historical 
and Comparative Perspective, London, 1963; Rivkin, Arnold; Nation-Building in 
Africa: Problems and Prospects. New Brunswick 1969.   
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largely post colonial creations and results from ethno-despotic-hegemonism and elite 
competitions for power and wealth. African States are cohabited by ethnic groups 
existing along one another with competing and conflicting stories and backgrounds 
and therefore ethnicity is a fact one should live with and ethnicization of politics is a 
mode of doing politics in Africa so far. And more, it is not ethnicity per se that is a 
problem; rather, it is the state’s failure at integrating society hitherto, the prevalence 
of politics that privileges some cultures, resources and resource spaces thereby 
practicing ethnic exclusion and oppression under the guise of national unity and 
territorial integrity over the rights of peoples and ethnic groups341 that goes to the 
heart of the issue. Further more, violence exists not because there are ethnic groups in 
a country/society but because there exists exclusion and injustice practiced by some 
over/against others. The danger therefore is not the emergence and existence of 
identity politics; rather, it is the exercise of repressive project of hegemony and  the 
imposition of authority by self proclaimed guardians of the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the state, those centers of power and authority interested in resources than 
people living in those areas of privileged resource. Still more, the recognition of 
“ethnic politics” means that there are no neutrally inclusive civil values/principles to 
this end in the first place, that almost all states failed in this respect in Africa. The 
politics of force and resource hunting as a condition of unity and integrity is 
                                                          
341Many instances can be cited from history: the former Soviet Empire; the former 
Indian Sub Continent, the former Republic of Yugoslavia, The Kurds strangulated 
between Iraq and Turkey and more. When it comes to Africa, almost every post 
colonial African state sits on an active national political volcano and is engaged 
(directly or indirectly, hidden or in public) in massive suppressive, even genocidal 
exercise.   
    150
antithetical to the creations of unifying neutral civic norms. So, rather than ignoring 
the facts on the ground and arguing in support of no existing values, one has to 
reckon with the given facts and engage in the creation of those socio-ideological 
values necessary for coexistence such as inclusive and accommodative politics, civic 
citizenship, conscious development of solidarity and common humanity, when 
possible. That is what it means to seriously engage in state/nation building in Africa. 
Social/political integration and ideological legitimating are steps in the right 
direction.  
 To reiterate, nation and state building means the stipulation, creation, and 
agreement on a common citizenship, which opens up democratic potential. The long 
standing debate between those who support solutions based on the recognition of the 
equal rights for individuals342 and those based on the recognition of the group 
rights343 have a paradigmatic impact on the nation/state building in Africa; there isn’t 
                                                          
342See Barry, Brian., Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of 
Multiculturalism, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001; Horowitz, 
Donald L., Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985; 
Offe, Claus., “Homogeneity and Constitutional Democracy: Copying with Identity 
Conflicts through Group Rights,” Journal of Political Philosophy 6(2), pp.113-41, 
1998; “Political Liberalism and Group Rights and the Politics of Fear and Trust,” 
Hagar 3(1), pp. 5-17, 2002; Snyder, Jack., From Voting to Violence: Democratization 
and Nationalist Conflict, NY: W.W. Norton, 2000.  
343Lijphart, Arend., See, Lijphart, Arend., The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism 
and Democracy in the Netherlands, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968; 
Democracy in Plural Societies, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977/1997; 
Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one 
Countries, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984; “The Puzzle of Indian 
Democracy: A consociational Interpretation,” American Political Science Review 
90(2) (June), pp. 258-68; Gagnon, Alain-G and Tully, James (eds.), Multinational 
Democracies, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001; Keating 
and McGarry, Minority Nationalism and Changing the International Order, Oxford: 
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easy way out. According to J. Hippler, nation/state building means engaging in the 
creation and sustenance of a unifying, persuasive ideology that integrates society and 
developing a functional state apparatus. These would allow mechanically and loosely 
linked communities to become a common society, thereby heralding the possibility of 
the formation of a common society with its own self-awareness. State-building is a 
key aspect in this process, which means partly that the state needs loyal personnel that 
do not identify themselves primarily with individual social, ethnic or religious 
communities but, rather, with the state and the actual or the imagined “nation” in 
question. Among some options, multinational citizenship and Liberal Constitutional 
citizenship are alternatives to be considered in Africa, when compared to different 
sources and centers of loyalty formations. Whether civic individual equality or group 
equality matters should be seen in the light and context of the African community life 
and its future dreams and hopes. An arrangement that ideologically and practically 
allows all its members first to become citizens instead of invisible and dehumanized 
subjects of the politics of exclusion and pure force in power is in order. In this sense, 
nation-building takes on a democratic potential because belonging to the nation is 
defined by common citizenship as a community criterion. However, it should be 
understood that the process of constituting a nation and building a state mean that 
conflicts previously lying dormant in the society and which had little chance of being 
articulated by virtue of the politics of exclusion can effectively be intensified. This is 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Oxford University Press, 2001b; Kymicka, Will., Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal 
Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995; Tamir, Yael., Liberal 
Nationalism, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.   
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all the more true if the determination of who actually belongs to the “nation” has not 
been settled or is disputed, especially in multi-ethnic or multi-religious societies like 
Africa.344    
     In principle, finding a solution that guarantees the existence and integrity of 
the post colonial state and its sovereignty is desirable and attractive. Righting the 
wrongs within existing states is an open possibility. But, because the post-colonial 
state’s sovereignty is grounded on violations and negations of the rights and freedoms 
of millions of peoples made invisible, one cannot stick to this as the only binding 
paradigm. Keeping on the table the possibility and likelihood of striking a balance 
between state sovereignty and freedoms and rights of the peoples involved, one has to 
acknowledge that, since Africa’s burdens are too heavy and deep rooted, the solutions 
too could be very taxing, even shocking as well. More important, the mere 
establishment of a democratic order/regime in deeply divided societies should not be 
taken as a solution to those entrenched problems. One vice of democracy is that it 
intensifies the already existing divisions and conflicts.345 Wise and controlled social 
and ethical engineering is needed, therefore. For instance, there are solutions that 
                                                          
344See, Hippler, Jochen, 2002: Ethnicity, State, and Nation-Building – Experiences, 
Policies and Conceptualization, Manuscript, 2002, (www.jochen-
hippler.de/Aufsatze/Nation-Building/nation-building.html). Question such as ‘does 
Nation-Building make sense when Nation-States generally are being weakened and 
undercut by global forces or how do we explain the new trend to Nation Building at 
exactly this time of weakening of Nation states?’ Cannot be ignored and serious 
reflection is needed urgently.  
345See, Mann, Michael; The dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing, 
Cambridge University Press, NY, 2005; Roeder, Philip G., Where Nation States 
Come From: Institutional Change in the Age of Nationalism,  Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2007.    
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require state dissolution and/or deterritorialization of some of the existing states; 
others need delocalization of boundaries; still others, creation of new states on some 
common or imagined criteria - language, religion, geographic-regions, shared 
resources, etc. Of course, state/nation building in an already existing state belongs to 
this therapy menu.  
 Among others, proliferations of political movements aimed at self-
determination and ‘democratization’346 have unleashed forces which may be 
incompatible with the survival of the current state system in Africa.347,348 There are a 
number of nations with frustrated statehood dreams; many fighting against the 
existing state349 because there exists ethnic hegemony of one or the other under the 
                                                          
346Ibid  
347Of value in this respect are Roeder’s “Nation State Project” and “Segmented 
State.” The former refers to a claim that “a specific population… should be self-
governing within a sovereign state of fits own. Unlike other constitutional 
claimant,… claimants pressing nation-state projects ultimately seek not simply to 
change the government or the regime within an existing state but to change the very 
human and geographic boundaries of the state itself. Unlike other autonomy claims, 
which much scholarship argues are either territorial or, communal claims, nation state 
projects are simultaneously territorial and communal. Nation state projects assert that 
a community of people has a right to state of its own within a specific territorial 
domain that allegedly belongs to that people as a homeland.” Roeder, Philip G., 
Where Nation States Come From: Institutional Change in the Age of Nationalism, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007, p. 12.   
348“A segmented state… divides its territory and population further among separate 
jurisdictions and gives the population that purportedly is indigenous to each 
jurisdiction a distinct political status… institutions create a common-state that is 
common to the whole territory and population and separate segment-states for the 
separate territories and populations. Segmented states are not simply territorial 
jurisdictions within a federal state; they also contain juristically separate communities 
of people who purportedly have special claim to jurisdiction as a home land…. Only 
states have given birth to new nation states.” Roeder, Philip G., Ibid, pp. 12-13.            
349I borrowed some of the expressions used here from Keating. See, Keating, 
Michael., “So Many Nations, So Few States: Territory and Nationalism in the Global 
    154
guise of state hegemony under centralized/decentralized governments. Therefore, the 
first step should be addressing the legitimate questions and grievances, that is, the 
remedy should start by appropriately and aggressively redressing Ali Mazrui’s 
observation quoted above.350 This means that peoples and nations sharing 
same/similar ethnic, linguistic, and cultural…backgrounds and who were divided and 
forced to live under two or more different neighboring post partition African states 
should be given the right and the opportunity to unite and live together as nation 
states with their own national flags and anthems as sovereign states in their own right. 
This presupposes, however, restructuring spaces or the redrawing of the map of 
Africa approximately along shared ethnic/linguistic/cultural geo-territorial lines. If 
the partition schema established artificial frontiers with no respect of any linguistic, 
ethnic, history, and the natural-social-human environment; and, if the borders were 
just traced according to the advances of each European army inside Africa, then 
caring and compassionate justice351 compels us to begin the needed corrections from 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Order,” in Alain-G. Gagnon and James Tully (eds.), Multinational Democracies, 
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, pp.39-64; 2001a; Nations 
against the State: The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and 
Scotland, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2001b.      
350To reiterate it, according to Ali Mazrui, “balkanization is a breeding-ground for 
political violence,” and he reminds us that, “It was…in Africa that Europe practiced 
the art of partition at its most elaborate. Where Europe attempted to unify those who 
were different, it sowed the seeds of future separatism… Where Europe divided, it 
left behind latent passions for reunifications…”  
351Caring and compassionate justice, to borrow from S. Weil, is one that attends to the 
cry of persons: it loves, caring, restoring, healing, and transforming. It is an exercise 
of unbounded love in settling questions of justice. It goes beyond the limits of 
fairness and equal opportunity and is not paralyzed neither by the anger of those who 
feel intergenerational burdens nor by the sense of resentment felt by those benefited 
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here. How/what would, say, a Spaniard feel if s/he finds that part of Spain had been 
put under France in one national State and another part of Spain with Portugal in 
another State? Why is the territorial unity and integrity of, say, Turkey or Iraq more 
important than the rights of the Kurdish people to come together and constitute a 
nation-state of their own? Why should the Genocide in the Sudan perpetrated in the 
name of the unity of the Republic when parties to the conflict want independence 
from the colonizing center and would like to join their fellow Africans across borders 
and fictitious divisions? Why should the Somalis be divided between Kenya, 
Ethiopia, Somalia, and the tiny Republic of Djibouti and continue to suffer in the 
name of the territorial unity and integrity of those other countries? Why should 
unwilling and unconsenting peoples be forced to live along one another as enemies 
and victims of each other and that of the central state? Since the boundaries and 
borders inherited from the partition were not fitted to any life enhancing and 
empowering ways of doing an all-encompassing business of life (political, social …) 
in ‘post colonial’ construction of Africa, the logic of this option entails that, first, 
contested and conflict ridden spaces must be redrawn, restructured, reconstituted, and 
redefined according to the linguistic, ethnic, cultural and religious overlapping and/or 
divisions or on the basis of any other preferred and imagined criteria. Since such 
correction is intended to correct the ills the African peoples went through, the 
reshaping must be done in consultation with the beneficiaries of the stipulated 
remedies, step by step. Once this is done, those groups of peoples with similar shared 
                                                                                                                                                                     
from their undeserving position in life.     
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backgrounds might decide to come under one sovereign state of their aspirations and 
choices or form a union on any of the available or any other creative political 
arrangements.  
 Second, since there could emerge as many hundreds, even thousands of such 
rearranged communities and redrawn spaces as possible, they should in return 
willfully be regrouped and come under higher and greater socio-political 
arrangements. Once the necessary and compelling lessons are drawn normatively 
from the individual-group rights considerations and in the light of the need for civic 
peace, political stability, caring justice, and an all-inclusive development, selected 
strategies can be employed to effect nation/state building in Africa on a new 
foundation. Although a regime that combines the egalitarian principles of 
constitutional democracy with innovative structures of group representations looks an 
ideal approach, choosing an appropriate and flexible group rights regime should be 
given priority. Adopting one or a combination of methods appropriate in a context 
such as centralized power sharing (for instance, consociationalism352) or 
                                                          
352“Consociationalism is a form of government involving guaranteed group 
representation, and is often suggested for managing conflict in deeply divided 
societies… The goals of consociationalism are governmental stability, the survival of 
the power-sharing arrangements, the survival of democracy and the avoidance of 
violence. Lijphart identifies four key characteristics of consociational democracies: (1) 
Grand coalition - Elites of each pillar come together to rule in the interests of society 
because they recognise the dangers of non-cooperation; (2) Mutual veto - Consensus 
among the groups is required to confirm the majority rule. Mutuality means that the 
minority is unlikely to successfully block the majority. If one group blocks another on 
some matter, the latter are likely to block the former in return; (3) Proportionality - 
Representation is based on population. If one pillar accounts for 30% of the overall 
society, then they occupy 30% of the positions on the police force, in civil service, 
and in other national and civic segments of society; and (4) Segmental autonomy - 
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decentralized power-division (for example, federalism, autonomy, cantonization) or 
any combination of these methods is both possible and desirable. So, it is not 
impossible to think of the possibility and likelihood of regime of substantive and 
substantial group rights coupled with equal individual rights serving as a foundation 
for further realignments and reorganizations of African peoples and new African 
states of their choices.  
 Hence, as long as people define themselves primarily as members of a 
particular ethnic group or nation, and as long as the primary identity and loyalty lies 
with the ethnicity or the nation or an ethno-religious group, it is this interest that must 
be met in the first place. Frustrated dreams and just demands of the oppressed should 
be addressed in ways and methods they see fit for themselves. Next, however, being 
small and divided don’t serve the dreams of freedom in Africa and because a unity 
based on consent and sense of fraternity will do more good, the nations and groups 
whose primary demands were satisfied, should be invited to reflect on and presented 
with the values and benefits of living together under larger, moral, just, and lawful 
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arrangements. Since the core concept here is redressing both the spatial and 
political/moral injustices committed on African peoples, both inherited and practiced 
at present, it matters little whether large federations or unions or states, or small self 
governing communities are chosen in so far the decision is not imposed and enforced 
upon the people who made the choice. Hegemonies founded on ethnic exclusion, sex 
and/or gender oppression, religiously sanctioned subjugation, resource control, 
cultural oppression, and material deprivation should have no place and future in 
Africa.  
 As mentioned above, however, neither the first nor the second option 
necessarily precludes the possibility and likelihood of correcting wrongs within any 
existing post colonial arrangement, the only point being giving a lasting remedy to 
contested claims. In other words, the knowledge and redrawing of existing maps 
shouldn’t necessarily lead to the breaking up of the existing states. This is premised 
on the assumption that just and fair arrangements are always possible for humans. 
Differences would not necessarily lead to disintegration provided rational political 
and moral choices are made available and agreed by contesting and contending 
parties. The alternative then would be to address and redress the just demands of 
peoples rights for their freedoms by avoiding both ethnic hegemony and ethnic 
despotism on one hand and instituting consensually and constitutionally agreed upon 
principles of power sharing, accommodation and inclusion of the excluded “others”, 
on the other. To this effect, roots of historic grievances that bred animosity and hatred 
among peoples should be identified and redressed openly by methods currently 
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available or creatively imagined. The point here is the prioritization of the 
sovereignty and unity of peoples on the basis of their choices and decisions and then 
inventing/reinventing new state and territorial sovereignty or renewing and 
reaffirming the sovereignty of the existing state and its territory.  
 Third, in Africa, redressing and correcting historically rooted injustices 
constitutes a significant path forward in the lives of the African peoples. The project 
shouldn’t stop at the completion of the two interrelated steps, however. Reclaiming 
dignity and humanity in Africa demands going beyond the restructuring and 
redrawing the map of Africa anew on ethnic/regional…basis. It demands a much 
more act of transcendence. Since Africans are burdened, afflicted and targeted 
peoples as a whole, reflecting on and looking into their future is no less important 
than correcting and redressing its past evils. Whether redrawing Africa on ethno-
cultural lines or forming an ethno-federalisms on these results or of regions or 
whether principles of multicultural/multiethnic solutions were forged to meet the 
challenges from the past, deeply afflicted, wounded, abused and raped peoples like 
Africans should not stop too early in their struggle from reclaiming their total dignity 
and humanity. And that presupposes Africans  unflinching unity and oneness as 
burden bearers of in the history of modern world. Africans were subjugated and 
dehumanized together no matter what their localities, regions, ethnicities, religions, 
level of resistances, and gallantry. Africans were browbeaten and raped as Africans; 
sold and shipped away as Africans; colonized and degraded as Africans; indebted and 
went through the shock therapies as Africans, infested and infected with all sorts of 
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man made and natural diseases and disasters as Africans. So, a burdened and targeted 
race of humans cannot and shouldn‘t get arrested only because they could/would 
reclaim their freedom from their fellow oppressors. That is a necessary step; it is not 
and cannot be the culmination of Africans struggle for humanly deserved freedom. 
Africa/Africans were enslaved; yes, but we still are not out from the darkness yet. 
This sordid truth means that Africans should look beyond the province of rights to the 
kingdom of caring justice.  
 So, an exit strategy to escape from the oppressive structures and bad 
neighborhoods of the conventional states should be compensated and superseded by a 
reasoned and consensually consented will of peoples to live together under a spatially 
larger  and morally higher just political order. In my view an inclusive Pan African 
Federal State353 and Pan-African Common identity should be the goal of the project. 
As long as people define themselves primarily as members of a particular ethnic 
group or nation, and as long as the primary identity and loyalty lies with the ethnicity 
or the nation or an ethno-religious group, regional or environmental…federations, 
                                                          
353A United African federal union (United Africa) can be constituted from various 
alternate federal arrangements of all possibilities also, a federal union of competing 
norms of federal arrangements, for instance. These may include ethno- cultural and 
linguistic federalisms (a federalism founded on shared history, common language, 
etc.), environmental federalisms centering around African Peoples sharing common 
resources like rivers or port services or others like the Nile Basin federation or the 
Niger river basin federation or the Great Lakes region federation, etc. The possibility 
and probability of regional unions or federal States is another sound way to go based 
on founding principles and choices of peoples concerned. , etc. is conceivable also. 
Even the superposition of different complementary arrangements where nation states, 
environmental federations, regional unions and others co-function depending on the 
reasoned and deliberated choices made by those concerned cannot be excluded. In 
Africa, therefore, suggesting the possibility, even feasibility of a second level federal 
structure does not constitute stretching the issue to the point of irrelevance.  
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etc., Pan African identity level remains subordinate or missing and a transcendent 
African polity cannot be materialized. Inversely, so long as the creation of Pan-
African identity and polity remain stuck and as far as releasing of nations and peoples 
from their traditional national oppressions under the post-colonial arrangements is 
taken as end in itself, Africa’s multiple burdens would remain intact. Africans need 
both greater space and greater freedoms to materialize their hopes and dreams so 
frustrated and unachieved in their history so far. It is by creating a united Africa as a 
common home (a common country), an African common identity, and an African 
common humanity that Africans should think of prevailing in the emerging and 
brutally uncaring world. Both PanAfrican space and PanAfrican humanity need to be 
released from the shackles of the centuries. Whereas the first step requires the 
creation of nationally and federally socialized personnel and institutions and 
nationalized/federalized state formation, the second demands the creation of an united 
African society and a Pan African state. So, one important goal of African democracy 
ought to be the creation of a knowledge based Pan-African democratic statehood on 
an a PanAfrican common space and a PanAfrican shared identity. Promoting new 
representations of identity and territory that transcends the racial, ethnic, linguistic, 
religious, regional identities, etc. is an imaginatively rich philosophical possibility.  
             V. Oneness and difference: to what extent is this proposal is different from 
the constitutive act AU? To make it clear from the outset, the argument here for 
PanAfrican unity is neither original354 nor purely speculative. Africa is the home of 
                                                          
354See, Nkrumah, K., Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonization, 
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burdened billions that served as the Guinea pig of the modern ages. It is both 
burdened and targeted beyond a reasonable doubt.355 It has been dehumanized by 
slavery; browbeaten by colonialism, mutilated and compartmentalized into fictitious 
boundaries; betrayed by the concerted logic of subverted decolonization; destroyed by 
                                                                                                                                                                     
NY: Monthly Review Press, 1970; Senghor, A., On African Socilaism, NY: Preager 
Press, 1964; Fanon, F., The Wretched of the Earth, NY: Groves Press, 1963; Cabral, 
A., Unity and Struggle, London: Heinemann, 1980; Revolution in Guinea - An 
African Peoples Struggle, London: Stage I, 1961; Okadigbo, Chuba., Consceincism in 
African Political Philosophy: Nkrumah’s Critique, Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth 
Dimensions Publishers, 1985. For a critical analysis of this tradition, see 
Serequeberhan, Tsenay., The Hermeneutics of African Philosophy, NY: Routledge, 
1994.  
355For instance see, Moret, Leuren., “Depleted Uranium Contamination,”  
http://www.consciousmedianetwork.com/members/lmoret.htm;“HIV = AIDS: Fact or 
Fraud?”,  http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-
830231400057553023&q=HIV+%3D+AIDS&total=6261&start=0&num=10&so=0&
type=search&plindex=0 ; Day, Lorraine., “Cancer, AIDS and Vaccines,” 
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=1251899533507877406&q=Cancer%2C+A
IDS+and+Vaccines&total=51&start=0&num=10&so=0&type=search&plindex=8“AI
DS, Inc.”,  http://www.consciousmedianetwork.com/movie/aids.htm ; “Vaccination - 
The Hidden Truth”, http://www.dark-truth.org/okt19-2006-2.html; “AIDS Hoax-Ten 
reasons HIV is not the cause of AIDS”, http://www.dark-truth.org/okt20-2006-
10.html; “The Other Side of AIDS,” http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-
266890172132861595&q=The+Other+side+of+AIDS&total=147&start=0&num=10
&so=0&type=search&plindex=0 ; “Nutricide - Criminalizing Natural Health, 
Vitamins, and Herbs,”http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-
5266884912495233634 ; MOJO WIRE Title: Broydo, Leora., "A Seedy Business", 
http://www.motherjones.com/news-Wire/broydo.html Date: April 7, 1998; THIRD 
WORLD RESURGENCE #92, "New Patent Aims to Prevent Farmers From Saving 
Seed," by Chakravarthi Raghavan EARTH ISLAND JOURNAL Title: "Terminator 
Seeds Threaten an End to Farming," Fall 1998, by Hope Shand and Pat Mooney ; 
THE ECOLOGIST, "Monsanto: A Checkered History" and Sept./Oct. 1998, Vol. 28, 
No. 5, by Brian Tokar, The Pesticide Action Network, "Revolving Doors: Monsanto 
and the Regulators," Jennifer Ferrara (www.panna.org/panna) newsletter Global 
Pesticide Campaigner Vol. 8, No 2."'Terminator Technology' Prevents Farmers from 
Saving Seeds," June 1998; Blake, Roy., “Genetic Bullets, Ethnically Specific 
Bioweapons,” Washington Free Press, Jan./ Feb. 2000; Bishop, Greg., “Ethnic 
Weapons for Ethnic Cleansing,” Konformist, March 2000 (also at 
www.konformist.com ;  Author Lederman, Robert; “The Human Genome Project and 
Eugenics,” North Coast Xpress, Fall 2000. 
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the mindless and indiscriminate mimicry of “modernization” (both capitalist and 
socialist); indebted to death; traumatized and incensed by various economic and 
politics shock therapies, internal conflicts, diseases, famine and hunger; and is frozen 
by the economic and political conditionality regime imposed by global powers and its 
institutions of enforcement. Africa is a place where peace, development, justice, 
human dignity, and socio-political stability remain ideal goods in the future. More 
still, it is the only region in the world where foreign development paradigms 
exclusively dominate its development and democratization projects as if these aren’t 
about values and exist independently from such value choices in the first place. 
Against these backgrounds, nothing seems more urgent and more compelling than 
forging a PanAfrican unity and identity. Since nothing is more uniting than shared 
suffering and collective afflictions, browbeaten and targeted peoples like Africans 
need a just and strong unity to survive in the 21st century and beyond. Otherwise, 
procrastination would tighten its strangulation in the face of an imminent re-
colonization.356  
                                                          
356Aggressive and coldhearted globalization is meant to accomplish draining and 
dumping  or, even worse, re-colonizing. See, Robidoux, Michelle., “NEPAD: 
Repackaging Colonialism in Africa,” Left Turn, July/August, 2002; Ismi, Asad., 
"Ravaging Africa," Briarpatch, Vol. 32, No. 1, Excerpted from The CCPA Monitor, 
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first time in history. For instance, see Hunt, Bryan., AFRICOM, 
http://www.moonofalabama.org/2007/02/understanding_a_1.html ; Snow, Keith 
Harmon., “Darfurism, Uganda and the U.S. War in Africa: The Spectre of 
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  More still, if the history of Africa is a history of its “inventions”357 and 
“reinventions”358, then forging a united Africa should be taken for a new and higher 
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Congo War, (Report), World Policy Institute, New York, 2000; Blum, William, 
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the Congo," Covert Action Quarterly, Spring/Summer 2000; Ray, Ellen and Bill 
Schaap, "NATO and Beyond: The Wars of the Future," Covert Action Quarterly, 
Winter 1999; Naiman, Robert and Neil Watkins, "A Survey of IMF Structural 
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of knowledge, Bloomington : Indiana University Press, c1988; The idea of Africa, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press; London: J. Currey, c1994. 
358See, Mazrui, Ali A. and Tidy, Michael., Nationalism and new states in Africa from 
about 1935 to the present, Nairobi; Portsmouth, NH : Heinemann, 1984; The 
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form and level of creating Africa anew. V.Y Mudimbe’s main thesis in both The 
Invention of Africa and The Idea of Africa is that Africa is an invention, just as 
Edward Said’s thesis in both Orientalism and Culture and Imperialism is about the 
invention of the Orient.359 Whereas Mudimbe speaks of African, Muslim, and 
European heritage in this invention theory, Ali Mazrui identifies them as the 
indigenous, the Arabic, and the Western heritage. Mazrui goes further and argues that 
“Africa has been re-invented in different stages. The first stage saw North Africa as 
part of the Mediterranean world; the second stage concerned Africa’s interaction with 
Semitic peoples; the third was stimulated by the birth of Islam and its expansion both 
north and south of Sahara; the fourth came with the impact of European capitalist 
penetration and subsequent colonization; and the final phase was its globalization.”360 
Given the chain of problems Africa finds itself since the imperial/colonial path of its 
interaction with West/Europe, both the “invention” and “reinvention” referred to 
remain a negative realization in its long history and encounters with ‘others’. So, the 
creation of a united Africa as another yet a conscious invention on Africa’s part 
means that the negative sides to the European heritage need to be filtered out and 
disinfected. Once this is acknowledged and done, the creation of United Africa on the 
basis of critical appropriations of these traditions would constitute a pinnacle of such 
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359See, Said, Edward W., Orientalism, New York : Vintage Books, 1979, c1978; 
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360Mazrui, Ali A., “Project MUSE: The Reinvention of Africa: Edward Said, V.Y. 
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inventive and creative act. To unite Africa is, therefore, to appropriate the best of 
African values as a foundation361 and to negate and overcome Africa’s balkanization 
as a negative out come of its long interactive history. Reading the Standard Maps by 
Norwich, Bassett, and Betz,362 will easily establish the authenticity of this claim, 
because there was no map of Africa with 50 plus pieces into which it was dissected 
before the 1891.     
 So, to bring an end to displaced millions, to mobilize the African masses and 
its resources for an emancipatory development of Africans, colonial boundaries that 
were sanctioned and endorsed by both the UN (the United Nations), OAU (The 
Organization of African Unity), and AU (The African Union) need to be revisited and 
rectified. It is as important to look ahead into a united Africa as a united sovereign 
state as it is to address the legitimate questions and aspirations of nationally 
                                                          
361In chapter 5, I explicitly outline and give an argument for PanAfrican unity based 
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also, Bassett, T. and P. Porter; “From the Best Authorities: The Kong Mountains in 
the Cartography of West Africa,” Journal of African History, 32: 367-413; 
“Cartography and Empire Building in Nineteenth Century West Africa,” 
Geographical Review 84 (3): 316-335, 1994.    
    167
oppressed peoples. Rather than stopping at or limited to nation-state making and 
building within the bounds of mutilated post-colonial African states; rather than 
pushing too far in redrawing new borders (if even this is the right and legitimate 
approach to begin with) in view to address the group rights of displaced peoples 
dispersed across mechanically partitioned African state boundaries, it would be more 
empowering and liberating to the peoples and future of Africa to move towards a 
united Africa as a sovereign state and a common national home. PanAfrican 
Nationalism was present at the dawn of the “decolonization” era; fifty years on, 
however, there are promising practical grounds and lesson to draw upon rather than 
mere hypothetical reasons to argue for and materialize the dreams of the leader-
fathers of the anti-colonial struggles of Africans.363 Thus, in the absence of a 
democratic reclaiming of a United Africa as a single Sovereign State for Africans, 
there can not be a successful development and democratization drive in Africa, for an 
Africana democracy means nothing other than the realization in history of the unity 
and fraternity of the African peoples in a United Africa. To this effect, both United 
Africa and Pan-African values ought to become the normative foundations of 
development, peace and democracy in Africa. This means that principles of 
Westphalian territoriality like the inviolability of frontiers and noninterference in 
internal affairs enshrined in the founding charters of the UN, the OAU and the AU364 
                                                          
363  See, for instance, Nkrumah, Kwame; Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for 
decolonization, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970; Senghor, S; On African 
Socialism, New York, NY: Preager Publishers, 1964.   
364See, Charter of The Organization of African Unity (OAU)., Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 
25th day of May, 1963, also available online at 
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must give way to different principles of interdependent-empowerment.  
 One may wonder why/how this proposal is different from the AU and its 
Constitutive Act and whether redundant conceptual reiteration is not involved here. 
This doubt needs dispelling and cannot be put to rest unless an appropriate response is 
provided. Basically, AU is OAU, “an old wine in a new bottle,” except for dividing 
time intervals. Philosophically, there does not exist any fundamental difference 
between the two. Let us see why. From the start, the AU is infested with the 
conceptual/philosophical division between “Africa of States” and “United States of 
Africa,” which goes back to the birth of OAU itself. Except for its unflinching 
support and efforts to the independence of African countries from the colonial rule 
(consistent with its promise under Article II (d)), OAU was an utter failure and AU 
was a continuation of these dismal failures in a completely changed 
global/continental contexts. For instance: Article II (a) of the OAU  promises to 
“promote the unity and solidarity of the African States;” Article II (b) promises to 
“achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa;” Article II (e) promises that the 
organization shall respect and stand for the implementation of the “Universal 
Declaration of human Rights,” etc. OAU deceased without realizing any of these and 
other related articles of faith. Contrary to the spirit of Article II (a), Africa is dipped 
deep in an endless series of conflict adding “a conflict ridden continent” to its ‘good’ 
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name.365 According to the World Bank Report 2000, Africa got poorer and poorer 
compared to the time of the inception of the OAU in 1963 thereby adding “the 
hopeless continent” by The Economist to it name. This shows that Article II (b) was 
thrown out through the window for almost four decades of the Organizations lifeless 
history. Even worse goes for Article II (e): given all the senseless wars, conflicts, 
poverty, famine, ethnocide and genocides, Africa experienced the most shocking 
human rights violations under the OAU.  
 
 That the AU is ‘an old wine in a new bottle’ can be seen from its constitutive 
act. Like Article 3 (3) of the OAU Charter, Article 4 (b) of the AU Constitutive Act, 
affirms colonial demarcations. The AU adopts the principles of territorial sovereignty, 
non interference366, and inviolability of colonial boundaries.367 Why the current 
political map of Africa remains a sacred cow and the AU worships this cow is a 
puzzle when most of Africa’s demarcated borders have in of themselves become the 
basis of many African conflicts and wars. The AU today, just like its deceased 
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forerunner organization promises to defend domestic sovereignty and nonintervention 
as the main principles guiding intra African relations; it promises to continue 
consisting of a pack of failing entities. It lacks the political, economic, and military 
muscle to safeguard and enforce the collective interests of the African peoples. In 
short, both Organizations sanctified and solidified the balkanization of Africa and all 
the drawbacks associated with it.    
 The institutional failure stated above has its failure in philosophical and 
ideological mapping also. The balkanization of Africa is being sanctioned and 
reinforced by the lack or ignorance of a unifying and driving ideological principle. It 
is both an institutional and ideological failure. The OAU lacked a clear ideology 
capable of providing the collective empowerment of the Africans peoples, an 
ideological strategy that would guarantee and enhance their hope, power and prestige 
in the post colonial era. Call it an “Africa-centeredness” or “Pan-Africanism” or 
“Consciencism” or “Afro-centricity”, or “Africana”, etc. a project of total 
emancipation, liberation, and unity cannot be accomplished without such ideological 
mapping. Yet, in both OAU then and AU now there exists a vacuum in this respect, 
even against the call of some founding fathers of the OAU.368 There should be an 
                                                          
368This ideological vacuum cannot be seen apart from the two ideological factions 
that underlined the founding of the OAU (which the AU itself is deeply infected 
with): The Casablanca Group (CG) and the Monrovia Group (MG). The MG shared a 
concept of African unity that was intent on retaining the colonial demarcations and 
the newly won political independence. Its intentions were to create an alliance of 
African States rather than a “United States of Africa.” The CG, on the other hand, 
sought to transcend the balkanized political systems created on the continent through 
colonialism by ceding fundamental aspects of sovereignty for an immediate United 
Africa with a common currency, foreign policy, defense structure and economic 
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ideological map that recognizes ‘all African peoples as being of one nation resulting 
from a shared historically born burdened identity (or, a shared historical experiences), 
targeted peoples, and an indivisible future destiny.’369 Otherwise, a union cannot be 
effective without a unity of purpose or an ideologically motivated sense of direction. 
An independent, united, and empowered Africa is not an option but a necessity.  
 The argument for a united Africa is an economic opportunity also since it 
means an economic unity at economies of scale magnitude. This is more urgent in a 
fast globalizing world where the AU finds itself now. Back in 1968, Green and 
Seidman made an observation ignored by the OAU generation: “Africa as a whole 
could provide markets able to support large-scale efficient industrial complexes; no 
single African state nor existing sub-regional economic union can do so. African 
states cannot establish large-scale productive complexes stimulating demand 
throughout the economy as poles of rapid economic growth because their markets are 
far too small. Instead the separate tiny economies willy-nilly plan on lines leading to 
the dead ends of excessive dependence on raw material exports and small scale 
inefficient ’national factories’ at high costs per unit of out put. Inevitably, therefore, 
they fail to reduce substantially their basic dependence on foreign markets, complex 
manufactures and capital.”370 It is dubious whether the AU generation learned the 
lessons well and if it is on the right track in this respect. Looking at the AU’s 
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369Ofuatey-Kodjoe, W. (ed.), Pan-Africanism: New Directions in Strategy, Lanham: 
University Press of America, p.391.  
370Green, Reginald H. and Seidman, Ann., Unity or poverty? The economics of Pan-
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economic blue print (New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD))371 one 
finds the plea for international capital and the separate development of national 
economies as a solution. If the critiques are correct, Its biggest failing is that NEPAD 
does not sufficiently recognize Africa’s peoples as partners for, and of, development. 
As it stands now, it sanctions an appeal to the good will and benevolence of the rich 
countries for investment and aid,372 the subservient, dependent, and colonized 
mentality at work as usual. In the final analysis, the remedy to Africa’s 
socioeconomic wretchedness lies in harnessing the local resources and talents as well 
as unique characteristics of the African peoples, since, in Africa, the greatest resource 
for development are the African peoples themselves.   
 To windup, it must be borne in mind that the carving up of Africa in 1884 was 
not meant to unite Africa; it was meant to divide and kill it and, Africa as it stands 
now is a witness to the crime committed and the darkness it is going through. The AU 
should fast amend the principle of inviolability of colonial borders and negotiate, 
first, for new boundaries in such a way that it addresses the just causes and voices of 
millions of African trapped in the colonial act of unjust separation or forced to be 
united against their choices and wills. The question of a land a given people claims or 
belongs to is at the heart of the question of justice and freedom itself, for there is can 
never be freedom in the abstract. Once the issue of justice and freedom are met and/or 
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accommodated, Africans should renegotiate to negate boundaries altogether. 
Certainly, the easiest way to scupper the idea of a united Africa is to give voice to the 
myriad of ethnic groups. It is laudable to take stand for the rights of all ethnic groups 
to exist and even to evolve into independent autonomous states as already argued. But 
one must ask whether those ethnic groups would be viable as independent states and 
whether their interests and concerns can best be accommodated within the existing 
states or whether they could thrive and flourish better given a greater human and 
geopolitical space. So the Grounding: Africana democracy can flourish if and only 
when Africa is reunited on a new spatial, moral, and political foundation.  
To reiterate, balkanization is a breeding-ground for violence and it lies at the 
core of the injustices rampant in Africa. To quote Mazrui again, “It was…in Africa 
that Europe practiced the art of partition at its most elaborate. Where Europe 
attempted to unify those who were different, it sowed the seeds of future 
separatism… Where Europe divided, it left behind latent passions for 
reunifications….”373 Grounding Africana democracy presupposes transcendence of 
this condition of spatial mutilation and human affliction in a Weilian sense of caring 
and compassionate justice. It lies in the extent to which the inherited colonial state 
boundaries can be transformed consistent with geographical and ethnic realities in 
Africa, which, in turn, presuppose the reexamination and subsequent overhauling of 
such conflict breeding boundaries and their imposed inviolability status. Besides, it is 
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instructive to recognize the relation between ethnic and cultural homogeneity and 
political liberty, as acknowledged by J. S. Mill,374 when envisaging the condition and 
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Chapter 5 
Towards Constitutional communitarianism and Africana Democracy: 
Constitutive values, principles, and institutions   
 This chapter charts out some principles and institutional routes ahead for an 
Africana democracy from various traditions and backgrounds. Starting with a critical 
examination of the rights-based tradition that serves as a foundation for WLD 
(Western Liberal Democracy), it attempts to borrow and draw lessons and concepts 
from various resources - philosophical, cultural, political, and scientific - that lead to 
Africana democracy. Discriminate use of principles and metaphors from valuable 
philosophies of various traditions and the latest sciences and technologies will be 
explored briefly; likewise, concepts, metaphors, and principles from Feminist 
philosophy and the “soft sciences/technologies” will be discussed shortly along with a 
short reiteration on John Rawls’ principle of “public reason.”375 Showing some 
critical reservation as to why WLD may not succeed in Africa, the essay winds up in 
suggesting the values and institutional foundations of Africana Democracy (or 
deliberatively communitarian Africana democracy).  
 I. Western (liberal) Democracy (WLD) is a political and institutional 
expression of an established way of life, both its liberal ways of living and its 
philosophically entrenched liberal values. It is individual rights and autonomy based 
democracy at its core. As is argued earlier, the liberal concept of rights, as a moral 
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and political doctrine, presupposes and is grounded on individualism and its rights; it 
is founded on the ontological primacy of the individual, which places the individual at 
the center of moral and political life and takes the individual (her or his dignity, 
autonomy, or interest) as the ultimate basis of justification for social, political, and 
legal arrangements. As a basic component of these arrangements, political and legal 
rights are instituted both as a protective shield against interference with freedom of 
action and as a positive requirement that others act in such ways to facilitate that 
freedom. They are conceived as “valid claims,” “trumps,” or “side constraints” that 
empower the individual to pursue a course of life of his or her own choice and impose 
obligations on others to respect this choice. They are believed to be absolute in the 
sense that they are not subject to political bargaining or the calculus of social utility. 
As J. Rawls puts it, each individual qua moral person “possesses an inviolability 
founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override.”376       
 The question now is whether, in line with our discussion in chapter three, it is 
possible to successfully transplant and integrate such rights and resulting political 
arrangements in social, political, and cultural contexts where such relations are absent 
both ontologically and historically. Given the current climate of the promotion of 
freedoms and democracy as a political conditionality, it looks like there is no 
alternative than pushing for more liberal democratic framework. There is no 
alternative; the presupposition goes, because it is in liberal democratic framework that 
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human rights and cultural diversity flourish.377 Although correct, the problem with 
this reasoning is that it ignores the issue of cultural/philosophical mediation in 
political engineering. Such omission, time and again, has proven ineffective and is 
counterproductive in instituting the democratic project in culturally and socially non-
liberal/illiberal settings. Besides, this amounts buying uncritically into the now 
famous Fukuyama fallacy (FF) that universalizes liberal democracy as constituting 
and defining the end of history.378 There are others who argue differently, insisting 
that a liberal conceptual framework such as the one espoused in the Anglo-American 
traditions is incapable of providing a coherent moral vision, because the language of 
rights and the presumption of self-interested and autonomous individuals that 
underlies it are the source of moral and political conflict, not the solution.379 This 
reasoning rests on faulty assumptions, too, for a rejection of the individualist claim 
doesn’t necessarily mean a rejection of rights altogether any more than an 
endorsement, say,  of a duty-based claim automatically leads to the endorsement of 
authoritarianism. Rather than tooting for either of the extremisms, culturally sensitive 
dialogical engagement seems appropriate.  
 Human cultures and values are not immutable nor their transferences 
unknown nor wrong. Accordingly, liberal conceptions of rights are precious and 
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relevant to humanity as time tested values. The problem is that they are usually 
couched as irreducibly universal and fail to give adequate attention to the context in 
which they originated and to the context to which they are to be applied. 
Consequently, they tend to lose their appeal when transferred to a different cultural 
and philosophical setting or they create lethal political conditions where there does 
not exist the institutional and cultural capacity to contain and accommodate them. 
People in the illiberal settings are often told that political cultures need to be 
transformed in order to sustain democratic ideas and institutions. But it should be 
known that this obliterates and negates people’s cultural identity or generates 
conditions of unlivable violence and confrontations. Seldom do such cultures hear 
that there is equally important need for reconstruction of democratic ideas and 
institutions in order to make them appeal broadly to local habits, beliefs, and 
sentiments. There are always ways of living in every cultures that are valuable to 
every people, if the “our ways of life” philosophy stands contest. Hence, a culturally 
sensitive approach entails attempting to bring into contact different sets of ideas and 
values through what Charles Taylor and others view as the project of building 
“unforced consensus,”380 that explores the possibility of a common discourse on the 
basis of which the idea of individual rights and freedoms could become a 
meaningfully shared experience. The exploration aims at reforming the dominant 
relations in society to provide a firm grounding for an emerging value on one hand 
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and reconstructing the transferred idea in a way that enables it to entrench itself in a 
different cultural context.   
 Now, given that webbed relations dominate in Africa, the liberal conceptions 
of rights would be less likely to resonate with the cultural understanding and 
sensibility of these peoples. Rather, shared rights seem to reverberate with such 
experiences. From the standpoint of such rights, rights are rooted in the social 
interconnectedness of expectations and responsibilities/duties rather than as inheriting 
in the individual pre-socially and pre-politically. Recognizing rights as a way of 
adjusting human relations and not as things exclusively possessed is important in 
embedded settings. Rights are relational not merely in the sense that others are under 
a duty to perform, but in the sense that any right carries with it a generic duty to see 
justice done. Furthermore, the relational view regards rights as a critical instrument 
for creating a more humane vision of shared life rather than a mere protective shield 
for individual self-interests; in so doing, rights become intrinsically connected with 
and indeed go to define who we are and what we do.    
 Such rights cannot be conceived merely as rights that are assignable to and 
secure goods for individuals alone but also as non individual rights that are common 
in nature. There are liberal rights theorists who tend to dismiss the idea of 
group/collective rights for reasons of debilitating rights.381 But for some liberal 
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thinkers this dismissal is untenable from both theoretical and practical grounds. But 
such defense has been founded typically on the same grounds on which individual 
rights are justified.382 Jeremy Waldron has advanced a view of collective rights not 
on the basis of the individual’s autonomy or wellbeing, but on the basis of the 
conception of a community as a nonreducible entity and of the communal goods it 
secures for its members. He argues that collective rights are not the subject matter of 
individual rights; rather, they constitute a separate category and rest on different 
grounds. One must be aware of the difficulties claims for collective or group rights 
presents, for establishing or defining a collective identity is not always easy to do 
(though analogies can be drawn from the rights of corporations and other collective 
entities). It is with respect to this ambiguity that the language of individual rights 
enjoys certain advantages over that of collective rights. But even given ambiguities 
like this, Waldron believes, there is no compelling reason for not framing collective 
goods such as a tolerant society, a shared language, and cultural traditions in terms of 
human rights, particularly when such rights are claimed against other collectivities.383  
 According to liberalism, a right is an affirmative power to control or release 
from control others in the fulfillment of duties. It is grounded in and embodies a 
                                                                                                                                                                     
York: Basic, 1974, among others.    
382See, Kymlicka, Will., Liberalism, Community, and Culture, Oxford: Clarendon, 
1989; Freeman, Michael., “Are there Collective Human Rights?,” Political Studies 43 
(1995 Special Issue): 25-40.  
383Waldron, Jeremy., “Can Communal Goods Be Human Rights?,” European 
Archives 28 (1987): 2:296-322. For a defense of group rights based on the 
disadvantaged group principle, see Owen Fiss, “Groups and the Equal Protection 
Clause,” in Equality and Preferential Treatment, ed. Marshall Cohen, et al, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1977, pp.84-154.    
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conception of the individual as an autonomous, rational and sovereign being. On this 
view, rights are primary, whereas duties are derivative and secondary. A right 
ordinarily implies a duty, but not vice versa. So, whether rights present themselves as 
“valid claims,” “entitlements,” or “side constraints,” it is clear that the notion 
typically denotes duties solely on the part of those against whom a valid claim is laid. 
Where there is no question of rights, duty does not surface ordinarily. In this regard, it 
seems intuitively impossible to advance a duty based conception of rights, because it 
looks a contradiction in terms. But disputing the claim that rights often imply duties 
but not otherwise, A.D Renteln argues that the relationship between the two is such 
that the existence of one may always imply that of the other. She raises two 
objections: “The first is that, in the case where we would agree that there are such 
duties, there is also a corresponding right. If society recognizes duties to be kind to 
animals and babies, for instance, then, indeed, those entities could be said to have 
rights. The second is, in those cases in which we are hesitant to assert the existence of 
rights, it is because the attribution of the duty seems dubious.”384 She adds that “just 
because a moral theory is couched in the language of duty does not imply that it 
cannot be a vehicle for the advancement of rights.”385 So, if we accept Renteln’s 
argument as valid, we would be justified in saying that duties are grounds of rights. 
Or, as a Marxist would argue, rights and duties are involved in a dialectical 
relationship and their correlativity is such that one always implies and depends on the 
other. So rights and duties are two sides of the same coin.                  
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 In the light of the observed relation between rights and duties and in lieu of 
making a culturally sensitive approach to the issue at stake, we ought to give an equal 
weight to rights and duties, which means couching the notions of rights in relational 
as well as in individual terms. In cultures where the concept of duty is pervasive and 
where duties are hierarchically and ascriptively assigned; where concerns over 
material wellbeing precede free choice; where personal obligations, loyalty, and 
family ties reign supreme, and where members of society owe to one another respect 
and trust as a matter of duty like indigenous Africana, possessive conception of rights 
fail to be rooted. If pushed without or against context, such possessive conception of 
rights would serve divisive, fragmentary, and destructive purposes in embedded 
settings. Rights are demands and a society that is materially weak and culturally ill 
prepared to contain such demands cannot withstand its own fragmentation and 
destruction.  Rights ought not to be seen as a one-way street that gives what Charles 
Taylor calls “option of weaver” without incurring any duty to the rights-holder. There 
is a kind of mutuality and reciprocity embedded in both rights and duties that enables 
the rights holder and the duty-performer to relate to each other in a way that benefits 
them both in particular and in organized life in general. Therefore, a right should be 
construed in relational terms as a meeting of the rights-holder and the duty-performer. 
While rights are reasons for imposing duties on others, they express a moral 
desirability that human relations in society be adjusted in a particular way, one that is 
conducive to the advancement of human wellbeing individually and collectively. 
They are our legitimate collective expectations that others act or not act in certain 
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ways. Whether an expectation is considered to be legitimate and thus should be met 
should depend on the special conditions under which it emerges and on the basis of 
“unforced consensus.” The relational character of rights as embedded in the 
interconnection of expectations and duties, thus, is particularly useful in lowering the 
possessive tone often associated with the liberal conception of rights.386   
 II. The concept of webbed or shared rights does not go well with the tradition 
of enlightenment/classical liberalism, whose core values include freedom, rights, 
autonomy, equality, pluralism, and distributive justice. To put it succinctly, liberalism 
is a general philosophical conception about individual rights and autonomy, 
pluralism, freedoms, equality, justice, the rule of law, tolerance, respect for the harm 
principle, and the neutrality of the state in matters of religion;387it rests on the value 
of individual autonomy; it emphasizes the protection of individual rights’ and 
freedoms with the assumption that such protections help them to achieve the goals of 
                                                          
386The idea of webbed rights is defendable; it is not immune to criticism, however. 
For example, one may argue that an asymmetric emphasis on duty may undercut the 
notion of rights by making it a toothless weapon for individuals to protect their 
legitimate interests. It may, say, encourage conformity and subservience, reduce the 
already narrow range of free choice by the ordinary citizens, and leave the individual 
defenseless in face of the abuse of political power. Moreover, it is inadequate and 
even perilous to order collective life on the basis of the reciprocity of good will and 
sense of duty, particularly the good will and sense of duty of those who wield 
political power. This is a well taken concern but the remedy lies not in prioritizing the 
rights regime, but in developing our civic virtues and in ceaselessly making the effort 
to develop our moral capability.      
387 Or is liberalism itself is an ideology?  If even so, however, in liberal democracies 
many of the main elements of liberalism tend to be generally accepted, even, in 
practice, by apparent critics of liberalism. For instance, within Rawlsian liberalism 
the argument is made that justice as fairness would be accepted on contractarian 
grounds by all reasonable citizens, and that it (and by implications, Rawls's two 
principles of justice) is therefore not a controversial political ideology.   
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self-perfection, self governance, and self realization.  Accordingly, governments are 
instituted to secure and protect these rights and derive their legitimacy through 
consent, expressed in free, periodic elections. Since individual rights are paramount in 
the enlightenment tradition, violation of rights of others is deemed immoral and 
criminal and punishable by law.  
Liberalism is not without its critiques, however. For instance, according to J. 
Gray388 and A. Ryan,389 classical liberalism is reluctant to go beyond freedom rights. 
They argue that any meaningful exercise of freedom requires adequate resources 
(economic, education, security, healthcare, etc), which means that equality, rights, 
and distributive justice must be extended to protect the conditions required for the 
exercise of freedoms. The egalitarian wing of liberalism is critiqued either for being 
coercive in its policy of redistribution or for not being egalitarian enough or for 
abandoning moral standards under the guise of neutrality, a criticism that comes from 
those who espouse the classical version of liberalism.390 The liberal conception of 
autonomy was criticized severely by communitarians. They question whether the 
essence of the “autonomous life” is individualistic, self interestedness, rationality that 
is aimed at realizing a private conception of a good life. Communitarians argue that 
(a) the insistence on individualism, rationality, and striving for the agents’ conception 
                                                          
388 See, Gray, John., Liberalisms, London: Routledge, 1989  
389 See, Ryan, Alan., “Liberalism,” in Goodin, Robert E and Philip Pettit (eds.), A 
Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.    
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of a good life is a product of one strand in Western tradition that has emerged from 
the Enlightenment, which is secular, atomistic, voluntaristic, and promethean.391 
There are religious or ethnic or communal… conceptions of the good life to which the 
liberal understanding of autonomy is both alien, even inimical. Therefore, it is a 
mistaken view to equate the liberal conception of a good life for the good life itself; 
(b) the requirements of self-interest, rationality, and the conception of the good life 
are not defined by autonomous agents but are the products of the moral tradition into 
which individuals are born and whose ideals, values, conventions, and principles their 
moral education inculcates in them. Furthermore, self-interest is rarely conceived 
egoistically, for agents identify with their families, friends, colleagues, ethnic groups, 
or fellow citizens. Their individuality, therefore is not formed by self-creation but by 
the multiplicity of influences to which they are subject. Autonomy, on this view, 
consists in finding a fit between their individuality and moral tradition.392
 So, a number of communitarians challenged liberalism’s claim that it is 
possible to develop a coherent theory of political community from an atomistic, 
individualistic foundations. For them the common good is not simply the sum of the 
individual wants and rights of people but rather the shared well-being of community 
members. A shared interest entails both wide support from the community as well as 
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the affirmation of the inherent dignity of peoples in their common life.393 There are 
varied approaches within communitarians: The communitarianism represented by 
such thinkers as Amitai Etzioni, Charles Taylor, and Michael Walzer, has emphasized 
the need to balance individual rights with communal bonds, freedom with order. 
According to this strand, a rights-based theory provides an inadequate account of 
political community and of the common good because people are not solitary, 
independent, unencumbered selves, but human beings whose very identity is 
dependent on the societies of which they are a part. Thus, this communitarian 
perspective emphasizes the cultivation of social and political relationships and of 
moral values and traditions that help to sustain the common life. Because of the 
important role of communal bonds, communitarians refuse to give precedence to 
individual rights over social solidarity and harmonious relationships.  
 The communitarianism represented by Michael Sandel and others emphasizes 
the capacity to choose rightly. According to Sandel, the ability to pursue the common 
good does not depend only on individual choice or respect of others’ right to choose; 
rather, it requires “knowledge of public affairs and also a sense of belonging, a 
                                                          
393‘Popular support’ and ‘inherent goodness’ have given rise to different perspectives. 
For some communitarians, such as Michael Walzer, justice derives from the widely 
shared values and habits within each political community. The common good does 
not derive from some ideal conception of justice but from the shared understandings 
and traditions that inform the political life of each society. Thus, the communal norms 
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society. For other communitarians, such as Michael Sandel, however, the common 
good derives not from the widespread belief in the tradition but from the moral worth 
or intrinsic good of the goals themselves. For a discussion of these two perspectives 
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concern for the whole, a moral bond with the community whose fate is at stake.”394 
This means that the conception of freedom that Sandel and others celebrate asserts 
that politics should not be neutral toward the values citizens espouse. Instead, it 
should pursue “rightly ordered” social and political relationships. From this 
perspective, the essential requirement of communities is not liberty or personal choice 
per se, but the capacity to make “right” choices based on moral habits and values 
developed through communal traditions. For George Weigel, the common good is a 
peaceful and just moral order that affirms human dignity and communal harmony; in 
other words, it is a rightly ordered communal relationship, or the tranquility of a just 
order.395 Communitarians emphasize the maintenance of a just public order by 
balancing the ideals of justice with those of peace. Indeed, they tend to give 
precedence to the restoration of political order as a precondition for justice. Thus, 
when civil strife and war erupt leading to widespread violence, for instance, 
communitarians assume that the primary task in public life is to restore a just peace 
rooted in the pursuit of national unity and reconciliation; they emphasize the renewal 
and healing of divided societies through the moral rehabilitation of social order and 
political relationships.396   
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 According to Will Kymlicka, liberals should be concerned about cultural and 
communal structures because they make it possible for individuals to maintain their 
autonomy, rights, and freedoms in order to achieve their rational life plan.397 To 
conceive an individual’s rights, autonomy, freedoms, etc. independently of the 
context of a person’s social community is to fail to adequately see human beings and 
persons in their proper environment. He argues that, “societal cultures are profoundly 
important to liberalism… because liberal values of freedom and equality must be 
defined and understood in relation to such societal cultures. Liberalism rests on the 
value of individual autonomy… but what enables this sort of autonomy is the fact that 
our societal culture makes variable options available to us.398 According to Kymlicka, 
a community and cultural structures do not have intrinsic moral values. They have 
only instrumental values, in that “it’s through having a rich and secure cultural 
structure that people can become aware, in a vivid way, of the options available to 
them, and intelligently examine their value.399 He also indicates how cultural 
structures and its informal model and communal processes of moral education help 
children to acquire self-respect, the sense that one’s life plan is worthy of carrying 
                                                                                                                                                                     
order is threatened, whether or not from internal threat or external aggression, the first 
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out. This sense of self-respect is essential or a precondition for one’s rights, freedoms, 
and autonomy. He argues “without such structures , children and adolescences lack 
adequate role-models, which lead to despondency and escapism.400 In other words, 
without the informal mode of education, which requires imitating role models and 
learning by experience in a community involving cultural structures, values, and 
practices, into which children are acculturated about relevant liberal values, they will 
not have any meaningful sense of the liberal values of rights or freedom. He 
underscores this point by arguing that “Cultures are valuable, not in and of 
themselves, but because it is only through having access to a societal culture that 
people have access to a range of meaningful options.”401 Properly understood, the 
liberal notions of autonomy, equality, freedom, and rights are, indeed, contextual 
notions that make sense only in a community or cultural practice involving liberal 
values.           
 Therefore, writes Kymlicka, “the liberal values of freedom and equality must 
be defined and understood in relation to such societal cultures.”402 These values only 
make sense in the context of a society where people interact and agree to respect such 
rights or freedoms; they are meaningful in the context of pursuing certain interests 
and goals, which are options that a society provides and makes meaningful. In his 
view, “freedom…is the ability to explore and revise the ways of life which are made 
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available by our societal culture.403 In this sense, he argues that freedom does not 
exist in a vacuum or in the absence of a society that makes options available. In order 
for this ability to be possible, there must be social responsibilities that we owe to each 
other and to the community. Kwame Gyekye stresses this point by indicating that 
“individual rights, the exercise of which is meaningful only within the context of 
human society, must therefore be matched with social responsibilities.”404 In other 
words, it makes sense to say that one has freedom and right only because such right 
and freedom are capable of being infringed on by others by virtue of the fact that they 
interact with one another in limited time and social space. It is this limitation of space 
and value of social interaction as a natural human trait that calls for social 
responsibilities. Such responsibilities, which indicate duties, are correlatives of rights; 
they are necessary to make sense of rights.  
 The concepts of rights and freedom are logically connected to the concept of a 
community or society and cultural principles, values, and practices. In the negative 
sense, freedom makes sense only because a community or society of people exists to 
remove or prevent constraints that may not allow us to do whatever we want. In a 
positive sense, freedom makes sense only because there is a community of people that 
actually respects it by providing us the necessary environment or facilities that will 
help us achieve whatever we need to achieve. Amitai Etzioni alludes to the logical 
necessity of a community when he argues that “We suggest that free individuals 
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require a community, which backs them up against encroachment by the state and 
sustains morality by drawing on the gentle prodding of kin, friends, neighbors, and 
other community members rather than building on government control or fear of 
authorities.”405 So, one has a right or freedom only because such a right is respected 
by other members of the community or in social context, as that sphere of life that 
other people should not intervene in. That is, other people owe us a duty to respect 
our rights. If such duty didn’t exist, there would be no rights. Also, if people lived 
isolated lives where they acted without any interactions with other people, the issue of 
right and freedom would not arise. As isolated individuals, we have infinite and 
unbounded rights and freedoms and the idea of freedom in such context turns 
superfluous.        
 But, according to Gyekye, persons are only partly constituted by the 
community,406 because each person has the capacity for their own individual 
judgments in spite of the degree to which they may be socialized by the community; 
“personhood can only be partly (never fully) defined by one‘s membership in the 
cultural community.”407 Although “enmeshed in the web of communal relations,” he 
argues, a person “may find that aspects of those cultural givens are inelegant, 
undignified, or unenlightened and would thoughtfully want to question and reevaluate 
them… The reevaluation may result in the individual’s affirming or striving to amend 
or refine existing communal goals, values and practices; but it may or could also 
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result in the individual’s total rejection of all or some of them….”408 Keeping this 
“moderate communitarian-individual” 409 of Gyekye as a contribution to the debate, 
one should not miss his larger critique of the rights based theory, however. He argues 
that values such as generosity, compassion, reciprocity, mutual sympathy, 
cooperation, friendship, solidarity, and social wellbeing are more important than the 
values of individual rights.410 R. Bell adds to this when he writes, “From such 
communitarian values should flow both a sense of responsibility of individuals to 
their community and obligation to one’s society.”411 Drawing from these Gyekye 
warns that “neglect of, or inadequate attention to, the status of responsibilities and 
obligations on one hand, and the obsessional emphasis on, and privileging of, rights 
on the other hand, could lead to the fragmentation of social values and, consequently, 
relationships and integrity of society itself. Responsibilities, like rights, must 
therefore be taken seriously.”412  
 Gyekye goes further and recommends that the communitarian virtues he lists 
“have to be regarded as intrinsic to be satisfactorily moral in a communitarian 
society.”413 Such virtues are often not promoted in individualistic rights-based 
societies, since “there are no obligations to be kind or generous or compassionate - 
though liberal ideas such as fairness and equal opportunity may provide some 
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motivation for generosity and charity.” For example, to borrow and paraphrase from 
Bell, ‘if a person is being mugged, one may believe it is the right course of action, 
morally, to intervene and prevent and stop the mugging. But on a rights-based view 
moral ambiguity creeps in. There is no intrinsic “right” that a person be helped, and 
there is no positive “right” that obligates one to help. Or if I see poverty, I am under 
no obligation to be generous. Because my notion of a good and any life plan I may 
have to realize the good may be different from yours and everyone else’s goods and 
plans, I am in no way compelled to agree with your course of action. I may criticize 
your good and your plan, but I will be inclined to choose not to interfere so that I do 
not invite your interference with my good and plan.’414 One can see the easy slide 
into moral relativism or moral neutrality here. As Gyekye argues, “The danger and 
possibility of slipping down the slope of selfishness when one is totally obsessed with 
the idea of individual rights is…quite real.”415 It follows from this that “The 
possibility of moral consensus or a common good diminishes as individualism 
increases, and the stake one may have in protecting one’s good from another’s goes 
up as her/his moral concerns decreases.”416 If, in fact, we assume values such as 
reciprocity, mutual sympathy, cooperation, solidarity, etc. as intrinsic, then the moral 
practices of the people would, indeed, be different. In Bell’s words, “There would be 
a greater sense of concern or care for the wellbeing of one’s fellow society members 
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and greater sense of civic responsibility.”417   
Gyekye’s communitarianism has a serious implication for his view justice 
also. According to him, if justice is “strictly rights based morality” and “it is about 
relations of claims and counter claims;” there is little of it as a moral concept since it 
has fallen to the status of the contention of one “right” or another; litigation resolves 
disputes and that is called “justice.”   He writes, “In the communitarian moral 
universe caring, or compassion, or generosity, not justice - which is related essentially 
to a strictly rights-based morality - may be a fundamental moral category. In a moral 
framework where love, compassion, caring, friendship, and genuine concerns for 
others characterize social relationships, justice - which is about relations of claims 
and counter claims - may not be the primary moral virtue.”418                
    Some fifty years before Gyekye, the French [moral] philosopher Simone Weil 
had articulated the same view Gyekye expresses.  Weil calls our attention to the 
concept of “rights” in a characteristically unexpected ways. She writes in her essay 
“Human Personality”: “[to say] ’I have the right…’ or ’you have no right to…’ 
evoke[s] a latent war and awaken[s] the spirit of contention. To place the notion of 
rights at the center of social conflicts is to inhibit any possible impulse of charity on 
both sides.”419 To have brought into rights language is to believe that power can be 
counterbalanced by power; to say “if we could just achieve equal rights…” means I 
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must either snatch rights from someone else (one who has a disequal amount) or 
impose an ideology by force or persuasion to “guarantee” rights in a more or less 
coercive way (even by civil law). This way of thinking will not easily go away. But in 
her thinking force cannot be substantially counterbalanced either through force or 
retribution or through a more equitable distribution of rights; “Rather, it is through 
attention to injustice and coming to a new notion of justice that restores a balance 
between aggrieved parities and that has as its most active ingredient love….”420  
According to Weil, “Rights” rooted in and tied to individual rights morality,  “have 
no direct connection with love,” and “justice in her compassion-based sense of the 
term has primarily to do with seeing that no harm is done to another human being. 
And this, of course, is her point: to contrast our current day use of “rights” with what 
she calls “a new virtue of justice” requiring attention to injustice, renunciation and 
fellow-love.”421    
 In her Essay “Human Personality,” Weil summarizes the difference between 
“rights” and “justice” in these ways: “The notion of rights is linked with the notion of 
sharing out, of exchange, of measured quantity. It has a commercial flavor, essentially 
evocative of legal claims and arguments. Rights are always asserted in a tone of 
contention; and when this tone is adopted, it must rely upon force in the background, 
or else it will be laughed at.422 Justice consists in seeing that no harm is done to 
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men…. [it is associated with the cry] “why am I being hurt?”423 The other cry, which 
we hear often is: “why has some body else got more than I have,” refers to rights. We 
must learn to distinguish between the two cries and to do all that is possible, as gently 
as possible, to hush the second one, with the help of a code of justice, regular 
tribunals, and the police. Minds capable of solving problems of this kind can be 
formed in law school. But the cry “why I am being hurt?” raises quite different 
problems, for which the spirit of truth, justice, and love is indispensable.424 The spirit 
of justice and truth is nothing else but a certain kind of attention which is pure 
love.425
 Simon Weil discusses the places of justice as compassion and love in the 
context of community and to show the priority of obligation in the moral life, which 
she views as one of the primary needs of the soul.426 She says in The Need for Roots: 
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New York: Harper Colophon Books, 197; Bell, Richard H., Simone Weil: the way of 
justice as compassion, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, c1998; 
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“The notion of obligation takes precedence over that of rights, which is subordinate to 
and relative to it.”427 Again, she argues that a human soul needs “a disciplined 
participation in a common task of public value,“ and it also needs “personal initiative 
within this participation.”428 Further more, writes Weil: “the human soul needs above 
all to be rooted in several natural environments and to make contact with the universe 
through them. Examples of natural human environment are: a man’s country, and 
places where his language is spoken, and places with a culture or a historical past 
which he shares, and his professional milieu, and his neighborhood.”429 These 
“natural human environments” are specific contexts in which humans can experience 
mutual respect, friendship, warmth, shared tasks of value (responsibilities), and some 
cultural linkage (such as common language, ethnic associations, symbols, arts, 
history, and physical work). These all create environments in which human 
expectations and aspirations may be fulfilled and in which good and not evil can be 
realized and flourish in a creative and peaceful way.      
 Accordingly, for instance, the “states” carved out by Europeans were created 
with no regard to roots and often systematically destroyed or supplanted local 
traditions. This loss of human environment was the supreme tragedy brought about by 
the partition of Africa. Andrea Nye observes that some traditional environments are 
particularly fragile for women and colonized cultures where indigenous ways of life 
were jeopardized. When these environments are destroyed “the only answer is 
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cartelization because ‘the living intercourse between diverse and mutually 
independent centers’ is impossible. Something infinitely precious and frail is lost, ‘the 
living warmth of the human environment, a medium which baths and fosters the 
thoughts and virtues’ (SE 79), the beauties of daily life: ‘home, country, traditions, 
culture’ (GG 133) which nourish and warm the spirit.”430        
 In short, communitarians from different generations, backgrounds and 
traditions see each human being as “thickly situated,” embedded in a social 
environment, reacting to and shaping her or his life from strands already present in 
the community’s. To borrow from Sandel, “We cannot regard ourselves as 
independent [from society]…[we must understand] ourselves as the particular persons 
we are - as members of this family or community or nation or people, as bearers of 
this history, as sons and daughters of that revolution, as citizens of this republic.” 
Though my life is subject to revision, it does have “contours” - a defining shape 
arising from my “projects and commitments” as well as from my “wants and 
desires.”431   So, if the critiques are correct, to infer the following would be 
warranted: (1) liberalism is not a universal human ideal but one restricted to the 
context of Western developed democratic states; (2) governments cannot be 
altogether neutral; (3) individuals are formed in essential ways by the context into 
                                                          
430Nye, Andrea., Philospohia: The Thoughts of Rosa Luxemburg, Simone Weil, and 
Hannah Arendt, , New York: Routledge, 1994, p. 120. GG stands for Gravity and 
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431Sandel, Michael., “Liberalism and the Limits of Justice,” in What is Justice?, 
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which they were born and in which they have been raised; (4) reasonable conceptions 
of a good life include ties of affection and solidarity; and (5) the desires of rational 
agents do not by themselves define the goods of the agents who have them. The 
criticism has results, for some recent liberal thinkers interpret the cherished values of 
liberalism in the light of these criticisms.432   
 So, if these inferences are true and if there exist such a huge philosophical 
fissure and paradigmatic shift at the very core of rights-based traditions with regard to 
the question of primacy (the individual vs. the community), embedded societies and 
communities of organic ties like Africa are justified in voicing critical reservation and 
doubt vis-à-vis the unduly imposition of responsibility-free language and politics of 
rights. When cultures founded on atomistic philosophical conceptions of society are 
filled with seeds of their own transcendence, embedded societies should guard some 
of their time tested value treasures in the light of the undergoing shift.  
 III. What communitarianism considers as its core values already constituted 
the core of the indigenous philosophy of Ubuntu concisely discussed in chapter 3. As 
indicated there, Ubuntu describes the essence of being human through fellow human 
beings; that all human beings are united in their humanity since they share the same 
basic needs, human potentials and the capacity to do good or evil. It contains 
elements of universality and inclusiveness in its scope and application. All humans 
                                                          
432 For instance; see, Kymlicka, Will., Liberalism, Community, and Culture, Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1989; Raz, Joseph., The Morality of Freedom, Oxford: Clarendon, 1986; 
Galston, William A., Liberal Purposes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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are united in being part of the greater universe, part of one human family with its 
common and divergent features. Of course, this unity and oneness does not deny the 
diversity of the human family as well. Where such diversity is acknowledged, 
interdependent relations are seen as necessary. As the maxim goes, ‘you are 
somebody only through others; I am because we are; we are therefore I am.’ This 
privileges the community before the individual, but having a good community leads 
to the flourishing of good and responsible individuals also. As p’Bitek Okot reminds, 
“Man is not born free. At birth he is firmly tied to his mother through the umbilical 
cord. He is physically cut free from her. But this cutting free is not merely a 
biological act. It is symbolic and most significant… he is an individual, who through 
upbringing is prepared to play his full role as a member of society…. Man has a 
bundle of rights and privileges that society owes him. In African belief, even death 
does not free him. If he had been an important member of society while he lived, his 
ghost continues to be revered and fed: and he in turn is expected to guide and protect 
the living…. Should he die a shameful death, his haunting ghost has to be laid.”433 
Since sufficient amount of discussion is done on many of these concepts in chapter 
three, it would be redundant to reiterate them here again.   
 But our discussion of ubuntu would be incomplete without mentioning here 
two important related concepts rooted in the ubuntu philosophical tradition, however: 
the place and role of mediation and the need to reinvigorate and modernize 
indigenous African democratic tradition rooted in the ubuntu philosophical heritage. 
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(a) Unlike rights-based cultures where a win-lose, zero-sum, or winner-takes-all 
method of resolution rules, peaceful and life enhancing plans are charted together 
through dialogue. Absent from the ubuntu based mediation are the brooding 
omnipresence of the law and the inalienable rights of persons. This is because, neither 
the mediator nor the law decides the dispute and neither is above or superior to the 
parties. It is the parties themselves who are the principal actors and the parties alone 
who dictate the terms of any settlement. In mediation, unlike the courts and the law, 
there is no hierarchy, there is no higher authority, there is no law to bind the parities. 
The parties develop a lateral dialogue between themselves, communicate their 
feelings and desires to one another, and learn to listen to the needs, feelings, and 
wishes of the other party. Such ‘magical’ dialogue transforms “conflict into 
cooperation,”434 to borrow from Daniel Yankelovich. Instead of asserting their 
individual rights and independence, the parties come to understand how their actions 
impact upon others and come to grips with their mutual interdependence. The 
mediator, unlike the judge, is there to aid the parties, but only as long as both parties 
maintain an explicit trust in the mediator’s impartiality and skill. The ultimate power 
lies in the hands of each party to the issue on the table. What is just and logical in 
mediation is subjective and hazy; it exists purely in and emerges from the synergy of 
the soul and mind of each party. Subjective feelings, personal value systems and 
stories, varying life experiences, and the perceptions of parties and persons to the 
problem are equally salient to the solving of that problem. Listening well to the views 
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and values of others is more important than insisting that one is celestially right and 
the other is damnably wrong. The relative success of the TRC of South Africa should 
be seen in the light of this background: it succeeded in exercising the conception of 
justice as ‘the spirit of attention and love,’ to borrow from Simon Weil, or what Iris 
Murdoch calls “attentive love,” following Weil. The aspiration of the ubuntu inspired 
mediation and the TRC is not illustrious victory, the goal is precious amity, rapport, 
and solidarity. Essential to the concept of ubuntu is harmony/balance, not one sided 
victory, consistent with its emphasis on sacredness, intuition, spirituality, and 
subjectivity, which is shared by most feminist philosophers/thinkers.435 In this sense, 
ubuntu is a natural ally to feminism (as it is to communitarianism).  
 (b) Democracy is not new to Africa, only liberal democracy is. Gyekye quotes 
Ndabaningi Sithole as saying “those who have lived in Africa know that the African 
People are democratic to a point of  inaction. Things are never settled until everyone 
has had something to say. [The Traditional African] Council allows the free 
expression of all shades of opinions.”436 This tradition was forced to discontinue or 
took a backseat in the long historical cultural and political suppression. There are 
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indigenous political ideas, values, and practices which are constitutive of democratic 
features of systems of governance in pre-colonial Africa.  Pre-colonial decentralized 
Africana were not new to local self rule, independence and interdependence, 
exchanges and building bridges across many locals and societies. It was participatory 
in nature and based on the African traditions of village assemblies (palavers) , village 
elders and their shared wisdom, earned leadership, orderly discussions, deliberations, 
accords, consensus building, etc. There were/are different institutions such as the 
house of chiefs (Chieftaincy), council of traditional leaders, face-to-face 
communications, and age-grade systems.  Making an exemplary self-sufficient living, 
records of outstanding leadership in the community and proven moral and political 
maturity and competence are valuable assets for leadership contest and competition. 
African indigenous democracy was based on consensus rather than on majority rule. 
As Bradley argues, “The reliance on dialogue and consultation as a means of decision 
making was, and still is in many instances, a democratic feature of African 
indigenous modes of governance.”437 K.A. Busia expressed this democratic feature 
when he writes, “when a council, each members of which was the representative of a 
lineage*, met to discuss matters affecting the whole community, it had always to 
grapple with the problem of representing sectional and common interests. In order to 
                                                          
437Bradley, Matthew Todd., “The Other”: Precursory African Conceptions of 
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do this, the members had to talk things over; they had to listen to all different points 
of view. So strong was the value of solidarity that the chief aim of the counselors was 
to reach unanimity, and they talked until this was achieved.”438 Adds T. Uzodinma 
Nwala, “Unanimity and all the rigorous process and compromises…that lead to it are 
all efforts made to contain the wishes of the majority as well as those of the minority. 
In short, they are designed to arrive at what may be abstractly called ’the general will 
of the people of the community.’”439     
 Kwasi Wiredu has a critical insight into how traditional political patterns may 
be instructive in realizing Africana democracy. There are potentials and lessons for 
the latter. Wiredu argues that the Ashanti traditional system of governance was 
consensual and democratic. According to him, the Ashanti system was “a consensual 
democracy…, because government was by the consent and subject to the control of 
the people as expressed through their representatives. It was consensual because, as a 
rule, that consent was negotiated on the principles of consensus. (By contrast, the 
majoritarian system might be, in principle, based on “consent without consensus.”). 
For all concerned, the system was set up for participation in power, not its 
appropriation, and the underlying philosophy was one of cooperation, not 
confrontation.”440 Such democratic arrangement is different from majoritarian based 
western democracy. According to him, “majoritarian democracy encourages 
democracy under a multiparty structure” and has led to “frustration and disaffection,” 
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leaving minority parties “outside the corridor of power.”441 This, says Wiredu, “has 
only exacerbated ethnic rivalries, as “parties” in the “multiparty” system have tended 
to fall along ethnic lines to serve local interests. The elected, majority party, however, 
makes all the rules to serve its interests. Wiredu sees this as “the most persistent cause 
of political instability in Africa.”442 … In short, “a consensual democracy is a much 
more representative form of government that necessarily must keep the interests of all 
the members of the society in mind;” he says that “the consensual model was a 
premeditated form of governance, and is actually widespread in (indigenous) African 
societies.”443  
 The Village palaver (community palaver/the village council), is a unique form 
of African local democracy. It is another indigenous institution worthy of citing here. 
According to Bell, “It is a model of free discourse for the purpose of making good 
judgments and for doing justice for individuals and the community”444 - on issues 
such as fairness, equality, kinds of punishment, general welfare, and the just 
resolution of disputes; it is an appropriate community method and practice to resolve 
conflicts among all the people and to strengthen organic mutual links of solidarity 
among all the members of the community. Africana democracy should reenergize and 
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modernize these traditions. Since democracy is government of, by, for the people, in 
Africa, this means involvement of and by all the people in the decision-making 
process concerning their general wellbeing. It is consultative, not oppositional politics 
that fits the African ways, given its values and its predicaments.  
 IV. The mechanistic world view valued the masculine dominance of nature 
and the feminine and discounted subjectivity and spirituality. This worldview 
encouraged the exploitation of the planet for human convenience and established a 
hierarchy of values and worth. It resulted in serious threat to sustainability of life on 
the planet. Accordingly, we find that (a) aggression and force are tools of the strong, 
whereas humility and accommodation are the trappings of the weak; (b) selfish 
ambition is prized and leads to power and wealth, whereas selfless generosity often 
subjects one to exploitation by the greedy; and (c) profit, expansion, money, and 
power are the ends of those who lead rather than spiritual growth, empowerment, of 
followers, and harmony among equals. Feminism’s critical stance is worthy of 
reflecting here. Its emphasis on context, situatedness, relation, emotion and history in 
knowledge making is refreshing and redirecting. Judgments about peoples or actions 
need not be a straightforward deduction from abstract universal principles. As 
Nussbaum reminds, it should instead be “informed by detailed understanding of the 
whole context and history of the problem, including the histories and characters of the 
people involved, their cultural traditions, and so forth.”445 Their emphasis on 
relationality and affective response are as important in humanizing the methods of 
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thinking as in transforming society. “Male knowing,” writes DeBeauvoir, “deals with 
objects, things that are thrown before one, re-presented. It is because of the cognitive 
distance between the subject knowing and the object known, there by producing a 
construct, that the male can take a more dispassionate, “objective” view of things.”446 
Susan Armstrong and Richard Botzler explain that ecofeminism is a form of 
feminism that not only seeks to end masculine oppression of women but also rejects 
the patriarchy of western science that leads to destruction of nature. It strives to 
bridge the gap between nature and culture; mind and body; female and male; reason 
and feeling; theory and practice.447 The importance of individuals and their lateral 
relationships is also stressed in feminism. In particular, the eco feminists argue that 
the self should be understood as being imbedded in a net work of essential 
relationships with distinct others.448  
 So, Feminism stands in relation to conventional politics as the quantum, chaos 
and complexity theory are to Newtonian/classical science. Both indicate the urgent 
philosophical and practical need for a shift from the patriarchal society of domination 
to a partnership society based on “actualization of power,”449 if Riane Eisler is 
correct. Partnership society transcends polarities; whereas the dominator model views 
power as the capacity to control and destroy, the partnership model views power as 
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empowerment, power with, not power over - hence, the politics of webbed 
connectedness and dialogue.450 In this model, as Whyte reinforces, “power through 
experience of life replaces power over life451 and “sharing power with” leads to 
decision making based on discussion and search for reasoned consensus.452 Hence, 
voices receive respect, not only equal votes.453 One significant way of realizing 
respect of voices is to let democracy thrive on uncertainty and unpredictability. 
Accordingly, democratization is institutionalization of uncertainty, which is inimical 
to the patrimonial and corrupt methods rampant in democratic contests.454  
 V. Newtonian mechanics, Western individualism and liberal democracy are 
inseparable partners.  To paraphrase from Danah Zohar’s The quantum Society, 
mechanism (and the mechanistic/Newtonian world view) stress unbridgeable gulf 
between human beings and the physical world where nature is perceived as wholly 
“other”; it stresses the absolute, the unchanging, the certain, the unambiguous, 
hierarchy, isolated existence, and separation. The mechanistic notion of society 
consists of isolated units, each blindly pursuing its own self-interest. Atomism 
encourages a model of relationship based on conflict and confrontation. Also, it 
stresses the single point of view, one way of looking at things and the world. In a 
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Newtonian physics, there is only one reality at a time; the either/or way of reasoning 
and thinking becomes paradigmatic; a statement is either true or false, an action is 
good or bad. There can be only one truth, only one best course of action. Mechanism 
underlies the modern cult of the detached individual (or expert) who is very 
knowledgeable about isolated bits of experience/information but ignorant of the 
whole of which these bits are a part. 455   
 The basic building blocks of Newton’s physical world were so many isolated 
atoms that bounce around in space and collide with one another like tiny billiard 
balls. The only actors were particles and the attraction or repulsive forces acting 
between them. Now, this model of reality became the model for modern 
philosophical, sociological and economic thinking from its birth. 
Political/philosophical thinkers of the time compared these colliding atoms and their 
interacting forces to the behavior and interactions of individuals in society as they 
confront each other in pursuit of their self-interest.456 Newton’s universal machine 
became their model for the state to a precise, law-abiding mechanism and portraying 
human beings as living machines. Metaphors such as “the wheels of government,” 
“the machinery of the state,” “mind machines,” “switch on and “switch off,” “blow 
our fuses,” “programmed,” etc are relics from the classical/Newtonian past. 
Mechanistic society stresses fixed role playing and rigid bureaucratic structures. 
Therefore, it is the force of government and the law that keeps people in their place 
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much as the force of gravity keeps all celestial bodies from falling apart. The rule of 
law mimics the law of gravity in miniature. It is government and its legal and 
repressive monopoly of force that gives us “property rights” and that enforces the 
criminal laws against trespass, assault, robbery, rape, murder….In other words, “In 
atomistic picture of our personal and social lives, this same concept of force takes the 
form of power relations that supposedly bind us together. Through the mechanistic 
paradigm, power grips the social imagination. In our everyday lives, power is 
exercised through a balance of coercion and seduction. Coercion is the “push” of 
force; seduction is the “pull.”457 Mechanistic and narcissistically individualistic 
models invite us to see all our personal and social relations in these terms. It now is 
very clear that the concept of checks and balances along with adversarial competition 
for control is rooted in these mechanistic conceptions of society. This mechanistic 
logic was questioned and even superseded in most of contemporary life except in the 
institutions of the apparatuses of politics and governance, however. A new and 
holistic view of looking, interpreting and organizing society and the world emerged 
since the beginning of the 20th century. In this sense, the transformation and 
reformation of liberal politics and liberal democracy (including some of the basics of 
its ways of life) are long overdue. The future of humanity rests no less in 
transforming liberal democracy458 as in democratizing illiberal societies and 
tyrannical polities.  
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 Let us cite few basic points about the holistic view.459 It emphasizes processes 
and waves, not structure and matter; permeable and overlapping interaction, not 
separation and isolation; the inevitability of and positive aspects of change, not stasis 
and order; randomness and change, not logic and law; the interdependence of 
everything, not the independence of individuals and component parts; grapples with 
the true complexity, mystique, and wonder of the world. These and other features set 
it apart from the Newtonian worldview. In its social application, the holistic world 
view “transcends the dichotomy between the individual and the community/society 
(relationship) by showing us that people can only be the individual they are within a 
context. I am my relationships - my relationships to the subselves within my own self 
(my past, my future), my relationships to others, and my relationships to the world at 
large…The quantum self thus mediates between the extreme isolation of western 
individualism and the extreme collectivism of eastern mysticism.”460 Quantum 
politics emphasizes conciliation, not confrontation, decentralization, accommodation 
and inclusion, cooperation, not adversarial contestation, dialogue and shared public 
meaning, flexible, responsive governance. Given these perspectives, governments, 
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big or small, should not be playing the role of a “referee” at a boxing match or as any 
other type of “arbiter” or “judge.” Neither should it provide any other kind of “top 
down solution.” Solutions must come from the grass roots that celebrate diversity. 
The role of government should be the promotion and facilitation of an “inner 
dialogue” among the many independent and interdependent participants in a context, 
be it dispute or any other concern, one that seeks and results in some “shared public 
meaning.” Thus, from the perspectives of feminist philosophy and the holistic 
conceptions of the world, liberal democracy is “Newtonian Politics” at work where 
adversarial politics and inquisitorial opposition run rampant at its core.461  
Paradigmatic difference between ways of thinking resulting from Newtonian and 
quantum models462
Feminist/Quantum Thinking  Pre-Feminist/Newtonian Thinking  
Holistic and integrated  
Stresses relationships and the connections 
between things 
Atomistic and fragmented  
Stresses the separate parts and gives rise to 
specialization 
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Individual and group  
Sees the individual developing in the 
context of the group -'Each of us is more 
ourselves through relationships with 
others' 
Individual or group  
Sees a tension between the individual and 
the group and/or fears the group being torn 
apart by allowing individuality 
Both/And  
Many valid paths from A to B. Diversity is 
a positive and pluralism should be 
encouraged 
Either/Or  
One best way 
Indeterminate  
Thrive on uncertainty and ambiguity. 'It's 
what makes us creative.' 
Determinate  
Value certainty and predictability 
Emergent  
Contextual and bottom-up. Encouraging 
'imagination, aspiration, experimentation' 
Reductive  
Force-driven and top-down. "Reactive" 
Participatory universe  
'People are not passive units of production, 
they are partners in a creative 
relationship ... Co-creative insiders' 
Observer-Observed split  
The notion of the detached observer 
Meaning  
The context and relationships are used to 
find meaning and add value. 'A quantum 
organization would be vision led and value 
driven' 
Efficiency  
Focusing on what is done to the exclusion 
of why it is done. 
 
Quantum Philosophy describes the universe that is paradoxical, both/and one as 
opposed to a linear and clearly dichotomous either/or world. In this respect, both 
feminist and quantum epistemology supersede the limits and shortcomings of 
classical science, its logic and its classical philosophical foundation. As Charlotte 
Shelton argues, “Conventional Logical thinking has made little headway in solving 
the enormous social, political, etc. problems facing the world and its organizations. 
After all, many of our organizational issues are paradoxical, both/and questions that 
cannot be answered by rational, binary thinking. For example, how can one balance 
responsibility to stockholders with responsibility to employees, customers, and the 
environment? How can one hit short-term targets and maintain a long-term focus? Or, 
how does one decrease errors and improve speed? The ability to think paradoxically 
might be the key to creating highly innovative solutions to these questions and a 
myriad of other twenty-first century organizational challenges.”463
 
                                                          
463Shelton, Charlotte., “If you only have a 
Hammer,”http://www.newwork.com/Pages/Contributors/Shelton/Hammer.html (The 
article first appeared in the World Business Academy "Perspectives," March 1999).   
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OR: Implications of post Cartesian principles464
Interconnectedness Planetary cooperation of human societies, 
living systems policy models  
Redistribution Justice, equality, balance, reciprocity, 
sharing 
Change Redesign of institutions, perfecting means 
of production, changing paradigms and 
values 
Complementarity  Unity and diversity, from “either/or” to 
“both/and” logics 
Heterarchy  Distributed networks and intelligence, no 
rigid organizations or hierarchies  
Indeterminacy Many models, viewpoints, compromise, 
humility, openness, “learning societies”  
 
 VI. Unlike mechanistic physics and its corollary politics since then, the 
technological possibilities of direct democracy (technologies of democracy) were 
foreseen by fecund minds and visionaries for more than half a century now. If sheer 
size made representational democracy the standard liberal norm, technological surge 
refutes and nullifies that premise irreversibly. Even more, technologically, humanity 
is on the verge of realizing direct democracy on a larger scales and spaces regardless 
of the size and dimensions of such spaces. Here we are in an age where cell//mobile-
phone messages helped popular insurrections and civil disobediences: the Ukraine 
and Georgia were case stories, for instance. Text messages in Pakistan, Ethiopia, and 
Kenya made the unthinkable possible along detrimental consequences such as the 
creation of communities of hate all over these countries, a moral paradox that remains 
to be addressed at the core of our technological civilization. Dictatorial tendencies 
                                                          
464Woolpert, Stephen, et al., Transformational Politics: Theory, Study, and Practice, 
New York: State University of New York Press, 1998, p.78.  
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and vote rigging are openly challenged and revolted against and societies risk deadly 
and violent confrontations like those happened/happening in the aforementioned 
countries and some others. Technologies of communications are fast becoming 
technologies of democracy. Of course, they can be used as civilian means to 
accomplish military ends also. These soft technologies are not meant only to provoke 
rebellion; they can equally be used as public weapons of instant discussions and 
debate on policy choices and issues. Thus, not only is Direct Democracy possible; it 
is becoming inevitable, for technology overcame the presumed challenges of distance, 
time, and size. The question now is how to facilitate institutional and ethical 
circumstances that would integrate these technologies to the political decision making 
process constitutionally. In this respect, diebolding and subpriming465 democracy 
should be viewed as moral and political failure, not a technological setback.     
  Around 1940’s R. Buckminster Fuller foresaw the future of virtual, vibrant, 
and vivacious electronic direct democracy. Fuller believed that “democracy has 
potential within it [to fulfill] the satisfaction of every individual’s need.”466 To realize 
that potential, he suggested, “democracy must be structurally modernized - must be 
mechanically implemented to give it a one-individual-to-another speed and 
spontaneity of reaction commensurate with the speed and scope of broadcast news 
                                                          
465“Diebolding” and “subpriming” democracy are metaphors borrowed from the 
election debacles in the US using the Diebold machine and the credit crunch draining 
the blood of the economy that is running rampant at the core of the global economy at 
present.   
466Fuller, R. Buckminster., No More Second Hand God, Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday, 1971, p. 9.   
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[which is] now world wide in seconds.”467 He argued for “electrified voting” that 
would yield “an instantaneous contour map of the workable frontier of the people’s 
wisdom, for purposes of legislation, administration, future exploration, and debate;” it 
would also certify “spontaneous popular cooperation in the carrying out of each 
decision.”468         
Hazel Henderson saw electronic-democracy as a remedy to avoid “further 
alienation and increasing number of bored, apathetic, irresponsible and violent 
people” - new “ways of improving communications channels to inform the voter, and 
machinery to channel his participation and ‘feedback.’” She suggested, since every 
home in America has a TV and a telephone, it is possible to conduct a national 
referendum system via television or a telephone voting system. She observed that the 
computer and the television can be united in the homes of citizens to provide the 
hardware for a true “computer assisted democracy.”469
 In his Strong democracy, Benjamin Barber suggested a system grounded in 
hundreds of face-to-face town meetings (5000 in each) throughout the US. He termed 
them “neighborhood assemblies.” He devised a system of “Television Town 
Meetings and a Civic Communications Cooperative, or CCC. In his view, “strong 
democracy requires a form of town meeting in which participation is direct but 
                                                          
467Ibid.  
468Ibid., p.11.   
469Henderson, Hazel., “Computers: Hardware of Democracy,” Forum 70 (Feb.): 22-
24, 46-51, 1970; “Perfecting Democracies Tools” at  
https://fp.auburn.edu/tann/hazel/tools.html  
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communication is regional or even national.”470 Barber realizes that strong 
democracy must contain direct citizen-powered decision making, like “a national 
initiative and referendum process….”471 His system emphasizes citizen interactivity, 
people power, and, of course, modern ICTs and randomness at expense of classic 
elitism and pyramidal power.  
According to the Tofflers (Alvin and Heidi Toffler), majoritarian systems are 
failing and Western governments teeter on the brink of “near breakdown.” As remedy 
for what they perceived as a future shock, the Tofflers recommended more and better 
genuine democracy. They write that “spectacular advances in communications 
technology open, for the first time, a mind-boggling array of possibilities for direct 
citizen participation in political decision-making.”472 They recommend random 
selection, cumulative voting similar to the system that protects minority shareholders 
in corporate elections, referendum and initiative processes with better options than 
“yes-no” or “pro-con.” They urge the need for designing workable new institutions. 
They write, “the old objections to direct democracy are growing weaker at precisely 
the same time that objections to representative democracy are growing stronger. 
Dangerous or even bizarre as it may seem to some, semi-direct democracy is a 
moderate principle that can help us design workable new institutions for the 
                                                          
470Barber, Benjamin., Strong democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984, p.216.   
471Ibid., pp. 284-285.  
472Toffler, Alvin., The Third Wave, London: William Collins, 1980, p.445. See also, 
The Future Shock, New York: Random House, 1970.  
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future.”473      
 One may draw a number commonalities and connections from these insights. 
All of them assume that western style representative system is insufficiently 
responsive to the context and the general public; all believe that Electronic 
information technologies (ICTs) exist to empower citizens to consider, deliberate, and 
decide on important public issues; they insist that this will produce a more educated, 
active, and civic minded citizenry. Accordingly (a) any national system needs to be 
constructed from the grass roots up and should include face-to-face meetings; (b) the 
new technologies need to create a lateral systems of communications between the 
citizenry itself; (c) there must be a good deal of informed dialogue and debate prior to 
any voting; and (d) the process must aim toward the development of broad public 
consensus. Although the hidden hands, the invisible minds, organized and powerful 
interests and classes may stand against the empowerment of the people through the 
new technologies of democracy, letting the system run the conventional way would 
amount to gambling with the possibilities and probabilities of collective extinction. 
When systems exhaust their potentials and where alternative modes are around for 
quite a number of decades, both wisdom and survival compel us to act in a different 
direction.            
 VII. Materially burdened societies, centuries old customs, traditions and 
economies cannot easily accommodate democratic drives and initiatives. Although 
there are alternate explanations why the human spirit may break away free from 
                                                          
473Toffler, Alvin, and Heidi Toffler., Creating a New Civilization, Atlanta: Turner, 
1994, p.94.  
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bondage, such burdens and backwardness only melt away under the tide of 
consciously, morally and responsively guided economic developments. So, although 
not automatic, democracy follows the train of material development and securities 
surrounding human well being.  
 Africana Democracy (whether as Africa of states or a united Africa) ought to 
be understood both in terms of the extent to which the people’s will enters decisions 
that will affect their life chances and the extent to which their means of livelihood are 
guaranteed. It has to empower them. Power is needed if one is really to be free and 
such power comes from property ownership that secures independence. Ownership is 
the basis of power and widespread ownership of property reduces grievances thereby 
minimizing the ground for rebelliousness. Dependent and extremely poor people lack 
the essential tools and virtues necessary for independent decision making. Materially 
deprived person is not (rationally) capable of fulfilling the responsibilities of full-
fledged citizenship. When extravagant riches, monstrous fortunes, decapitating and 
grinding poverty coexist, democracy becomes a façade at best thereby confirming the 
view that it is a cover for economic dictatorship. Property ownership would make free 
and independent decision possible, for ownership is a source of personal authority or 
independence. Rather than being simply something persons possess, ownership is an 
attribute that defines one’s personality and protects her/him from outside pressure. 
Property ownership open to all would have political benefits such as promoting 
political cohesion. Both government take over of the property rights of persons and 
the corporate take over of governments is inimical to conditions of creative 
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entrepreneurship that helps the realization of an ownership society.      
 The anti democratic feature of dependency and poverty can be seen from the 
fact that it makes civic life tortuously difficult thereby breeding and reproducing 
socially toxic environments that sanction the instinct of survival and violent 
existence. As Adam Smith suggests, dependency increases crime, for instance: “In 
Glasgow,” he wrote, “where almost no body has more than one servant, there are 
fewer capital crimes than in Edinburgh. In Glasgow there is not one in several years, 
but not a year passes in Edinburgh without some such disorders. Upon this principle, 
therefore, it is not so much the police that prevents the commission of crimes as the 
having as few persons as possible to live upon others. Nothing tends so much to 
corrupt mankind as dependency, while independency still increases the honesty of the 
people.”474 So, dispersing property ownership widely (thereby avoiding concentrated 
property ownership) should be seen as central to an African democracy. Accordingly, 
it ought to be a duty of an African states and United Africa to abolish poverty and 
dependency and to this effect; rough economic equality should be enshrined into the 
Constitution. All citizens should be sufficiently free economically to be politically 
able to defend their own interests, to be independent, and to be capable of exercising 
democratic citizenship.  
 In Africa, democratization ought to serve the creation of the capacity to lead 
secure and worthwhile lives. It should open up development possibilities that would 
help limit endemic suffering and poverty, to begin with. And good/right questions 
                                                          
474Smith, Adam., Lectures on Jurisprudence, Meek, R.L., D.D. Raphael, and P.G. 
Stein (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978/1982, pp.486-87.  
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should be raised to grasp the grip of poverty and suffering in this context.475 A. Sen’s 
capabilities philosophy deserves mentioning here. He urges us to ask, for instance, 
whether poverty is a consequence of famine, of inaccessibility to food, of larger 
systematic problems or unemployment, of lack of health care, or of communal 
“shunning” or “taboos” linked to family structures.476 Given the magnitude of 
suffering Africans are condemned to undergo, Sen’s developmental choices such as 
provisions of health care and its delivery, adequate nourishment, access to education, 
shelter, the capability to lead a life without shame, the freedom to move about without 
coercions, etc. would give people the capacity aforementioned than, say, one’s level 
of income. He links poverty with issues of development, the distribution of food, and 
the availability of basic services, thereby making it a philosophical issue - both 
ethical/moral and political. Such development conception is derived from Sen’s 
definition of poverty itself. According to Louis Uchitelle, Sen defines poverty as “the 
lack of freedom to have or to do basic things that you value.”477 And, “in considering 
who is poor and why, Sen would have us ask not what minimal goods or what income 
level a person may have, but what capabilities they have to do certain things that 
show their overall wellbeing.”478 He argues, “The ordering of poverty and the 
identification of the poor may be very different if it is done entirely in terms of the 
                                                          
475This by no means minimizes the centuries long afflictions, suffering, raping, 
poverty, indignity, etc.  African went through. It is rather to take responsibly to the 
present in the light of some theoretical breakthroughs in this respect.  
476See, Sen, A., Inequality Reexamined, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1995.  
477Uchitelle, Louis., “How to Define Poverty? Let us Count the Ways,” The New York 
Times, Saturday, May 26, 2001.    
478Bell, Rethinking Justice: Restoring our Humanity, c2007, p. 85.   
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size of income (as is the standard practice in most countries) compared with what it 
would be if the focus is on capability failure… By focusing poverty study on 
specifically on incomes as such, crucial aspects of deprivation may be entirely 
lost.”479 Thus, Sen’s capabilities approach - the overall wellbeing of people - adds 
positive freedom to the debate on poverty and development;480 it also is indicative of 
the centrality of human development and human overall wellbeing in an African 
democracy. Sen has given a human face to development economic theory. To 
measure poverty by considering a person’s ability to function as human being and to 
consider a community’s overall wellbeing (basic needs, local traditions, and family 
structures…) by factors other than income level gives voice to the poor and the 
invisible in ways that western economic and development strategies had failed to do 
and show. This ought to be the line that African democracy should follow in 
                                                          
479Sen, A., Inequality Reexamined, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995, 
p.112f. See, also Crocker, David A., “Hunger, Capability, and development,” in 
World Hunger and Morality, ed. William Aiken and Hugh La Follette, Upper Saddle 
River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996; Crocker, David A., and Toby Linden, ed. Ethics of 
Consumption: The Good Life, Justice and Global Stewardship, Lanham, MD: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998.     
480David A. Crocker echoes this strategic and ethical line of reasoning when he 
writes: “Nutritional wellbeing is only one element in human wellbeing; the 
overcoming of transitory or chronic hunger also enables people and their 
governments to protect and promote other ingredients of well-being. Being 
adequately nourished, for instance, contributes to healthy functioning that is both 
good in itself and indispensable to the ability to avoid premature death and fight off 
or recover from disease. Having nutritional wellbeing and good health in turn, is 
crucial to acquiring and exercising other valuable capabilities such as being able to 
learn, think, deliberate, and choose as well as to be a good pupil, friend, householder, 
parent, worker, or citizen” (Crocker, David A., “Hunger, Capability, and 
development,” in World Hunger and Morality, ed. William Aiken and Hugh La 
Follette, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996. For a foundational essay in 
development ethics, see Crocker, David A., “Towards Development Ethics,” World 
Development, 19:5, 1991, pp.457-483.      
    223
energizing and empowering the African peoples, not the political elite of the 
conventional wisdom of democracy.    
  Further more, “The destruction of political equality is inherent in economic 
inequality,” writes Hill, and the failure to see this is not only shortsightedness but a 
complete loss of sight. Economic inequality results in political inequality and is 
therefore undemocratic. It is undemocratic for (a) it deprives large numbers of 
citizens of equal political power, and (b) if inequality is too extreme, it can lead to 
tragic outcomes that succeed in producing dictatorial regimes. It is this vitiation of 
political equality that challenges Francis Fukuyama’s argument in his End of History. 
It is true that the failed Soviet Socialism merits criticism; however, that does not 
necessarily make liberal democracy the goal of history,481 for at least he cannot know 
that liberal democracy is the goal of history, however. Given that groups and 
individuals continually struggle for more freedoms and more empowerment, it is 
difficult to be sure that there will not be some better approach to protecting the rights 
of all. Liberal democracy existed for over two centuries with unresolved contradiction 
at it core: economic inequality, the result of the liberal part of the term, undermines 
the democratic part of the equation. Since contradistinctions are driving engines of 
human history (to borrow from the Marxian literature), liberal democracy, too, would 
be subject to change and replacement in the course of human history. For instance, 
there is the possibility for an emergence of a society that is both democratically 
balanced and economically just. So rather than declaring the end of history 
                                                          
481Fukuyama, Francis., The End of History and the Last Man, New York: Avon 
Books, 1992       
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speculatively and untimely, it would be more urgent and more philosophically 
compelling to argue and act for a more equal liberty than ever before. Liberty should 
no longer trump equality and we must rejoin the perennial struggle to achieve Equal 
Democratic Liberty.   
 VIII. As argued in chapter 4, redressing and correcting historically rooted 
injustices constitute a significant path forward in the lives of the African peoples. 
There are normative reasons why ethnic conflicts should be addressed and handled 
appropriately. These include, to borrow and paraphrase from Peleg482: (a) as a means 
of saving human life; (b) as a way of enhancing justice. (c) as a way of assisting in 
the full and genuine democratization of a country; (d) as a tool for prompting political 
stability; and, (e) as instrument for advancing the legitimate rights of people drawn to 
a conflict. There are some approaches to the issue at stake. The first is applying an 
individual rights approach to the issue; the second is applying a group based 
approach, or, third some elements of both. The individual-based approach is the 
simpler of the approaches. Associated with liberal democracy, the approach argues 
that in all societies, homogeneous or heterogeneous, ethnically divided or unified, all 
individuals must be treated as equals. While liberals recognize that most societies are 
divided into ethnic groups, they view ethnic status, loyalties, and commitments of any 
kind as a private matter that ought not to be politicized. They believe that it is the best 
way of maintaining equality, liberty, unity, and stability. The group-based approach, 
on the other hand, begins with the assumption that because most states are 
                                                          
482Peleg, Ilan Democratizing the hegemonic state: political transformation in the age 
of identity, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. PP. 20-44.  
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heterogeneous, and some are deeply divided along ethnic lines, a collectivist strategy 
for managing internal conflict is necessary. Moreover, many group based theorists 
believe that the only way for achieving justice, equality, and stability in deeply 
divided societies is through the public recognition of different identities within the 
polity. The group based approach is very complex. For one thing, the idea that groups 
within existing polities are entitled to any type of recognition, let alone self 
determination, immediately raises series of questions as to what groups are entitled to 
such a right (only ethnic groups?), and how and by whom is the decision on self 
determination and its implications to be made (by the group alone or by the polity at 
large?); secondly, it ought to be recognized that even if the principle of self-
determination of groups is conceded, it leads to a series of issues. Could it be 
achieved, say, by secession, (Bangladesh/Eritrea) partition (Cyprus, Israel/Palestine, 
The Indian Sub Continent, Czechoslovakia, The USSR, Yugoslavia…) or by 
recognition of the existing constitutional association so its multinational character is 
recognized and accommodated? A balance between individual and group rights 
approaches entail promoting unity in diversity as well as application of extensive and 
equal individual rights along with substantive and substantial group rights, provided 
societies constitutional framework is perceived as the product of genuine dialogue 
between society’s major groups rather than as a reflection of the hegemonic 
imposition by society’s dominant group.483  
 Also, as shown in chapter four, the project shouldn’t stop at the completion of 
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the first two of the intertwined proposals made, however. Reclaiming dignity and 
humanity in Africa demands going beyond the restructuring and redrawing the map of 
Africa anew on ethnic/regional…basis; it demands a much more of an act of 
transcendence. Since Africans are burdened, afflicted and targeted peoples as a 
whole, reflecting on and looking into their future is no less important than correcting 
and redressing its past. Deeply afflicted, wounded, abused and raped peoples like 
Africans should not stop too early in their struggle from reclaiming their total dignity 
and humanity. And that presupposes Africans’ unflinching unity and oneness as 
burden bearers in the history of the modern world. So, a burdened and targeted race 
of humans cannot and shouldn‘t get arrested only because they could/would break 
free from the injustices rooted in their history and from their fellow oppressors. That 
is a necessary step; it is not and cannot be the culmination of Africans’ struggle for 
humanly deserved freedom. Africa/Africans were enslaved; yes, but they still are not 
out from the darkness yet. So, an exit strategy to escape from the oppressive 
structures and bad neighborhoods of the conventional states should be compensated 
and superseded by a reasoned and consensually consented will of Africans to live 
together under a spatially larger  and morally higher just political order. So, an 
inclusive Pan African Statehood484 and Pan-African Common identity should be the 
                                                          
484A United Africa can be constituted from various alternate arrangements of all 
possibilities extending from smaller autonomous units to regional and PanAfrican 
statehood. One can envisage a cohesive and viable Nation state to begin with; then 
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Union of East African States, Union of Northern African States, Union of Southern 
African States, Union of Western African States and then to a United Africa. Or other 
patterns of arrangements cannot be excluded. These may include ethno- cultural and 
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goal of the project. As long as people define themselves primarily as members of a 
particular ethnic group or nation, and as long as the primary identity and loyalty lies 
with the ethnicity or the nation or an ethno-religious group, regional or 
environmental…federations, etc., Pan African identity level remains subordinate or 
missing and a transcendent African polity cannot be materialized. Inversely, so long 
as the creation of Pan-African identity and polity remain stuck and as far as releasing 
of nations and peoples from their traditional national oppressions under the post-
colonial arrangements is taken as end in itself, Africa’s multiple burdens would 
remain intact. Africans need both greater space and greater freedoms to materialize 
their hopes and dreams so frustrated and unachieved in their history so far. It is by 
creating a united Africa as a common home (a common country), an African common 
identity, and an African common humanity that we should think of prevailing in the 
emerging and brutally uncaring world. Both the African space and the African 
humanity need to be released from the shackles of the centuries. Whereas the first 
steps require the creation of nationally and federally socialized personnel and 
institutions and nationalized/federalized state formation, the second demands the 
creation of a united African society and a PanAfrican state. So, one important goal of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
linguistic federalisms (a federalism founded on shared history, common language, 
etc.), environmental federalisms centering around African Peoples sharing common 
resources like rivers or port services or others like the Nile Basin federation or the 
Niger river basin federation or the Great Lakes region federation, etc. Even the 
superposition of complementary arrangements where nation states, environmental 
federations, regional unions and others co-function depending on the reasoned and 
deliberated choices made by those concerned cannot be excluded. In Africa, 
therefore, suggesting the possibility, even feasibility of a second level federal 
structure does not constitute stretching the issue to the point of irrelevance.  
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African democracy ought to be the creation of a knowledge based Pan-African 
democratic statehood on a Pan-African common space. Promoting new 
representations of identity and territory that transcends the racial, ethnic, linguistic, 
religious, regional identities, etc. is an imaginatively rich philosophical possibility.  
 
Critical Reservations: 
 Why WLD wouldn’t successfully be transplanted and integrated into the 
Africana ways of life  
 To begin with, the pride of place should go to the liberal civilization, for its 
enormous transformative impact on the modern world, be it in the economy, 
technology, democracy…. In this respect it is truly a common human heritage. 
Having acknowledged this fact, however, it is also worth mentioning about some 
questionable assertions/claims surrounding WLD, both in theory and in political 
practice and the limitations resulting from this: (1) equating liberal democracy with 
democracy in general; (2) infusing understanding of democracy with liberal ideas and 
assumptions; (3) conceiving democratization as liberalization; and (4) framing an 
argument for democracy in terms of an argument for liberal values such as individual 
rights, individual liberty, and the free market.485 These and others need to be 
corrected, to begin with. Not only are there different conceptions of democracy all of 
which have useful things to say about what a democratic polity should be, there also 
are actual democracies operating on principles and institutional arrangements which 
                                                          
485See, Diamnod, Larry., Developing Democracy, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1999.  
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are different from the liberal ones. Even among liberal ones, differences in value 
orientation and institutional operations abound. Thus, liberal democracy should be 
understood as one among many possible models, the viability of each model 
depending considerably on the socioeconomic and cultural contexts to which it is to 
be applied. Accordingly, uncritical endorsement of liberal democracy not only 
“leaves unanalyzed the whole meaning of democracy and its possible variants,” but 
also tends to ignore possible tensions “between the liberal and the democratic 
component of liberal democracy.”486  Since cultural/philosophical considerations 
should be constitutive of the project democracy, “the cultural particularity of liberal 
democracy”487 should not be ignored in the discourse on democracy. Thoughtless and 
arrogant attempts to universalize liberal democracy as the end goal of world history is 
both self defeating and imperialistic at its core. At issue here is not whether a culture 
is suitable for democracy at all; rather it is what kind of democracy is the most likely 
prospect for a culture and to what extent can be successfully instituted given the 
limits set by social and cultural constraints on democratic development. That is why 
the reflection on whether it is possible to transplant and integrate liberal democracy in 
Africa becomes philosophically attractive investigation in of itself. In the light of this, 
here are some reasons/reservations why the uncritical attempt to universalize liberal 
                                                          
486Held, David., “Democracy: From City-States to a Cosmopolitan Order?” in 
Political Studies 40 (1992 Special Issue): p. 11.    
487Parekh, Bhikhu., “The Cultural particularity of Liberal Democracy,” Political 
Studies 40 (1992 Special Issue): pp. 160-175. This, however, is not to deny that that 
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democracy may fail to bear fruit with detrimental consequences for both the imposer 
and the importer under illiberal socioeconomic, philosophical, and cultural 
circumstances.  
1. One difficult constraint begins with the tension, even the contradiction 
permeating the “liberal” and the “democracy” conjuncts in the liberal democracy 
disjunction. There exist a wedge between liberalism and democracy, to borrow from 
I. Berlin. The first such challenge is the contentious status of liberalism as a political 
doctrine. According to critics like Kekes, liberalism misrepresents society as a 
collection of atomic individuals, recognizes only voluntary ties and neglects the basic 
facts of unchosen human solidarity; it locates the source of human happiness in lonely 
endeavors instead of in the virtues that these projects require; it exaggerates the role 
of unaided individual reason and fails to give weight either to custom and tradition or 
to the emotions; it contains questionable morality in a number of ways: for instance, it 
is too universalistic and neglects particular ties; it deceptively claims neutrality, thus 
effectively disguising its own onesidedness; it gives indefensible primacy to the value 
of autonomy in moral life. According to John Kekes, despite its obvious 
attractiveness, liberalism is full of inconsistencies. For instance, its moral elevation of 
the self-chosen life comes into conflict with the values that make life good, and so it 
is forced to either to impoverish life by insisting on the prime importance of choice, 
or else to compromise this value, thus losing its distinctiveness as a moral and 
political philosophy.488
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Second, there are also objections to the theories democratic pretensions. Here 
waves of critiques and counter critiques have left with two rival conceptions of 
democracy: the substantial and the procedural. This creates an inescapable circle in 
which thinking about democracy often tends to move. Following the line in Plato’s 
Euthyphro, one is forced to raise the question whether the outcome of democracy are 
good because they are democratically chosen, or whether democracy is good because 
it leads to good outcomes; in other words, is it the procedure that makes the outcome 
legitimate or the outcome that legitimates the procedure?  
Frequently, liberal democracy is thought to offer a mode of democracy that 
allows individuals and groups to promote and defend their interests. Once this link is 
made, liberal democracy at once becomes vulnerable to powerful ranges of 
objections. If one favors democracy on the basis of the outcomes that it produces, we 
have to face the fact that, in general, we have no convincing way to prefer one set of 
outcomes to another. True, the results produced by majority rule can be shown to be 
‘special’; but this is the case only if a number of very restrictive assumptions are 
made.489 We have to assume that majorities and minorities will form and reform in a 
quite volatile way on an issue-to-issue basis, or, failing that, that opinion will be 
spread more or less evenly along the spectrum. On this assumption, any given voter’s 
distance from the outcomes will be minimized, and we would find it rational to adopt 
the majority principle. But even then we have to make a further assumption that 
voter’s preferences are equally strong, so the satisfaction of the majorities can be put 
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in the same scale as the dissatisfaction of minorities and be shown to outweigh it. And 
if we could somehow deal with these difficulties, we would still confront a problem, 
because if we assume that politics is based on the promotion and defense of interests, 
we are hard put to say why it is worthwhile for individuals to vote at all.  
Alternatively, let us say no judgments need to be made about outcomes and 
stick to the view that democracy is valuable because, by its very nature, it embodies 
equality, as Christiano argues.490 A liberal might find this consideration persuasive 
because liberalism, too, embodies equality, in a certain sense, in rejecting paternalism 
or other things that privilege one person’s view of life over another’s. But 
acknowledging the value of equality, the difficulty is to show why this conception of 
equality is preferable to others. Why for example, should we give equal weight to 
individuals, when in fact their group memberships may be of primary importance, and 
what we may need is a consociational or multicommunal polity in which equal weight 
is given to ethnically or linguistically or religiously defined groups? Or why should 
we opt for a procedural view of equality, when what might really be important is 
equality of conditions? So, the wedge runs deep: putting all the weight on 
mechanisms expressing a merely formal status vs. the conception of democracy as a 
requiring a fully egalitarian society.  
Third, this leads to a larger issue also: whether liberalism and democracy are 
compatible. Is the idea of liberal democracy a self contradictory idea; or, is the 
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conjunction between the two, a paradox? It seems, in deed. Anthony Arblaster writes 
of “the importance of sustaining [a] dialectical or, if you prefer, ambiguous attitude 
towards liberalism,” which, while remembering what is of value in it, also refuses to 
forget its bourgeoisie and its anti-democratic character.491 Richard Bellamy argues 
that the ethical commitments that have sustained liberalism in the past have become 
increasingly parochial and insular, and that the task of preserving freedom in a deeply 
pluralistic society depends on cultivating a more robust kind of democracy than 
liberals have generally welcomed.492  According to D. Beetham, the very idea of 
liberal democracy contains elements of ‘paradox’, for although it may be true that 
some features of liberalism are indispensable to the practice of democracy, liberalism 
has often served as “a constraint upon the process of democratization.”493 L. Banning 
argues that the liberal and democratic traditions have been conjoined only for 
historical reasons, and normatively viewed they may be fundamentally inconsistent or 
incompatible.494 Even more, Levine comes with the hardest version: liberal and 
democratic principles dictate two different constitutions, so that, if we attempted to 
combine them, we would have not a liberal democratic constitution “but rather two 
constitutions, one liberal, the other democratic.”495 This means that, while liberalism 
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demands outcomes which are guaranteed to express individuals’ preferences, 
democracy demands outcomes that respond to shifts in overall preference. Thus, it is 
hard to see how these two demands could be confined tidily to non-competing 
spheres.  
But, what have liberals or democrats done to clarify the meaning of liberal 
democracy itself? An essay by Isaiah Berlin appears to drive a wedge between 
liberalism and democracy. It represents them as responses to two quite distinct 
questions and suggests that liberals’ values might be satisfied by wholly non-
democratic systems, and wholly unsatisfied by democratic ones: “just as a democracy 
may, in fact, deprive the individual citizen of a great many liberties which he might 
have in some other form of society, so it is perfectly conceivable that a liberal-minded 
despot would allow his subjects a large measure of personal freedoms.”496 Others 
dissent from such a view, for they do not take “negative liberty” to define the liberal 
program. Ronald Dworkin, for example, rejects the view that liberty is liberalism’s 
foundational value, and contends that representative democracy is one of the major 
ways in which liberals would seek to give expression to their belief in equality of 
respect.497 But what is given with one hand is not exactly taken away by the other, 
but is at least somewhat diminished by it, for it then transpires that democracy 
contains inherently oppressive tendencies against which liberal rights are the first line 
of defence. Liberalism calls for democracy, but also seeks to keep the world safe from 
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it.  
Rawls, in his Theory of Justice, specifies that a liberal society must be a 
democracy; the “original position” from which the contractualist argument begins is 
one of equality, and this feature should be ‘transferred’ to the basic decision making 
institutions of the polity.498 However, according to J. Cohen, whatever Rawls himself 
would like to see, the argument itself leaves the form that democracy should take 
more or less indeterminate: there is something of a gap between the quasi-contractual 
argument that Rawls evolves and the kind of democracy that he thinks we should 
have.499 In his Political Liberalism and other later works, Rawls discusses principles 
and institutions that might help a society to evolve a “public reason” by means of 
which people whose views of life differ can govern themselves in a just and stable 
manner. But it would not be unfair to suggest that what his discussion explains is how 
democracy can be put to use by a liberal principle of legitimacy; it does not treat 
democracy as an idea with its own internal requirements, which might turn out to be 
compatible or incompatible with those of liberalism.500 Others such as R. Dahl 
bluntly admit that if we value democracy then we cannot prescribe particular 
outcomes, such as liberal ones, in advance. A democratic process might, from a 
liberal point of view, go wrong; so, however, might any process that we might put in 
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place to protect ourselves from democracy.501   
These tensions have implications for the possibility of liberal democracy in 
Africa and other ontologically and culturally different spaces. One has to understand 
the cultural particularity of liberalism in order to argue for a different democratic 
order. To borrow from B. Parekh, individuals enjoy “separate existence” and seek “to 
run their lives themselves, to make their own choices, to form their own beliefs and 
judgments, to take nothing for granted as given... to reconstruct and recreate 
themselves, and thus to become autonomous and self determining.”502 Liberals frame 
their conception of democracy within these basic assumptions, and the resulting blend 
of liberal democracy therefore necessarily has features that are objectionable to 
people with different cultures – people who, for example, “define the individual in 
communal terms” and wish to deny “the freedom to mock and ridicule their sacred 
texts, practices, beliefs, and rituals.503 Whereas democracy as such proves attractive 
to many non-western societies, and can be successfully indigenized, the liberal 
component of liberal democracy is received with more suspicion, as something that 
“breaks up the community, [and] undermines the shared body of ideals and 
values.”504    
  2. WLD is founded on the conception of human nature that is either only 
expressive of the essence of Western humanity or else extremely exaggerated, even 
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out rightly wrong. [My reasoned suspicion is that the reality of logic took precedence 
over the logic of reality in such hyper inflated conception. This means that, the 
hypothetical model for political theory construction was accepted as social and 
natural without discharging the assumption entered at the outset of the reasoning 
process.] As Pantham aptly puts it, liberal democracy “is founded on a pessimistic, 
one-dimensional conception of humans as brutish and selfish beings.” Given this 
nature, he argues, “Social order can only be secured through the structure of political 
machinery, not through the actions of individuals and community.”505 While the 
brutishness of humans justified the role of the state in maintaining social order, the 
assumption that humans are selfish and atomistic sanctioned the view that their 
interests are to be regarded by the political sphere as being morally neutral. So, the 
stuff of politics is taken to be the atomistic and amoral conception of human interests. 
Accordingly, the problem of securing order becomes a problem of arranging “the 
powers of each selfish inclination in opposition so that one moderates or destroys the 
ruinous effect of the other. The consequence for reason is the same as if none of them 
existed, and man is forced to be a good citizen even if not morally a good person. The 
problem of organizing a state, however hard it may seem, can be solved even for a 
race of devils if only they are intelligent. The problem is: “Given a multitude of 
rational beings requiring universal laws for their preservation, but each of whom is 
secretly inclined to exempt himself from them, to establish a constitution in such a 
way that, although their private intentions conflict, they check each other, with the 
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result that their public conduct is the same as if they had no such intentions.506 This 
liberal individualistic conception of humanity and the atomistic, amoral conception of 
its interests are antithetical to the community society and the moderate 
communitarianism discussed above. The realization of Africana democracy and the 
promotion of necessary Africana values necessitate the adoption of different 
conceptions to begin with. Some such conceptions include that “humans are 
essentially social beings; that not all their interests are of equal moral worth; and that 
humans can be educated to discover and pursue their morally justifiable interests,”507 
among others.    
 3. As discussed elsewhere, WLD is founded on values (liberal values in 
particular) and tradition historically specific to the West. Samuel Huntington captures 
this when he write, “Western concepts differ fundamentally from those prevalent in 
other civilizations. Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, 
human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the 
separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, 
Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist, or Orthodox cultures.”508 Whether it is peaceful 
coexistence or clash of civilizations that follows from this premise is open to debate. 
WLD is a rights based democracy that gives precedence to individual rights with little 
or no appreciation of group right, for it is believed that group rights violate the equal 
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rights and worth of persons. There is another dilemma as well: if the liberal state 
ought to protect the human rights of individual citizens, then it makes a great deal of 
difference whether the rights are interpreted merely as protection from unwarranted 
interference with the exercise of individual freedom or as the obligation to provide 
such substantive benefits as individuals may be thought to require as part of the 
minimum requirements of their welfare. Caught deeply in this dilemma, liberal 
democracy privileges political and civil rights over/against economic, social, and 
cultural rights, even considers questions of the latter as irrelevant. But, how/why is it 
so self evident that the free transmission of, say, literature is more important than 
people having enough for subsistence? Or, is there a black hole behind the façade of 
liberal democracy where equal chattering and lethal litigation are permitted while 
disproportionate ownership rights of property is morally and legally protected? Then, 
M. Gandhi was correct in his assessment: “My notion of democracy is that under it 
the weakest should have the same opportunity as the strongest. That can never happen 
except through nonviolence. No country in the world today shows any but patronizing 
regard for the weak. The weakest, you say, go to the wall. Take your own case. Your 
land is owned by few capitalist owners. The same is true in South Africa. These large 
holdings cannot be sustained except by violence, veiled if not open. Western 
democracy as it functions today is diluted Nazism or Fascism. At best it is merely a 
cloak to hide the Nazi and the fascist tendencies of imperialism.”509 In Africa, rights 
are neither individually and naturally owned nor granted by a supreme authority but 
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are socially negotiated and constructed artifacts. They are an integral part of social 
and political experience and do not have a pre-social and pre-political existence. 
Hence, given the history and values of Africans, Africana democracy ought to 
emphasize social, political, economic and cultural rights along with collective and 
individual responsibility of persons, thereby paving the ground for the full 
development of freedoms in general. Since the meaningful exercise of all sets of 
freedoms require adequate economic and social resources, Africana democracy will 
“de-emphasize abstract political rights and stress concrete economic rights,”510 during 
its takeoff period as a project. If democracy is rule of, for, and by the people, it can 
only mean self responsibility, moral self restraint, and self reliance in Africa.  
 4. Also, in line with the first and the second, WLD privileges the atomistic, 
selfish individual over/against the community. But humans are individuals embedded 
in social relations, values, and norms. The culture of narcissism is barren at its heart, 
for it fails to nourish us either as individuals or as members of groups and societies at 
large. So, neither extreme individualism nor excessive collectivism can satisfy our 
growing need to see ourselves as creative individuals within a larger and meaningful 
whole. Mediation between self centered, fragmentary individualism and the extremes 
of imposed collectivism is necessary to flourish our social humanity. There should be 
a balance between an obligation to the community wellbeing and the ability to sustain 
some creative sense of the self or self respect in response to the community. 
Individuality and interdependence (sociality) are essential for the functioning of a 
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healthy society. M. Gandhi wrote, “I value individual freedom, but you must not 
forget that man is essentially a social being. He has risen to the present status by 
learning to adjust his individualism to the requirements of social progress. 
Unrestricted individualism is the law of the beast of the jungle. We have learned to 
strike the mean between individual freedom and social restraint. Willing submission 
to the social restraint for the sake of the wellbeing of the whole society enriches both 
the individual and the society of which one is a member.”511 So, neither the atomistic 
individual of the west nor the lonely Cartesian self populates the Africana 
philosophical and social landmass and therefore it cannot grow a vibrant liberal 
democracy on its soil unless it dares a complete destruction and uprooting of what 
remained intact.       
 5. WLD is founded on and evolved through all kinds of violence and wars, 
genocides, ethnocide… It is grounded on centuries old global structural and human 
violence: slavery, imperial conquests, colonialism, unmitigated resource wars and 
holdings. As discussed elsewhere, colonization is a project of dehumanization 
pursued rationally and results in human affliction that goes beyond ordinary human 
suffering and poverty. As argued above, T. Mann links the rise of western liberal 
democracy with genocidal cleansing. In his book, The Dark Side of Democracy: 
Explaining Ethnic Cleansing, he makes a number of hypotheses, the first of which is 
that “Murderous cleansing is modern because it is the dark side of democracy…. 
Democracy has always carried with it the possibility that the majority might tyrannize 
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minorities, and this possibility carries more ominous consequences in certain types of 
multiethnic environments.”512 This thesis contains two core concepts: modernity and 
democracy. He comments, ‘although not unknown in previous history, ethnic 
cleansing is modern; and such cleansing is a hazard of the edge of democracy since 
amid multiethnicity the ideal of rule by the people began to entwine the demos with 
the ethnos, generating organic conceptions of the nation and the state that encouraged 
the cleansing of the minorities.’ “In their past, cleansing and democratization 
proceeded hand in hand. Liberal democracies were built on the top of ethnic 
cleansing…murderous cleansing has been moving across the world as it has 
modernized and democratized.513 Mann is not alone in making such a claim given his 
paraphrasing of A. Wimmer, who argues, ‘modernity is structured by ethnic and 
nationalist principles because the institutions of citizenship, democracy, and welfare 
are tied to ethnic and national forms of exclusion.’514 The modern project that ignited 
western democracy entailed national exclusion, if Mann and Wimmer were correct. 
Thus, both causative and correlative relation exists between democratization and the 
cleansing of “the other.”   
 6 WLD is a child of racism, or flourished along with racism both at home and 
abroad. It is enigmatic as to how and why a project meant to enshrine those noble 
Enlightenment ideas and ideals succeeded in sanctioning its antithesis on perceived 
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and encountered “others.” European colonialist projects were based on the “noble” 
assumption that the non-western societies needed to be rid of their “primitiveness” 
and brought into European civilization. The strategies of that colonialist project - 
armed intervention and the institutionalization of organized destruction - remain 
reminders that the “noble” effort was a colossal failure. Given the discussion about 
humanity’s desire for freedom and the role of choice, it becomes necessary to 
question strategies that purposefully introduce force as a route to honor and respect. 
To borrow from Kalu, “Given the failure of the colonial project to transform 
“primitive” Africans into modernized Europeans, should Africans then conclude that 
human beings, by nature, are estranged from their fellow humans, and thus negate 
essential communally oriented African epistemologies that support strategies that 
insist on harmonious coexistence between the community and the individual? If so, 
what type of moral and sociopolitical arrangement is likely to ameliorate the 
condition of estrangement? Are there universal principles and practices that are 
culture neutral? Is democracy, for instance, one of those strategies? To what extent 
are the factors of European social formation replicable in other regions and cultures 
of the world?”515 If Anthony Pagden is correct, “the earliest and most enduring of the 
European assumptions about non-Western societies is rooted in Greek civilization.” 
For instance, Plato’s Eleatic Stranger complained that “in this country, they separate 
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the Hellenic races from the rest as one, and to all the other races, which are countless 
in number and have no relation in blood or language to one another, they give the 
single name ‘barbarian’. Does the notion of the Eleatic Stranger allow for global 
inclusiveness on the basis of democracy?” 516 Then, to paraphrase from Basil 
Davison, ‘why adopt models from the very societies or systems that have oppressed, 
despised, and dehumanized you? Why not develop and democratize from the models 
of your own history or invent a new model?’517 Africana democracy is an attempt in 
that direction.  
 7. WLD is based on distinctions like public/private, political/personal, and 
public/non-public reasons. Such distinctions are deeply rooted in the Enlightenment 
tradition. Locke and Kant conceived the chief purpose of government as the securing 
of safety and negative liberties, demarcating spheres of activity in which the state is 
not to interfere. But these distinctions make no or little sense under conflict situations  
in divided societies and/or community societies like Africa. For instance, how would 
a liberal respond to the reconciliation initiative and exercise, say, in South Africa? Is 
the healing of victims through acknowledgment of their suffering, the moral 
restoration and transformation of offenders through repentance, and forgiveness an 
appropriate goal for states actively to promote? Obviously most liberals would 
support those aspects of the activities of the truth commission that reinstate the 
citizenship of victims, foster stable, healthy, and just democracy, and contribute to 
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accountability, the usual traditional liberal ends. Otherwise, “reconciliation of all with 
all” or “the healing of the nation” or “restorative justice,” or “forgiveness,” or 
“repentance,” etc. are illiberal ideas and therefore cannot be proper political ends of 
states.518 In a civil war or in crimes of Apartheid, however, the public and the private, 
the political and the personal…are closely intertwined, the boundary collapses. The 
“personal” wound that political violence caused was inflicted in the name of the 
political order. Its meaning and its healing are bound up in that same order. The 
healing of the victim and her/his moral restoration and transformation comes in part 
through the telling about her or his past and acknowledgment of her or his suffering 
by the state, by the offender, and fellow citizens, all in the context of public forum. 
Repentance and forgiveness involve the transformation of both the victim and the 
offender. Both personal moral transformation and social moral restorations are 
involved in the TRC’s public hearings, dictated by the socially embedded nature of 
African societies. In societies where spaces are entangled, restorative and legitimate 
interferences are unavoidable, even necessary. The critiques of the TRC and other 
recent truth commissions should study and examine in depth Abraham Lincoln’s 
second inaugural speech where the President urged for reconciliation and 
reconstruction. While liberalism provides a useful system for fostering accountability 
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and maintaining a credible legal order in conditions of relative political stability, it is 
inadequate in addressing the suffering and destruction arising in intractable political 
disputes, as was the case in the Civil War. In such circumstances the Lincolnian 
strategy of communal restoration stands supreme to the pursuit of strict justice based 
on the distinction of offender and victim.        
 Similar in spirit is the distinction between the public and the nonpublic. If the 
argument from the public-private distinction rejects government interference in 
decisions that are properly personal, the public/nonpublic distinction demands that 
laws, policies, and judicial procedures be articulated through discourse that is 
properly public. According to J. Rawls, “public reason” is public in three respects: 
first, it is the reason of citizens in their capacity as citizens; second, it is concerned 
with the public good and matters of fundamental justice; and third, in content, it 
draws from a society’s conception of political justice.519 “Nonpublic reason” 
proceeds from a “comprehensive conception” that demands assent to far more, and is 
shared by far fewer, than the shared political conception of justice, the basic liberal 
and democratic principles upon which the polity is grounded. For example, religious 
conceptions are such CCs. Again, if we take the proceedings of the TRC, religious 
language and ritual pervaded the hearings; they are closed and opened by prayers and 
hymns, which liberal critiques completely rejected. But both victim and offenders 
made sense of their experiences in more of theological terms than political ones and 
much of the TRC’s success is attributed to its religious character. So, TRC’s leaders 
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didn’t confine the hearings to the boundaries of liberal public reason. Given the 
tensions between political reconciliation and components of liberal justice, it is no 
wonder that theological input is required to account for reconciliation’s intelligibility 
and its warrant. In situations like this, only such commitments can explain why 
restoration, not justice or rights or entitlements, ought to be conceptual lodestar of 
justice. This is also reminder that it is time to restore morality and spirituality to both 
our intellectual discourses and political practices.520       
 8. There is an undemocratic and elitist side to WLD, which stands in 
contradistinction to the definition of democracy as ‘rule of, by, and for the people.’ 
For instance (as indicated in chapter one), Joseph Schumpeter argues that democracy 
is an institutional mechanism through which political elites acquire the power to make 
decisions by competing for popular votes.521 This conception of democracy limit’s 
the role of the citizens to that of periodically selecting a representative body or a 
plurality of such bodies to rule for her or him. It is deficient because it minimizes and 
narrows the range of freedom by handing over decision making power to political 
elites. Democracy ought to be a self government through participation in the 
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collective affairs of society; it ought to not merely be a system of institutional 
arrangements through which political decisions are made for the ordinary citizens. 
Only through active participation can democracy as self rule be truly realized. 
Participation or active involvement need not be conceived exclusively as an 
adversarial process of contestation and opposition; it can/should be understood as a 
cooperative opportunity to manage collective affairs and as an obligation of each 
citizen to share the burdens of self governing.522 Besides, as clearly noted by K. 
Pranis, there is a fault in majority rule democracy also: “If your position has the large 
numbers, there is little incentive to seek common ground or ways that the interests of 
all might be served. In fact, if you can outvote the other position you don’t even need 
to understand that position. Majority rule decision-making often leaves a significant 
number of people feeling left out, alienated, and resentful because no attempt was 
made to understand their needs.”523 As observed in many so called “emerging 
democracies,” the winner takes all arrangement has deadly consequences in those 
societies, and Africa is full of such outcomes. Thus, how democratic a polity is 
should be determined by the extent to which it maximizes equal and meaningful 
citizen active and conscious involvement at different levels and in different spheres of 
collective life as well as how attentive, understanding, and responsive it is to the 
needs of those who could be outvoted in the process. Africana democracy cannot 
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imitate the reification, the alienation, objectification, and the technocratic 
manipulation pervasive of liberal political machinery. Since the past of the liberal 
civilization cannot be the future of the Africana course of direction, that route must be 
created by those who are responsible for the future they dream.     
 The value and institutional contents of Africana Democracy 
 The choice of democracy and a democratic path should not be mistaken for 
and equated necessarily with a liberal democratic course. Yet, many make such 
erroneous claim. Every people with its particular ways of life and tradition have to 
elaborate its own version, have to choose its own way for the establishment of 
democratic institutions based on their own sociological, economic, political cultures 
and philosophical heritages. Again, the importance of the knowledge of the liberal 
ways and its constitutional models to other countries is beyond dispute.  
 (1) The principle of unity in life, community society, individuality within 
community, humanness, diversity of views and cultures; the belief in responsibility 
for oneself and others (one’s friends and families, relatives, the community, and 
fellow human beings); generosity, friendship, truth, compassionate caring, etc. ought 
be the value foundations of Africana democracy. Thus, a moderate communitarian 
view in which all humans are given equal regard and any concept of the individual 
ego is integrally tied to the community through the aforementioned values ought to 
serve as its basis. This arises from the understanding that the possibility of a common 
good diminishes as individualism increases, and the stake I may have in protecting 
my good from another’s goes up as my moral concern/compass decreases. Since 
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human individuality is different from the development of atomistic and narcissist 
class of individualism, Africana democracy ought to prioritize the values that draw 
from the best of the indigenous African heritage, values of communitarian and 
feminine nature. If communitarians, feminists, and quantum theorists are correct in 
their critique of liberalism, then individuals are formed in essential ways by the 
context into which they were born and in which they have been raised; reasonable 
conceptions of a good life include ties of affection, emotional attachments, and 
solidarity; that the desires of rational agents do not by themselves define the goods of 
the agents who have them; and, governments cannot be altogether neutral. A 
government that is active and free from the virus of corruption is as indispensable as 
the market in advancing economic development and the conventional economic 
maxim that urges everything to be left to the “market forces” needs radical revision. It 
is wrong to make fetish out of either the market or government and the market forces, 
public and private individuals should enter into a partnership in advancing and 
bettering the lives of Africans. This means that responsibility based democratic 
commitments ought to precede rights based claims, without violating rights that are 
indispensable for the development of human individuality, human dignity, respect for 
life, etc.  
 (2) The institutionalization of Africana democracy should be open to warrants 
and rationales that lie outside the conventional liberal domain; one that would be 
open to language and concepts that are difficult to express through the language of 
rights, freedoms, equality, utility, and other familiar liberal concepts. It is obvious 
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that liberalism attaches great importance to pluralism, freedom, rights, equality, and 
distributive justice as basic. But; why, for instance, are order, prosperity, peace, 
security, civility, or happiness, virtue, friendship, compassion…not regarded as basic?  
Because they protect individuals; but what is the protection for? Because they provide 
favorable conditions; but to what are the conditions favorable? Because they are 
constituents of, or essential means to some ends; but what are these ends? Or, suppose 
that the citizens of some liberal society are in full possession of the basic values. The 
question then would be whether this possession is compatible with living empty, 
wasted, misdirected, miserable, boring, lonely, and pointless lives. When learning and 
drawing from the achievements of the liberal civilization, one ought to be on guard 
against the negative realizations of that world historical achievement also.  
 (3) Africana democracy ought to be grounded on a morally nourishing and 
spiritually re-centering democratic project.524 Since African societies are conflict 
ridden, democratic society is impossible without the development of national 
solidarity, ethnic and political tolerance, economic development, and attentive justice. 
This demands the privileging of social-moral restoration and individual 
moral/spiritual transformation to retributive justice. Therefore, a system that would be 
flexible in its view of retribution, open to different forms of accountability, which 
might fall short of proportionate punishment, is in order. Both the philosophy of 
                                                          
524See, McLaughlin, Corinne, and Gordon Davidson; Builders of the dawn: 
Community Lifestyles in a Changing World, Summertown, TN: The Book, 1990; 
Spiritual Politics, New York: Ballentine, 1994; Weil, Simon., The need for Roots: 
Prelude to a Declaration of Duties towards mankind, Trans. Arthur Wills, Boston, 
MA: Beacon Press, 1952, p. 11.      
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ubuntu and the culture of mediation inform this proposal.  
 (4) Africana democracy ought to refrain from demanding any strong version 
of the public-private distinction, viewing the restoration of the victims of political 
violence, in all its dimensions, as a proper political end. Equally, it ought to renounce 
any strong reason for “public reason” and be open to importing into the political order 
concepts whose roots lay in comprehensive conceptions like religions. Public 
explanations may not always have to be described and presented in the terms of this 
conception, but the public would widely understand its roots where/when it is 
made.525  
 (5) To borrow from Zohar and her fellow quantum and feminist philosophers, 
Africana democracy ought be grounded on  a holistic conception of the world that is 
pluralistic, responsive, bottom up or emergent, green, spiritual, dialogical, and that 
gets beyond the individual collective dichotomy.526 When the technologies of 
democracy are added to this world view, Africana democracy would deliver 
exemplary democratic features. Soft politics and lateral communication ought to 
inform Africana democracy and the role and capacity of African women in governing 
African societies should become a matter of necessity. The empowerment of women 
                                                          
525For instance, see Tutu, Desmond; No Future Without Forgiveness, New York: 
Doubleday, 1999; Meiser, Robert; “Forgiving and forgetting: Lincoln and the Politics 
of National Recovery,” in Human Rights in Political transitions: Gettysburg to 
Bosnia, ed. Carl Hesse and Robert Post, New York, Zone Boks, 1999; William safire; 
Lend Me Your Ears: Great Speeches in History, New York, Norton, 1992; Minow, 
Martha; Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: facing History After Genocide and 
Mass Violence, Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1998; Volf, Miroslav; “Forgiveness, 
Reconciliation, and Justice: A Theological Contribution to a More Peaceful Social 
Environment,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 29 (3), 2000.     
526 Zohar, D. and Marshall, I., The Quantum Society, pp.29-33.   
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and privileging and celebrating their maternal and feminine wisdom presents itself as 
a rich alternative to the macho politics of war mongering patriarchy.  
  (6) The destruction of political equality is inherent in economic inequality and 
it is undemocratic for it deprives large numbers of citizens of equal political power, 
and when this is too extreme, it can lead to tragic outcomes. Africana democracy 
should envisage for a society that is both economically just and democratically 
balanced. Liberty, important as it is, should not trump democratic substantial equality 
and we must rejoin the perennial struggle to achieve Equal Democratic Liberty and a 
more equal liberty than ever before. In this context, it is important to note Stephen 
Holmes’s warning about a common error in constitutional theory “…that the primary 
or even sole purpose of a constitution is to secure individual liberty by hamstringing 
the government and its agents.”527 Following the paradigm shift taking place, creative 
and cooperative economy should be sought over the wild and destructive competition 
inherent in the philosophy of market economy. There is no shortage of resources, 
only of creative ideas and cooperation among citizens of the planet. Also, because 
Africans cannot afford the luxury of rampant corruption and since corruption entails 
mass death in Africa, capital punishment should be enshrined into the Constitution as 
a method to minimize and consequently to bring an end to such practices.      
 (7) Africana democracy should modernize and reenergize the indigenous 
democratic assets available in Africa. The community meetings and the palaver 
culture pervasive in Africa, the concept of earned leadership, consultation, discussion, 
                                                          
527Holmes, Stephens., Passions and Constraints: On the Theory of Liberal 
Democracy, Chicago: University of Chicago press, 1995, p.101.     
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and consented consensus, mediation, etc. ought to be reinvigorated and made 
constitutive of Africana democratic institutional norms. What one learns from the 
concept of an earned leadership is that politics shouldn’t be made one’s means of 
livelihood in emergent democracies. When a political office holding becomes one’s 
only source of income and living, people would do anything at their disposal to enrich 
themselves and their immediate beneficiaries thereby resorting to violent corrupt 
practices. The traditional concept of politics as service to community is worthy of 
examining and instituting accordingly. The possibilities of leadership by rotation, 
executive power-sharing, the council of elders and scholars need not be discounted. 
Whether the conventional three branches of government are apt to Africa needs to be 
examined seriously and the Newtonian concept of “checks and balances” based on 
opposition/confrontation should be given a serious second thought and it is high time 
to reform or overhaul it, for in Africa, opposition breeds conflict and war among 
competing interests. Furthermore, opposition politics is a post colonial investment in 
Africa and how costly it is, is terribly evident across the sleeping giant. Lessons from 
successful liberal democracies show that opposition politics is embedded in, tolerated, 
exercised, and have meaning in those societies that enjoy “cultural homogeneity,” to 
borrow from Mill. So, when the economies got moving and the technologies of 
democracy become common everywhere and, when these are added to the cultural 
values and assets all across Africa, the combination would enable a democratic 
culture and society on its own groundings.  
 8. As constitutional liberalism was the philosophical and value foundation of 
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liberal democracy, so mild constitutional communitarism must serve as the 
foundation of Africana democracy. For instance, freedom of speech ought to be 
exercised in a very responsible and respectful manner, that is, speech is free but it 
shouldn’t offend the sensibilities of others and therefore demands conscious self-
restraint on part of the rights bearer. We should bear that there are societies where 
their comprehensive conceptions are highly valued that the liberal distinction between 
one’s politics and religion fails to make sense; or the “no-harm principle” ought to be 
understood as no harm to both the self and others simultaneously. We are living in a 
world where what happens to fly over the Sea of China affects the farmers in Mid-
west America; the likelihood that one cheats on her/his spouse, that marriage ends in 
divorce or that one is alcoholic or unethical and illegal practice in some sectors of the 
economy, say, the Wall Street, has a socially contagious and transmittable effect on 
the lives and economies of others across the planet. Political and civil rights ought to 
be respected but not at expense of economic, social and cultural rights of persons and 
the concept of equality must be substantive in its content. Mere recognition of 
equality before the law or civil-formal equality is not sufficient to protect the equal 
dignity and worth of persons in the absence of conditions that enable persons to live 
and exercise these rights. Moreover, the mere compliance with the rule of law ought 
to be revisited, for the language law reigns supreme in a society where both morality 
and spirituality are either diminished or nonexistent and such a society is a deliberate 
creation of an immoral power elite itself. A healthy society is one in which its 
intellectual, moral, spiritual, and physical balances are kept in measure and does 
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know what is right and how to live/do the right.  
Before I close I would like to state that my argument for modest 
communitarian democratic society is dictated by the philosophical and sociological 
universe I originated from. It also is influenced deeply by my exposition to and 
readings of liberalism and its critics from various sources and backgrounds. Nor do I 
endorse everything that belongs to the African traditions and backgrounds, only those 
that can be modernized and support our survival and integrity as a people in a fast 
changing world. Thus, I cannot sell my soul to the excesses of either side in the 
debate: thus my argument for the best of possible worlds. So, I fully acknowledge the 
limitations and drawbacks present in any uncritical imposition of any philosophy on 
any society and none of the philosophies I touched upon are exempted from such 
scrutiny. Accordingly, for instance, any position that “restricts women’s opportunities 
to adopt roles other than wife and mother”528 is both despicable and objectionable. 
Nor is any essentialist account of women’s nature, both of which are latent in most 
communitarian stances. No community based argument can be purchased and 
justified at expense of women’s inalienable right to equality, freedom, rights, and 
justice and, no amount of emphasis on collective wellbeing and individual’s 
responsibility to that wellbeing should trump the achievements of modern political 
philosophy that are too precious to women and the oppressed groups in general. The 
only thing we can do is to develop and enrich our conceptions of, say, justice, rights, 
freedoms, etc. in the light of the new realities unfolding and challenging us today. So, 
                                                          
528Kittay, Eva Feder., A Feminist Public Ethic of Care Meets the New 
Communitarian Family Policy, Ethics 111 (April 2001): 523-547.   
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modest communitarianism calls for “responsible individuals in responsive 
communities,”529 to use Amitai Etzioni’s expression. 
  As to issue of religion, it is always safe and preferable to live under conditions 
where there is no state sponsored and imposed religion, where the two institutions 
remain separate and the state, secular. But this is easily said than lived and history is 
our witness and school. Our best hope lies in learning from history and keeping the 
dialogue wide open and ever going thereby making sure that every success we make 
in this battle of ideas is worth fighting until we all celebrate and attain our 
emancipated social humanity. Since humanity overcame the religious persecutions of 
the dark ages, it also is reasonable to assume that the fundamentalisms that we face 
today and the oppressions resulting from this would die out as those societies break 
away from their medieval life styles, material backwardness, ignorance, cultural 
isolations, phobic mindsets, and the educational, exemplary and diplomatic pressure 
of the international community.     
 Thus, from a critical appropriation and synthesis of African philosophical 
groundings, political/moral philosophical resources from other traditions and cultures, 
and the frontier sciences and technologies would emerge an emancipatory, moral and 
spiritually holistic Africana democracy. It aims at transcending conventional 
polarities between views of polity which tended to submerge individuals into the 
whole community and of atomistic approaches that elevated the individual, 
diminishing community. Africana Democracy points a way ahead into a new African 
                                                          
529Etzioni, Amitai (ed.), The Essential Communitarian Reader, Lanham, Md.: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1998, p. XXXIV.   
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democratic order where our “particle” selves and our “wave” aspects; our private and 
our public lives get intertwined thereby mutually enriching one another, with 
boundaries in between responsive to context. Such a democratic exercise should be 
given a chance at all levels of carrying out democratic politics in Africa - be it at level 
of a united Africa or in the context of Africa of the existing states or at every other 
local level. If the highly dreamed and talked Renaissance of Africa is to become 
reality, Africa must begin on its own path towards its future, without blinding itself 
against the global forces impacting its visions and projects, towards total 
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